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Causality is a tricky beast, one which we always seem tempted to tame.  We cannot, but 
we try.      
 
When I think on the process of ‘my’ PhD I feel particularly gifted.  Despite my own 
failings and flaws I have been provided with encouragement, companionship, with gentle 
prods, and firm reprimands.  These were administered by family and friends, but also by 
trees, walls, houses, bikes, concrete blocks - the list of essentials that have sustained me 
is endless.  Here are just a few, which seem appropriate now. 
 
My thanks to all those who shared with me the joy, exhaustion, pain and pleasure of 
parkour practice.  In particular I am indebted to JZ and Tony Wolf who gave freely their 
hospitality, knowledge and time.  To Martin, Goth-Boy, Andy, and all the Trials-Forum 
regulars who have inspired me with their friendship as well as their craft, I am grateful.     
I am similarly indebted to everyone that has played capoeira with me.  The list is too 
long, but Magrau, David Hedley, Lenhador and Laura Cascales deserve a special mention 
for helping to organise workshops, share in teaching, provide shelter, and for their 
infectious enthusiasm and axé.  The capoeira photos, unless otherwise specified, are 
gratefully accredited to my photographically happy capoeirista and friend, Matthew 
Koziol.  I count myself as fortunate to have gotten to know these practitioners of bike 
trials, parkour and capoeira, for all have helped show me what it is to trust in play.    
                             
I am indebted to those authors who know me barely or not at all, but have none the less 
inspired me to write this research.  Ursala K Le Guin, Nigel Thrift, O. Fred Donaldson, 
David Abram and many others whose words have made me wonder, and shown me what 
it can be like…        
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Tim Cresswell saw something in this stuff and helped to set me off on this research, and 
for this I am most appreciative.  The staff and postgraduates at the Institute of Geography 
and Earth Science have provided a supportive and friendly community which I have been 
privileged to be a part.  I am particularly thankful for the friendship and company of 
Laura Jones, Steve Atherton, Kelvin Mason, Mark Welsh, Sophie Wynne-Jones, Alex 
Phillips and the rest of the G1 crew.  Not only did many provide valuable feedback on 
drafts of my work and ideas in process, but lunchtime would have been a dull affair 
without them.  I have also benefited from ideas shared through correspondence and draft 
papers from Peter Kraftl, Justin Spinney, Mark Paterson, Pete Adey, Oli Mould and Paul 
Harrison. 
 
I owe a huge debt to my supervisors Pete Merriman and Gareth Hoskins.  Both have been 
vital in the development of my ideas as well as drafts of this thesis.  They have pointed 
out concepts and writings to which I was blind and tugged out strings of thought that 
were otherwise a tangled mess.                    
 
This acknowledgment section would be nowhere near complete without a mention to my 
parents, who have supported and encouraged me throughout.        
 
Most of all I thank Samantha Saville: she has carried me when I have faltered, helped in 
talking through theoretical concepts, commented on drafts, tolerated my wild ideas, 
practiced capoeira with me, kept me motivated, and so often incited me to jig about the 
place with glee.          
 









Three, two, one: jump back and arrive, mingled…  
 
It is 1997.  I am part way through my first year of A-levels and have first got on a bike 
with the intention of doing some unusual ‘moves’.  Like most people I had ridden bikes 
since an early age, but went no further than learning to ride on the road.  Now though,  
after being relatively shocked and surprised at seeing Tom do an endo
1
, followed by a 
hop on the back wheel, I am about to attempt the same. And for me a new world of bike 
riding is opening up.   
 
Along with some of my school friends, I had gotten interested in mountain biking and 
had begun doing some off road riding in the Welsh hills near my home.  One day out 
riding, we came up with the idea of riding off the edge of a small retaining wall.  Our 
approach was to ride quite fast, lean back and hope for the best.  My dad’s borrowed bike 
did not last very long after that, despite our technique improving somewhat over the 
following months.  
 
A few years of saved birthday and Christmas money and some casual web design work 
bought me an 18 inch aluminium framed mountain bike that was superior in every way to 
the bikes I had ridden before.  By today’s standards it was totally unsuitable for technical 
trials riding, that is riding off walls, bunny-hopping up boulders and turning with endos 
and other manoeuvres. But this bike, for me, marked the beginning of an enduring 
enthusiasm for trials.   
                                                 
1
 An ‘endo’ is a common trials movement in which the back wheel is lifted off the ground and the bike can 
be pivoted around on the front wheel.  For further activity specific terms I have included a glossary.  
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Being a fledgling activity in the UK at the time, my friends and I found ourselves 
experimenting, and developing movements - all of us eagerly exploring new obstacles 
and possible ways to ride them on bikes.  Though at first we didn’t even know what to 
call what we were doing, we eventually found that ‘trials riding’ fit the bill.  Of course 
we hungrily consumed every snippet of trials related media we could find.  Though 
sparse at the time, articles in Mountain Biking UK magazine (MBUK) often hinted at 
trials techniques, and some mountain biking videos had tantalising short clips of trials 
riding. 
 
Since those early days of UK bike trials, the practice has grown in popularity 
tremendously.  The technology and the techniques have not stopped for a second – such 
that the things trials riders can now do, is able to astound both the seasoned trials rider 
and the curious first-time observer.  From those hazily remembered days until the time of 
writing I have practiced bike trials and despite fluctuations in zeal, it has remained a 
significant part of my life.  I have ridden many different bikes to destruction, written 
internet articles on technical subtleties and movements involved and been sponsored by 
Brisa bikes, to ride and promote their trials specific-frame, the B26D (the third version of 
which I still ride).  It has influenced the choices I have made and my thoughts about the 
world.  It has even intruded upon my academic work - something of an irony considering 
my school teachers’ aversion to the dangerous and silly ‘play-time’ activity. 
 
Geography and bikes? 
 
During an undergraduate course in human geography my tutor, Kate Edwards, asked me 
to write an assignment that listed the ten books or articles I had found most 
geographically influential – my ‘Desert Island Discourses’ (an idea she took from Cloke, 
et al. 2004).  When I sat down to list them my thoughts would not stay on topic, but 
strayed towards the practice that I found most influential: bike trials.  Jumping my bike 
over a particular gap, I reasoned, had had at least as great an effect on my understanding 
 xii 
of space as had the confusing texts of academic geographers.  A gamble then: change the 
question - I would, if I could, write an essay on the ten practices (and I included reading 
academic writing as one) that had changed my geographic outlook.  Luckily for me the 
gamble paid off: practice, it seemed, was in vogue.  
 
With encouragement from various staff members at Aberystwyth, I worked on an 
undergraduate dissertation based on bike trials.  During this project I began to explore a 
set of theories that might now be roughly termed ‘pre’, ‘more-than’, ‘anti’ or ‘non’ -
representational.  Here were some theories, it seemed to me, that while exceptionally 
confusing, joined in with bike trials, as practices that were explorative.  I must admit, at 
that time I did not know what I was doing with these theories: I was not describing, or 
even particularly understanding bike trials through them.  They were not a lens that could 
clarify things.  Rather I continued to muddle them together with my embodied practices, 
a pervading feeling that I was creating something new keeping me going.  What that 
something was I did not and perhaps still do not know. 
                                  
None the less, this PhD thesis has been carried out and constructed with the benefit of the 
texts of those famous ‘antiphilosophers’
2
: Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilles Deleuze (whether directly or more often through the 
insightful exposition and incorporation of their work by other authors).  All asserted 
against the prevailing tradition that our worlds and lives could not be understood in terms 
of rule-based theorisations.  In other words, conventional philosophy, and by proxy most 
of my broadly ‘representational’ ways of thinking were working from a spectacular 
illusion. Instead these thinkers came to the conclusion,  
 
that perception could not be explained by the application of rules to basic features.  
Human understanding was a skill akin to knowing how to find one’s way about in the 
world rather than knowing a lot of rules and facts for relating them.  Our basic 
understanding was a knowing how rather than a knowing that. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986: 4).       
                                                 
2
 So called by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986).  
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‘Knowing how’ was exactly what I had been attempting for as long as I had been riding 
trials.  I had already noticed that I quite literally knew my way around places better after I 
had ridden trials in them.  Through trials I could create a host of imaginary signposts that 
I would actually remember.  That big gap jump with a particularly tricky and gritty take 
off and nice soft rounded landing edge; leads over to the phone box that we considered 
one could possibly, though we dare not yet, drop onto from the bus shelter roof; which is 
right by the long curved curb that is slightly raised and makes a challenging balance 
beam, and so on.   
 
This way of getting to know my way around places worked so well that I began to 
deliberately employ it as a strategy when I went to new towns or cities.  Regardless of 
whether I was riding a bike or not, I both deliberately and at times spontaneously, picked 
out features of places that I could relate to riding, and that therefore stuck in my memory.  
In this way I found it easier to navigate the complicated warren of city streets and public 
places that were quite different to the rural landscape of my early childhood.  My spatial 
perception was being ‘trained up’ by my bike trials practice, something surely deserving 




I first became familiar with the term ‘parkour’ when I was doing my undergraduate 
dissertation on bike trials. At the time I was lucky enough to be house-sharing with a 
keen climber and general adventurer
3
: a person who had always poked about in places, 
clambered over and under and generally found a way to make everyday terrain into 
unusual and exciting challenges.  He saw ‘parkour’ and ‘freerunning’ as terms that more 
or less fit with what he had always been doing.  I held a similar view, but with the 
‘invent’ of parkour, we had a hook, a name around which things could adhere.  As with 
                                                 
3
 Though somewhat clumsy, this word seems to best describe him, his way of thinking and his way of 
approaching situations.   
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bike trials the internet provided a medium in which ‘parkour’ ideas flourished.  The 
practice of parkour practically fed into and off this new ability of named identity. 
 
Validated by the knowledge that other people took their play seriously too (they were 
calling it a ‘discipline’, an ‘art form’, and even ‘a way of life’), it was not long before 
parkour found its way into my academic work.  With the encouragement and guidance of 
Tim Cresswell, I prepared a research proposal that would look at ‘non-representable 
places of mobility: parkour, bike trials and tai-chi’.  Of course, I did not quite know what 
that meant.  The pitch was based on the promise of adding the gritty first hand 
experiential to the emerging and supposedly ‘under-empiricized’ non-representational 
theory.  To some degree, and in spite of large changes, that still holds appeal: this thesis 
is very defiantly about what the three dynamically evolving activities can teach us, and 
what questions they can beg us ask.   
 
From the time I wrote that proposal, and throughout my masters year I dabbled in parkour 
with friends, practicing irregularly in Aberystwyth.  For some, the idea of practicing 
parkour in a modest sized town seems strange – parkour is touted as a distinctly ‘urban’ 
activity
4
: it involved running and jumping across the rooftops of high rise buildings, 
moving free, while the press of ‘everyday’ urbanity remains constrained below.  As I 
show in this thesis, this distinction does not hold up: there are innumerable landscape 
features on and in which a person can practice parkour in any town.  Indeed, parkour is 
also practiced in more rural settings, using trees, field boundary fences, gates, farm 
machinery and buildings, and other natural features.  Aberystwyth then, provided ample 
fuel for our practice of parkour.  In short supply though, were other dedicated and 
experienced practitioners.  After my adventuring housemate left Aberystwyth, my group 
of ‘parkour friends’ were actually martial artists, or trials bike friends.  They were people 
who liked the idea and had a go from time to time, but did not see it as so many faceless 
forum avatars did: as ‘a way of life’. 
 
                                                 
4
 Oli Mould, for instance, considers it ‘specifically as an urban practice.’ (2009: 739).    
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In response to this dilemma, on Christmas Day 2005 I travelled to Sydney, where I spent 
three months doing parkour with a much expanded group of dedicated practitioners.  
During that stay I also attended an intensive ten day dance/movement festival, ‘Stamping 
Ground’
5
, which for the second year, was running parkour workshops.  Enough, for now, 
to say that this was an excellent experience which broadened my (parkour) horizons 
significantly.  It was also at this event that I first experienced capoeira.  
 
Capoeira                              
 
I started this thesis with the intention to research three activities – bike trials, parkour and 
tai-chi - with the justification that I would be able to compare and contrast them.  As you 
will have noticed tai-chi was dropped in favour of capoeira.  Despite ‘trying’ tai-chi once 
a week for six months, I did not feel it ‘fit’, with what I was doing.  The original rationale 
was that I would be able to talk about the slow deliberate movements, and the movement 
of internal energy or chi, and this would provide a nice counter-point to the other two 
supposedly adrenalin filled mobilities.  After six months I did not feel any closer to being 
able to do, or feel, this kind of movement.  While I could now move through some of the 
‘forms’ well enough, I did not feel I knew them sufficiently to be able to create new 
‘mixes’ of theory and practice with them.  More importantly, for me, because of the 
exacting way they were taught, they did not gel with the creative, improvisational 
element I had been attracted to in the other two activities.    
 
Capoeira though had these qualities in plentiful, yet mysterious supply.  As I first 
experienced it at Stamping Ground, it was a crash course introduction, in which I did one 
two hour long class each day (I might have done more but at the time I was primarily 
there for the parkour).  After that Australian introduction it was not until much later that 
it occurred to me that this was something I wanted to incorporate into my research.  The 
game of capoeira was an enigma that merged elements of many of the body practices I 
                                                 
5
 This was an annual event/festival, which was originally specifically for men’s dance, but in latter years 
became unisex, and began to incorporate other movement based practices.  It was held in a small town 
called Bellingen, some eight hours train ride from Sydney.     
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was interested in.  It involves acrobatics, music, dance and martial techniques in an 
intriguing mix.  The game itself, the roda, for which capoeiristas train, usually consists of 
a circle of capoeiristas who clap, play instruments and sing, while two of their number 
move to the rhythm in the middle.  The pair, if experienced, exchange kicks and ducking 
dodges, and manoeuvre about each other in a seamless flowing improvisation of 
acrobatics and strategic positioning. 
 
Such capoeira play is very often described as a dialogue of movement.  If parkour was an 
activity that was raw, organic, involving the body, some obstacle and little else, and bike 
trials was a practice in which I could seek to understand the body’s integral co-action 
with technology (the bike), then capoeira, I thought, would add a new level of interest, as 
the individual body attempts to become familiar and move with other bodies.  The way in 
which such processes unfolded in a playful, yet learning context drew them together, 
such that I thought it reasonable to commit to researching and doing capoeira.               
 
About a year and a half since first trying capoeira, on the 1st of July 2007 I travelled to 
the city of York, to spend three months practicing with ‘Capoeira York’: a vibrant and 
distinctive group, who meet to do capoeira each weekday evening.  After three months of 
intensive training, in York, I felt I had begun to understand something of what capoeira 
was about.  It was fair to say at least, that I was hooked.  On returning to Aberystwyth, I 
wanted to continue practicing and playing capoeira, but there was no local group. 
 
In order to continue I put out a barrage of posters, fliers and university wide e-mails to try 
and find like-minded people who had hopefully done some capoeira, were based in the 
Aberystwyth area, and were in the same predicament.  Meeting with some small success, 
we had our first gathering one sunny October evening.  Four of us assembled at the castle 
grounds and shared what we knew, had a play and practiced capoeira movements.  
Following this we began to meet regularly, once a week in a local hall.  Soon after that 
Christmas, we had a good group of about eight people who would come and practice at 
least once a week, with new people joining occasionally.  About this time we arranged to 
 xvii 
have my teacher from York come and stay, and give a weekend long workshop, which 
was also advertised to people who had never done any capoeira before.   
 
Following that successful workshop, we eventually increased our training and capoeira 
play to three nights a week, calling ourselves ‘Capoeira Aber’
6
.  We organised special 
workshops, having guest instructors from London, Manchester, Swansea, Liverpool and 
York.        
 
During these times, and as more people who had not done any capoeira came to join in, I 
found I was often taking on a teaching role (myself and one other capoeirista took it in 
turns to ‘lead’ the sessions).  Though woefully under qualified to teach anything but the 
absolute and rough basics of capoeira, I did have many more years of other martial arts 
(and some other martial arts teaching) experience to fall back upon.  I found, for example, 
that after some experience I could lead a warm up in an improvised way, taking exercises 
from other disciplines.  To better fulfil this role though, I consumed whatever I could 
relating to capoeira.  I borrowed from capoeira training books, commercially available 
DVDs, an endless number of capoeira websites and every shred of experience I had had 
with different capoeira teachers (and here my geography based research diary I kept in 
York came in handy).  In short, as with the other two activities, capoeira became an 





This PhD has been a sequence of living experiments, each undertaken with no control 
group, or verifiable hypothesis.  Instead, they were enacted on the basis that they were 
incredibly intriguing, and they did not stop throwing up enticing, immeasurable 
anomalies.  The writing process was no different.  It was never in the plan, for example, 
to have a chapter about ‘play’, but after doing the activities, and thinking about what it 
was that made them, when at their best, so attractive, so empowering, and so involving, I 
                                                 
6
 Sometimes jokingly suffixed by ‘the orphans’, because isolated as we were in Aberystwyth we had no 
‘real’ teacher.   
 xviii 
found ‘play’.  Here was something I wanted to affirm.  Here was, for me, a whole new 
kind of politics, one which could occupy very different realms – and had already 
profoundly affected my life and created a fresh and experimental world.  A world which 
was playful and therefore wondrous enough to keep me waking up excited in the 
mornings.           
 
I only hope to reflect some of this wonder here, as it is wonder, I believe, which is 
necessary to bring new qualities of contact to people’s lives.  Through wonder, places 
become enchanted; transformed from isolating, lonely and desolate places into places that 
involve the body in their unfolding.  It is in the doing of these transformations with which 









There was a wall. It did not look important. It was built of uncut rocks roughly 
mortared; an adult could look right over it and even a child could climb it. Where it 
crossed the roadway, instead of having a gate it degenerated into mere geometry, a 
line, an idea of boundary.  But the idea was real, it was important.  For seven 
generations there had been nothing more important than that wall. 
Like all walls it was ambiguous, two faced. What was inside it and what was outside 
it depended on which side of it you were on … 
The wall shut in not only the landing field but the ships that came down out of space, 
and the men that came on the ships, and the worlds they came from, and the rest of 





What if we could play with that wall – jump and hop between freedom, meaning, lines 
and ideas?  If we could make contact with the ‘other side’, all be it less free…   
 
Like the wall in Le Guin’s sci-fi novel, we are daily transected by walls of our own co-
production.  Some are fantastical constructions, shifting feats of imagination and 
ingenuity, ones that draw us into their marvellously diverse embrace.  Without doubt 
there are others, blank, bland and seemingly final, but even these lifeless obstructions are 
but a leap away from showing some interest in us.        
 
 2 
Making Place, Making Contact  
 
 
This work has, on the whole, been a labour of love.  From the time I started to ride bike 
trials, I have been fascinated by experiences of learning to move in new ways.  Just as my 
mountain bike components were broken, changed, swapped and modified, so were the 
capacities of my body in a state of continual revision.  My emotions, perceptions, 
imagination, and physical make up were radically altered through the three body 
practices that are the focus of this thesis.  Bike trials, parkour and capoeira – each of 
them was at some point entirely foreign and unknown to me.  And each, at different 
periods of time has come to dominate my daily life, tying me into the world in very 
different ways. 
 
This thesis is an attempt to mix these happening embodied revisions and relations into 
geographic theorizations of place, practice and mobility.  I hope it is now clear this 
involves first hand, immersive participation in capoeira, bike trials and parkour.  In 
learning and regularly practicing these activities practitioners actively connect and make 
contact with the materialities of place.  It is in this, often casually forgotten contact, that 
this study is interested.  Such contact occurs in many different ways, be it ‘on the run’, 
engaged in an exuberant dance, or in fearful static contemplation of an imagined set of 
movements.  All are with certain people and places.  Each will have its own unique 
unfolding affects.  The commitment throughout this work will be toward finding ways of 
making contact (and thus making place) in mobile modes that are playful, inquisitive, 
testy, unsure and emotionally charged.  In other words, this performance is interested in 
experimenting with places and possibilities.  
 
Through immersive participation, I hope to offer a performance which affirms some of 
the potential of playing towards certain types of contact.  Critique and problematization 
of one linguistically defined and defended logic after another has led us to something of a 
‘post-structuralist impasse’ (cf. Friedman 2006).  While it is true that such deconstructive 
critique has been crucial in the sense that it has cleared the ground for new knowledge to 
 3 
emerge, it has not, it seems to me, been quite so keen to seek knowledges in new 
engagements with the world that produce new imaginings, times and spaces.  Neither 
does it always take good account of experience, instead it often works from a ‘top down’ 
approach, pulling apart named ‘institutions’ and behemoth-like discourses. 
 
In geography numerous writers have begun to move beyond a purely deconstructivist 
approach. Ongoing work in non-representational theory, for example, has given a 
vibrantly varied set of approaches, which have added significantly, acting with a 
commitment to make “more of the world, not allowing it to be reduced, but rather 
allowing it to be read and writ large.” (Thrift 2005: 475).  This thesis has developed 
through a belief in the malleability of embodiment, which can, through certain practices, 
lead to better ways of living with each other.  In this, I must admit, I have faith in utopia.  
Not any single utopia, or utopia as representation, but utopia as multiple process (see 
Kraftl 2007, Pinder 2002) and utopia as embodied, as flexible idea, imagination and 
experimentation.  Utopia, as dynamic ‘utopic practice’ adds to life, gives it drive and 
allows it to grip us without denying its messy paradox.   
 
Parkour, capoeira and bike trials can all be considered utopic practices.  They seek to 
imagine and change places, to play with our comfortable and secure feelings of what a 
picnic bench is, of how a human body moves, or of what a cyclist might be.  In doing so 
place can be more multiple, people’s imaginings amplified, and technologies remade.  By 
practicing these ludic activities spatial knowledge is ‘done’ – it is revised, negotiated, 
unlearned, forgotten, replaced, embedded and complicated.  By making new kinds of 
contact we are co-creating new places as we mess with the materiality we are in.  ‘An 
active body incorporates bits and pieces of the world around it, while its action may be 
shifted out of the body, excorporated’ (Mol and Law 2004: 53). 
        
An experiential, experimental account of contact with place has allowed me to participate 
in this process in a way that research based purely on documentary sources and 
deconstruction, might not.  Intuitively we know that when we read an account, or view a 
film, or see a photograph, that it has happened – it cannot, at that moment at least, see us 
 4 
(or so we tend to think).  Participation is interesting because it is a ‘two way’ process: our 
own actions often evidently affect that which we are interested in, which in turn, and 
usually immediately, has its own affects on us.  The materiality of an event has great 
purchase and intensity on the body when it is lived.  It is given spatial and temporal 
context that engulfs us and can, through contact, fuel the imagination and multiply up 
affect in a quite recursive way.  In short, being involved in place gives us the possibility 




Enabling possibility and ‘non-representational theory’  
 
 
Uncovering and enabling possibility, finding new ways to make new kinds of contact that 
amplify life, playing beyond boundaries – none of these things comes easily to traditional 
enlightenment thinking.  Quite ‘successful’ attempts to form knowledge that is sure and 
final has given us a host of binaries, and a limited number of cordoned off and set 
identities.  A shared interest in recent geography has been to break down and overcome a 
Cartesian mind/body duality that has been linked to these structures of knowledge.  Such 
divisions prop up hierarchical social systems and are implicated in much of the social 
inequality we witness in the world (see Moeckli and Braun 2001, Rose 1993, 1995). 
 
In attempting to make a brake with hierarchical knowledge authors have employed what 
are often considered to be ‘constructionist’ approaches; that is, methods which tend to ask 
how, when, where, and by whom, is knowledge about (or in) bodies produced and 
reproduced (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Cresswell and Dixon 2002, Gergen 1999, 
Jackson and Penrose 1993).  For pure social constructionists there are no ‘truths’ about 
the world, only more or less persistent belief systems which are, or at least should be, in 
continual contestation.  The spirit of social constructivism is to ask who or what defines 
categories of people, things and actions (categories as varied as the male, the 
neighbourhood, disability, science…) and therefore inevitably chooses what is included 
and what is excluded from those categories (Cresswell 1996, Sibley 1995). 
 5 
 
One might be forgiven for thinking that ‘constructivist’ research was strangely named, 
considering it actually involves a de-construction of knowledge.  A process in which the 
roots of knowledge are uncovered, discursive sites examined, historic distinctions 
questioned.  This way of working can be productive because it takes nothing for granted, 
and in the process, is itself inevitably involved in the creation of new knowledge.  Non-
representational modes of thinking build on a similar interest with what is taken for 
granted about knowledge, but strive to undo the emphasis in the social sciences on 
representation and the deconstruction of texts.  Instead they seek to understand and take 
account of the performance or ‘doing’ of everyday life (Hetherington 2003a, Rose 1999, 
Thrift 1997, 2000a, Thrift 2003). Thus, non-representational theories of practice require a 
shift of attention towards the continual emergence of life in each new moment. We are 
asked to consider the non-logical, pre-conscious, spontaneous, and un-thought actions 
which account for the richness and immediacy of embodied existence (Anderson 2006a, 
Dewsbury, et al. 2002, Latham 2003a, Thrift 2004a, 2004d, Wylie 2005).   
 
Related to this ‘in-place-immediacy’ of the body, another trend in non-representational 
thinking has been to re-incorporate ‘things’ as productive of, and essentially inseparable 
from, human lives.  The places we inhabit largely consist of non-humans entities, which 
are too forceful to be entirely ‘social constructs’ (for an alternative view see Harvey 
1996). Thus, while the material corporeality of life is being stressed across the board 
(compare Latham and McCormack 2004, Longhurst 2005), it is worth noting from the 
outset, that what is termed as ‘the body’ and ‘the subject’ is far from un-contentious.  
Subjectivity and agency are increasingly being considered to include the object world 
(Haraway 1991, Latour 1993, 2000, Pile and Thrift 1995, Sheller 2004, Thrift 1994) and 
the notion of a discrete and bounded body is being quite convincingly challenged (cf. 
Briginshaw 2001, Longhurst 2001, McDowell and Sharp 1997). In this way the body is 
an elusive term; exactly what the body is, where it begins and ends, and attempts to 
address its ‘meaning’, have been numerous and are often ambiguous (Longhurst 1997, 
Pile and Thrift 1995). 
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Nigel Thrift, who was the first, and remains one of the strongest and most consistent 
champions of ‘non-representational theory’ in geography, suggests that a Foucauldian 
approach to power needs to be tempered with understandings of the body as having 
“special qualities which flow from its tacit nature.” (1997: 137).  Indeed, a new 
consideration of the human body, including its perceptions and abilities has been 
prominent in a lot of writings associated with ‘non’ or ‘more-than-representational 
theory’ (Crouch 2005, Dewsbury, et al. 2002, Harrison 2000, Obrador-Pons 2003, Thrift 
1997).  The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968), has been 
particularly influential.  His phenomenology, specifically his use of the concepts ‘body-
subject’ and then ‘the flesh’, sees the body as having irresolvable intelligences that act 
before deliberative thought.  This philosophy has a reasonably long tradition in 
geography, being used by humanist writers to consider how the human body inhabits, 
gets to know, and becomes familiar with its environment (Buttimer 1976, Relph 1977, 
Seamon 1979, Tuan 1974).               
 
While drawing on this rich tradition, Thrift and many others have been keen to move on 
from humanist accounts, instead calling for a ‘post’, ‘anti’ or ‘trans’-humanist 
perspective which gives back some sense of agency to non-human animals and things 
(Massey and Thrift 2003, Wylie 2005). For some authors though, Merleau-Ponty’s ‘body 
subject’ was already necessarily entwined with, and immersed in, fields of more-than-
human relation (Abram 1996). When we consider the body as Merleau-Ponty’s ‘body 
subject’, it becomes our experience itself and the body itself is: 
 
…my ability to cry and laugh, or to howl at night with the wolves, to find and 
gather food whether in a forest or a market, the power to walk upon the ground and 
to imbibe the swirling air.  Yet “I” do not deploy these powers like the commander 
piloting a ship, for I am, in my depths, indistinguishable from them, as my sadness 
is indistinguishable from a certain heaviness of my body limbs, or as my delight is 
only artificially separable from the widening of my eyes, from the bounce in my 





 theorisation, the body is thus intimately connected with the 
environment, which is predominantly unmediated by considered logical reasoning (see 
Seamon 1980).  Thinking of the body similarly, authors (such as Crouch 1999, Crouch 
and Desforges 2003, Ingold 2000, Obrador-Pons 2003) have drawn on the work of 
Heidegger (and Dreyfus’ (1991) interpretations of him), and most notably his notion of 
‘dwelling’, to propose the body as “involved in the world in which it extends itself 
metaphorically, transforming the space, flirting with space.” (Crouch 2001: 62, emphasis 
in original). 
 
Through such work we might find a focus on the micro-politics of ‘doing’ place, and 
how, through practice, the body engages, discovers, and enacts its environment 
(Dewsbury 2000, Holloway 2003).  Through the notion of ‘enactment’ non-
representational theory is given a way to break free from the continued and supposedly 
inescapable representation and re-representation that maintain the very situations that the 
analysis should seek to change (Thrift 2004d). Instead, non-representational theory looks 
to create knowledge without using dictated or historic definitions and classificatory 
systems.  Rather than taking meanings and representations at face value we should seek 
to take account of the way they are lived; namely through pre-cognitive body practices.  
Our way of being in the world is mainly practical, rather than cognitive, and involves a 
skilful coping or interweaving with our surroundings (Ingold 2000).  This being the case, 
we can say that most social action is not accounted for in the social sciences (Harrison 
2000, Latham 2003b, Thrift 2000a, 2000b). 
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 David Abram work is considered throughout and thus follows some brief biographical details.  Abram 
himself has been called an ‘ecophenomenologist’ (Toadvine 2005), a professional sleight-of-hand 
magician, a performance artist, and ecological activist.  His colourful history, particularly his interest and 
practice in magic has led to his long standing interest in perception.  He has travelled across Southeast 
Asia, studying with indigenous ‘shamans’.  This has informed his views of our modes of sensing the 
landscape, which he considers as being animate.  His widely acclaimed book, The Spell of the Sensuous, 
deploys a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in an attempt to persuade readers that the so called 
‘inanimate’ is no such thing.  He argues in this book and other essays, that every experience of perception 
is a reciprocating event, which ‘proves’ the falsehood of thinking of the more-than-human world as 
unconsciousness and entirely distinct and from humanity.     
 
Now living in North America his work focuses on the ecological repercussions to changes in our 
perception, and particularly how perception is bound up with our use of writing and language.  He is one of 
the founders of ‘The Alliance for Wild Ethics’ (the website of which makes available many of Abram’s 
essays), a diverse group of artists and academics working to loosely ‘environmental protection’ agenda.              
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For all its emphasis on non or pre-representational embodiment, this work does not, in 
general, do away with our constructivist understanding.  Bodies are not generic, but bear 
the marks of culturally constructed and contested difference.  Modes of embodiment are 
effected by bounded categories, which are performed in certain places, but those 
categories do not exist outside of individual embodiments of them. In other words, 
people’s notion of what it means to be white/black, male/female, gay/straight, young/old, 
and so on, makes a material difference, but there is little ‘truth’ in such categories, which 
are ideological rather than ontological. 
 
Following Grosz’s (1994) definition of the body as more than just a pre-given, or ‘raw 
material’, but something that is socially and culturally inscribed, geographers have shown 
how ‘work’ on the body (Shilling 1993) can be manifest as inscription in biology.  Lynda 
Johnston (1998), for example, suggests that through the hegemonic powers operating in 
gym spaces, blatant feminine/masculine bodies are reworked to better fit into a 
male/female binary.  Whilst female body builders disrupt this spatialised binary between 
the male and female body, they are still considered deviant and out of place because of 
their comparison to a coherent (if challenged) representational notion of masculinity.  
Similarly, when we learn bodily practices like capoeira, bike trials or parkour, our 
techniques and embodied habits of movement, are reformulated along different spatial 
lines.       
 
Constructivist work of this sort is all well and good, but the implicit accusation of non-
representational theory is that ‘representationalist’ accounts, that treat the body as a text 
to be analysed, can reduce the body to language.  Representationalist thinking treats 
worldly events such as a cartwheel in capoeira, or a backhop in bike trials, as texts, 
which can be read and carefully analyzed.  All too easily they deny the fleshy, expressive 
corporeality of living bodies (Harrison 2000, Longhurst 2001).  Here we run into the 
problematic nature of representation in general, but particularly in relation to bodies: we 
will never be fully able to communicate an experience, situation, feeling, emotion, event 
or thing, no matter how technically sophisticated or ingenious our representation.  Here, 
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not only do words ‘fall short’ and fail, but so too do all manner of digital ‘reproductive’ 
techniques.  There is no rewind button for life.          
 
What are we aiming at here then; there is no sense in critiquing the inevitable failure of 
representation?  There is however a need to consider the way we think about and treat 
representations.  Representations only fail, if we ask them to do the impossible (a perfect 
reproduction), but if we talk of the representation in a pragmatic sense, as something that 
is better or worse, depending upon its affects, then we may have a way forward.  Indeed, 
representations are most often experienced in a way that is non-representational: they 
evoke (cf. Laurier and Philo 2006).   Precisely because the body is situated, unable to sit 
above and look down with dispassionate objectivity and view representations, we are ‘in 
them’ (Thrift 2000c).             
 
If body and space are mutually defining, the body cannot be understood as wholly 
distinguishable from its environment.  Indeed, drawing on a rich tradition of feminist 
writings on embodiment and performativity (e.g. Butler 1993, Grosz 1994), we are able 
to destabilise the bounded body’s identity, and make problematic any easy distinction 
between thought, ‘un-thought’, action and place (cf. Pred 1984).  Through its emphasis 
on sensuous ‘practice’, non-representational modes of working and thinking strive to get 
around the reduction of the body to atemporal language (Harrison 2007).  Indeed, to take 
better account of the body is not simply a question of addressing the historic primacy of 
representations and the visual (Rodaway 1994) and inserting the ‘forgotten’ senses, but 
requires a complete reconceptionalisation that prioritises multi-sensual embodied 
processes (Crouch and Desforges 2003, Thrift 1996). 
 
We tend towards objectivity in attempting to match up our mental representations 
with reality or accept social constructivism’s idealisation of language. Neither of 
these accounts takes notice of the actions of the bodies towards the objects.  
(Harrison 2000: 507, my emphasis). 
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Taking heed of non-representational theory, then, involves new awareness of action in the 
‘now moment’.  We might see the world as in a state of becoming or emergence; a 
continuous flow of ‘nows’.  Bingham (1996) suggests that during such emergence, space 
changes into place multi-sensually, by the body’s movements in it as well as perceptions 
of it.  Here the body, constitutes place as much as place constitutes the body.  Non-
representational theory, though, is not so concerned with representing the ‘reality’ of 
bodies or places, as it is with moving on from the relations and practices between body 
and place, that brings any such reality into being (Thrift 1997)
8
.    
 
If places and bodies are mutually constituted then inevitably we must ask how they are 
producing each other in this way.  Without universalising, such a question becomes very 
difficult to answer - it will surely be specific to individual places and bodies, and change 
over time.  In place, “all kinds of spatial stories could be taking place at once, and 
continuous trade could take place between them.” (Massey and Thrift 2003: 288). 
 
These relational practices have been understood and developed using the metaphor of 
performance.  Through performance the body can be said to ‘learn’ the socially correct 
ways of behaving, as it is ‘internalised’ (Butler 1993, Young 1990)
9
.  The way 
movements are repeatedly performed becomes part of the body which is reconfigured as 
they are continually performed with other people and places.  Whilst those promoting 
non-representational theories do not tend to use the term ‘the social’, it is clear that 
situated bodily comportment is learnt and practiced in an inescapably communal and 
connected way, as bike trials, capoeira and parkour can demonstrate.   
 
Such mobile connectivity is not limited only to human bodies (Cresswell 2005).  Rather 
our embodied becoming extends to the entirety of our environment.  Practice is filled 
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 Although it is true that this is often done by strategically deploying representations (academic papers).  
9
 Here I am mainly concerned with performance in the Butlerian sense, in which performances become 
habitual through re-iteration.  However, it is worth noting that performance is a multifaceted term.  Thrift 
and Dewsbury (2000), for example, consider four distinct but related types of performance: ‘performance’ 
as associated with Judith Butler; ‘performance’ as has developed through non-representational theory; 
‘performance’ as in the ‘discipline of performance itself’ (often associated with the writings of Schechner 
1988), which they claim to be an ever unstable concept; and finally the consider ‘performance’ as applied 
to the practice and methods of academia.            
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with a mutuality that reaches beyond constructed spatial and temporal constraints.  In this 
way the term ‘the social’ may be unnecessarily limiting, but for many it still plays an 
important, and political, role in formulating certain bodies and places. We must qualify 
though, that the part played by the ‘social’ is always partial and corrupted by other 
‘things’ and technologies (Latour 2000, 2004, 2005).  
 
Drawing on actor network theory non-representational theorists tend to shy away from 
talk of ‘the social’, for it can never be separated out from the realms of non-humans – that 
is, the ‘things’ that affect and surround the body. For them the body is immersed in 
‘fields of affect’ (Harrison 2007, McCormack 2003, 2005).  In other words, every 
intentional action of the body, in every passing moment, is entangled with, or in part 
influenced (affected) by, its surroundings, be they people or things.  In this sense, having 
a body is immersion in the world, it is being inseparable, vulnerable and open to the 
affective fields that swirl around and through (Harrison 2008).  As a priority, non-
representational theory seeks to acknowledge that these fields of affect are ever shifting, 
with the movements of bodies and materialities; they are not static or immutable, but to 
varying degrees, mobile.      
 
When our bodies develop ‘automatic’ habitual ways of moving and thinking (and not 
thinking), what Paul Harrison (2000) calls the ‘contraction of habit’, we have an 
inevitable constriction of possibilities.  As this thesis is concerned with the ‘questing’ 
body, the body that is forming new ways and new playgrounds, it shares in the desire of a 
good deal of geographic research which attempts to ‘break the habit’ – or at least break 
those which have been unquestioningly and unintelligently inscribed on the body through 
reiteration of subject and place relations.  In order to break this habit there must be other 
possibilities, other ways of being in the world and it is this that Thrift appears to prioritise 
over intensively cognitive, deconstructive methods. Thrift proposes a creative and playful 
body, which is emotional and experimental (Thrift 2004b).  Armed with such knowledge, 
we might think that the body of the academic, of all people, would appreciate this fallible 
humanness in consideration of its own engagements with the world.  But as we are 
reminded, we too often see the world (with varying degrees of arrogance) as finished, a 
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sure-thing, predictable, or needing our theoretical structuring to be meaningful: in short, 
we often delude ourselves into thinking we can know the world (Rose 1997). 
 
Thankfully the ramifications of non-representational theories for future research methods 
in geography remain muddled and undetermined. Tightly prescribed methodological 
clarity is something of an anathema to a set of theories which prize experimentation, 
creative wonder and playfulness, and strive to broaden, rather than narrow possible 
avenues of investigation (Anderson and Harrison 2006, McCormack 2003, Thrift 1996, 
1997, 2004c). Such work seeks to show as false accounts in which bodies, relations or 
places ever come to rest, are finished or neatly concluded. Rather, non-representational 
theories delight in the ‘excess’ of the world which is ever in motion and does not simply 
‘add up’ (Dewsbury, et al. 2002, but see also Doel 2001). 
 
Despite this, there has been little implementation of non-representational theory in 
experientially grounded empirical research.  Eric Laurier and Chris Philo go as far as to 
say that, for all their talk, proponents of non-representational theory, ‘tend to migrate 
towards the philosophy and ethics sections of the library’, rather than involve themselves 
in the messy jostle of ‘everyday life’ (2006: 361)
10
.  I find sympathy with this position, to 
a degree, as exploring philosophical questions with more philosophy, leads to stories, or 
representations (like some of Harrison’s articles) that do not evoke, because they remain 
so far removed from what I recognise as ‘life’ (and often hang upon sparse and borrowed 
empirical examples).  Yet we cannot deny that reading and philosophising, no less than 
any other activity, is a messy and lived process with its own ‘everydayness’.    
 
While the body is the ‘object’ of much of this philosophising, it has hardly seen the 
revolutionary reinsertion into research one might expect.  “Having been what could be 
called geography’s ‘absent presence’, the body is becoming its ‘present absence’” 
(Simonsen 2000: 9). This may also be because non-representational theory attempts to 
create new and unfamiliar vocabularies which might impart a sense of the felt 
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 Though for some examples where this is less the case, see McCormack (2003, 2004), Spinney (2006) and 
Wylie (2005).         
 13 
sensuousness of being in ‘enchanting’ hybrid body/place relations (Massey and Thrift 
2003).  This is not easy.  Similarly, it is not easy to conceive of a methodological 
approach that is truly open and accepts that finding the answers to questions and 
formulating them often occurs simultaneously and inseparably.   
   
With calls towards a ‘policy turn’ (Massey 2000) and attempts to rematerialize geography 
(Anderson and Tolia-Kelly 2004, Hoskins 2007, Jackson 2000, Kearnes 2003, Mee and 
Waitt 2003), our theorizations of the body are attempting to develop new methods that 
take seriously the politics of everyday life (Pain and Bailey 2004). “Greater 
understanding of the body requires interaction between theories about the substance of 
the body and analyses of particularities of embodied experiences and practices.” 
(Simonsen 2000: 9).  In all this, ‘theory’, like the body, is more than one thing at once 
(Rothfield 2005), and will, one hopes, not remain contained in any particular category or 
library section for long.  Instead, it travels out, mixing indistinguishably with practices 
that we tend to consider separate, like ‘fieldwork’ and ‘everyday life’.       
 
In what follows, I tend to think of this uncontrollability of ideas and practice in a fairly 
positive light, for it has the capacity to add possibilities.  Possibilities for unique kinds of 
embodiment, mobility and emotionality, are all being built up as we invent (Thrift 2005).  
The processes of how, or if, we choose these new kinds of embodiment, are in the 
balance when we make contact with our environment.  It is only in contact that the body 
is capable of re-inventing itself as it participates in and with.            
 
Through the movements of the body and the powers of speech the subject can jointly 
produce the possibility of converting one spatial signifier into another. New places 
and meanings, acts and footsteps, meanings and directions are produced and they 
produce. (Thrift 1996: 16, emphasis added).  
 
Evolving techniques of movement, such as bike trials, capoeira and parkour, are 
additions that allow us to engage in the world differently.  In this, difference is something 
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special, something worth seeking out.  That is to say, by changing the way we sense, and 
the way we make sense, such activities change everything.                      
 
 
A note on Contact 
 
 
New contact is made when we feel, for a split-second, that we participate in the 
immeasurable.  There is no ‘point’ of contact; it happens, it befuddles our notion of space 
and time.   
 
Contact can be made with anything; movement, painting, building, memory, tree, body, 
book… What it will make of us, that is the question.     
 
Contact, v. 
1. trans. To bring into or place in contact.  
1834 EDEN in Fraser's Mag. XI. 644 The spark and the gunpowder contacted, and 
acting together, produce the explosion. 
2. intr. To come into, or be in, contact.  
1883 H. GREER Dict. Electr. 21 To prevent contact with two or more plates at the 
same time, their contacting portions are so arranged that no two consecutive 
plates are in the same vertical line. 
 
3. trans. To get into contact or in touch with (a person). orig. U.S. colloq.  
 
1927 Spectator 6 Aug. 212/2 Dreiser should not be allowed to corrupt his 
language by writing ‘anything that Clyde had personally contacted here’. 1935 A. 
P. HERBERT What a Word! 100 A charming lady in the publicity business 
shocked me when we parted by saying ‘It has been such fun contacting you.’  
        (Oxford English Dictionary, Online). 
 
 
It seems worth noting that the OED also lists ‘contact’ as a noun, with predictable 
descriptions of items such as an electrical contact, a person who can be called upon for 
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assistance, and so on.  More interesting perhaps, is the draft addition to the dictionary 
entry, dated June 2008, entitled ‘contact high’:  
 
‘contact high’:  slang (orig. and chiefly U.S.) a feeling of elation or intoxication 
influenced by the (esp. drug-induced) behaviour or mood of another person; (also) 
an instance of intoxication caused by (inadvertent) inhalation of smoke from 
another person's marijuana cigarette, pipe, etc. 
1977 Oakland (Calif.) Tribune 3 Sept. B7/2, I felt higher than I had ever been and I 
had taken no drugs. Was it a contact high from three days around gurus? 
(Oxford English Dictionary, Online) 
 
‘Contact high’ makes a reasonable starting point for the types of contact I want to 
develop and affirm in this thesis.  This is a kind of contact that makes obvious the way 
contact has unexpected affects.  It also demonstrates the way contact does not necessarily 
involve touch, although this can often be an important element of contact.  Essentially, 
contact of this kind highlights the permeability of the body.  Just as I watch friends ride 
up a steep grassy bank, for example, I am inevitably now excited by the prospect of 
attempting the bank myself.  My embodiment is enacted with and in contact.                             
 
Throughout this thesis, I refer to ‘contact’ and so, following academic convention, feel a 
pressure to define it here at the outset.  But really this is unnecessary, for I use it in no 
specialised, unfamiliar way.  What I do is consider the different and new ways we might 
make contact.  The grassy bank now looks different – a simple example – it now meets 
my leg muscles from afar with a resonance that wishes to pedal.  Place is changed.  A 
new quality of contact is developed.  Contact gives us the ability to participate in, modify, 
perhaps even engineer affect, because affect is more than the personal quality of emotion.  
Rather affect is a ‘felt but impersonal, visceral but not neatly corporeal, force of intensive 
relationality.” (Latham and McCormack 2004: 706).      
 
Though it is not particularly dwelt upon here, it is worth noting affect’s relation to 
contact.  Contact, for me, is the ‘exciter’ of affect, it allows and encourages it.  Of course, 
the trouble with talk along these lines is that, affect, intangible as it is, has been theorized 
in numerous ways, some of which see it as having little difference to emotion (Davidson 
and Milligan 2004 cf. Kraftl and Adey 2008, Thrift 2004b).  For the purposes of this 
 16 
work though, where I use affect I have treated it as a type of relational potential.  It is 
thus always in a state of emergence as new configurations of people, things and animals 
form and reform; their changing contact bringing about moving possibilities and 
potentialities. 
 
In this way we can start to question the idea of the inanimate. As I show in the 
subsequent chapters, contact occurs when we are affected by the world.  Animals, people, 
places, and technologies can be understood as entities which are perceived with 
reciprocity.  In other words, the nature of contact can be such that we can feel ourselves 
moved by, and with things, inane and supposedly inert.  As such ‘contact’ like the idea of 
‘contact high’, is a moment in which our perception is caught within, and becomes 
inseparable from, our surroundings.      
 
Perception itself is an inherently relational, participatory event; we say that things 
"call our gaze" or "capture our attention," and as we lend our focus to those things we 
find ourselves affected and transformed by the encounter -- the way the blue sky, 
when we open our gaze to it, reverberates through our sensing organism, altering our 
mood and even the rhythm of our beating heart. (Abram 2005: 1023).           
 
The limits of this kind of notion, of contact, are its lure as well: that contact is wildly 
variable.  As I go on to discuss using the case studies, the quality of contact we have is 
not something essential to the human body.  Rather we are open to the places we 
participate in, to greater or lesser degrees, and our habits of perception allow places to 
affect us to greater or lesser a degree.  As has become something of a motto for the 
‘Alliance for Wild Ethics’
11
: “We are human only in contact, and conviviality, with what 
is not human.”  Contact, as I will attempt to show through the following studies, is 
developed, changed and always ongoing. 
 
                                                 
11
 An organisation co-founded by David Abram, that promotes oral traditions, and ethical conduct based on 
re-discovering first hand, the knowledge of humanities reliance upon the land.    
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Our abilities to perceive (or not) certain affective capacities of our environments, can, but 
are not necessarily in continual revision.  Learning a new movement, depending upon a 
new technology, or having to bodily deal with the unexpected actions of others, all bring 
to awareness differing subtleties, and remind us that what is beyond our own bodies is not 
an objective realm waiting to be disclosed, but is in fact ‘underway’.  Shifts of attention 
and changes to our embodiment give us a way to make different types of contact with 
animate worldly happenings.                            
 
 
User’s Guide  
 
The thesis can be read in any order.  It is structured around the three case studies 
(chapters four, five and six), each of which provides a way to focus in on changing 
embodiment and its involvement in place making processes.  It is perfectly possible for 
the user to skip ahead to any of these and come back to the more theoretical discussions 
in chapters two and three.  Each chapter deals with what could be considered discrete 
activities, but really the contents blend together.  All have involved my body as 
participant and all are on-going.  Experiences from one, like ice into hot water, merge 
with my practice in others - insights from some activity being useful (or not) in others.  
As such, examples of activities blur between chapters.  This is particularly the case with 
the next chapter, Finding a Playground, in which I evaluate some of the different ways in 
which we think about play.           
 
In this chapter I ask what is important about play.  Play can be many things, and in a 
sense this remains its most alluring power.  Welcoming this multiplicity, I argue 
nonetheless, that play is better when it is not overly competitive, but instead when it is 
based upon developing contact with the world.  Through this development, play, I reason, 
is immensely powerful, as it is capable of writing new scripts, forging new ethics, and 
enhancing life as lived with (as play cannot, I suggest, be done alone). 
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Neither for that matter, can research be anything but involved.  Yet there is a large degree 
of variance to which one can approach that involvement during the research process.  In 
chapter 3: Making Methods, this becomes evident.  Here is the place for a discussion of 
the way in which we do ethics just as we make methods.  Methodology is no less an 
embodied activity than bike trials, capoeira or parkour, and as such it is worth 
considering how we develop our ways of being with.  For me, doing the activities was 
crucial, because it appeared the best way to be sure that the world was kept free to teach 
me.  “That means retaining difficulties, uncertainties, inaccuracies since mistakes are part 
of the lesson, proof that the problem can still grip us.” (Thrift 2005: 474).                   
              
As it has been noted, activities like these “could be ‘colonized’ by the academic and the 
intellectual. The ‘play’, the ‘pleasure’ could be destroyed by the intellectual agenda.” 
(Stephens and Delamont 2006: 335).  It is my contention that we might avoid this by 
treating the methods in the same playful manner the activities themselves can operate.  In 
other words, this thesis ‘write up’ makes requests, as did the research.  It begs to be read 
in a certain way: one that does not hunt after answers, precise and final.  Each word or 
‘sign’ on these pages, asks to be treated as such – as a pointer to animate knowledge, not 
to be affixed upon, but to propose possible directions.  As well as this, a prime request of 
this user’s manual, is that the reader imagines doing the activities, however unlikely that 
might seem.  Where I write ‘I’, please think of yourself.  Approached with such an 
attitude, this dumb representation may be given to live, and to speak.          
 
There is paradox in such a request, as imagining these activities is closely intertwined 
with the embodied doing (or not doing) of them.  This remains the challenge of 
representation.  Without doing it, how do we know how to feel when asked to think about 
leaping between two brick walls, grasping the edges, the strain on the muscles, the 
changes of perspective?  Luckily most of us will know what it is like to jump, and what 
bricks are like, how they can make up a wall, and so on.  Although all these things can 
vary enormously, we are able to piece them together with the help of representations and 
imagination.  However roughly, in a whole body process, we can form a better idea about 
activities like parkour practice.               
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Being an art form that requires very little specialist equipment, parkour is used to 
consider a slightly abstracted ‘raw’ engagement in place.  In chapter 4: Playing with 
Fear: Parkour and the Mobility of Emotion, the process of learning the bodily 
movements themselves is recounted and theorized in some detail, and forms a foundation 
from which the capoeira and bike trials case studies will build.  Parkour and closely 
related activities like ‘freerunning’ have exploded into public consciousness through 
commercial media representations and films.  Parkour is depicted as a spectacular urban 
sport that either can or cannot be done.  We might, though, consider what has been 
excluded from these representations: the emotions involved in trying, experimenting, and 
gradually learning to make contact in places differently.  In parkour places are ‘done’ or 
mobilised in tentative, unsure, ungainly and unfinished ways which can be characterised 
by a kind of play with architecture. 
 
In this play, places are tried, re-imagined and tried again.  In trying new kinds of contact, 
there is uncertainty and often fear.  This chapter is concerned with understanding fear as 
an important, and not necessarily negative, part of an engagement with place.  Here fears 
can manifest differently, not only restricting mobility, but in some cases encouraging 
imaginative and playful forms of movement.  These kinds of contact construct new ways 
of knowing and experiencing place.  As with capoeira and bike trials, in parkour, the 
body is cultivated, in various ways, to facilitate this trying and re-inventing of place.  In 
common also is the fact that any such cultivation is done with, it is a process that reveals 
the lie of a self-contained or self-made individual. 
 
In bike trials, for example, this becomes more obvious because of the learned reliance 
upon the trials bike.  Appending the body with a technologically complex piece of 
equipment, one that is under continual revision, links the body into tangible networks of 
manufacture and design.  Thus in chapter 5: Bike Trials, I consider the evolution of trials, 
in which I have participated, over the past 10 years.  Changes in styles of movement and 
favoured riding locations have been mirrored by an array of changes to the bike 
technologies produced and consumed. The bike geometry, weight, stiffness, and 
component specification make a huge difference to the practice of trials riding.  The co-
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evolution of technology and embodiment has enabled riders to move over obstacles, in a 
way which would have seemed impossible even a few years ago.  In the practice of bike 
trials, the body and bike merge; feeling place through tyres, pedals and handlebar grips.   
 
The way in which the interaction, or as I would have it contact, of such things as bike and 
body transform perception, was famously noted by the pragmatist philosopher William 
James
12
.  James, who made some of the keenest observations to do with the way our 
attitudes are interlinked with both emotion and perception, claimed that we learn to see 
places in particular ways.  For him attitudes were crucial and as an ethical imperative 
should be brought into conscious reflection:  
 
A man's[sic] Empirical Thought depends on the objects and events he has 
experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent determined by his habits of 
attention.  An object may be present to him a thousand times, but if he persistently 
fails to notice it, it cannot be said to enter into his experience. We are all seeing flies, 
moths, and beetles by the thousand, but to whom, save an entomologist, do they say 
anything distinct?  (James 1879: 11-12). 
         
For those that look, in most European countries and in many parts of the USA bike trials 
is now visibly present in cities and towns.  Simply put, the practice involves riding a bike 
up, over, down and around whatever landscape features a rider chooses.  The traditional 
form of mountain bike trials descended from motorbike trials and was generally 
concerned with activities in the woods and formal competitions on ‘natural’ courses, over 
large rocks, steep banks, rivers, and so on.  However it is now more popular in urban 
areas, where riders have, through changes in perception, made obstacles of concrete 
                                                 
12
 William James’s thought is particularly relevant here, and to orient the reader some relevant background 
biographical details follow.  James, an American thinker who also spent a good deal of time in Europe, has 
had an enormous impact on the direction of Western philosophical thought, influencing the likes of 
Edmand Husserl, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Ludwig Wittgenstein (Goodman 2009).  James, well 
known for his contribution to philosophy (particularly a strand of pragmatism), also studied in physiology, 
psychology and painting (for a summary of his extremely varied career see Goodman 2009). Indeed, while 
James may be best known for his philosophy, he had little or no formal training in that discipline.  His ideas 
on emotion (discussed in detail later in relation to Parkour) and his well known ‘Stream of Thought’ thesis, 
sees our consciousness as a ceaseless relation to things in the world (James 1890).  This makes his thought 
particularly of interest in our discussion and development of ‘contact’.             
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walls, benches and rails to name but a few.  This is known as ‘street’ or ‘urban’ riding as 
opposed to ‘competition’ or ‘natural’ riding.  This chapter of the PhD primarily deals 
with street riding, but most of the observations and questions asked, could be applicable 
to both.  
 
Trials riders, it seems, reflexively improvise their movements.  That is, they spend time 
considering bike design, material choices, and geometry as much as bodily technique and 
training practices; all are reflected upon, modified and fed into each and every 
improvisation.  Similarly, the improvised play of capoeiristas is at times analysed, down 
to the micro details of nutrition and acrobatic technique.  Chapter 6: Capoeira: learning 
to trust a chameleon, wonders at the way in which capoeira practice opens possibilities 
to make such improvisational movement, in conditions of intense contact with other 
capoeira players.   
 
Capoeira is a body practice that includes varying combinations of dance, martial art, 
music, theatre, strategy and play. In combining tradition with play, and dance with fight, 
capoeira is left with a profound ambiguity which defies all our efforts to place it into 
already existing genres (Lewis 1995).  Like the previous two practices, the capoeira jôgo 
(game) involves learning unfamiliar bodily movement, and then applying them directly 
with another body.  These commingled movements can unfold in many different ways.  I 
wish to use this study as a way to explore the possibilities for a theory of changing 
contact, as deployed in the previous chapters.  
   
In this chapter I consider the way players of capoeira (capoeiristas) communicate and 
connect through movements (which are diverse and range from cooperative acrobatic 
improvisations, to, in the extreme, outright fighting). Movements are scripted and 
improvised to different degrees in relation to the moving place in which capoeiristas 
practice. The most important contact a player has is with the person they are playing 
with: a kick, directed at a player that does not evade, has a high chance of being ‘pulled’ 
and stopping short, but there is an ever-present possibility of getting hit.  This uncertain 
risk demands a player move in relation to their partner/opponent.  Here I consider the 
becoming and hybrid movements between two bodies playing capoeira.  Such 
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movements however are always place dependent as well as place making: the venue, the 
time of day, and the people in attendance all add to the mix.  The music, for example, 
which is so crucial to the game, sets the rhythm and on occasion specifically calls for 
certain types of play. 
 
In this chapter, then, it becomes clear that the body, not only in contact, but forming new 
kinds of contact, on the go, is involved in the engineering of affect and therefore place.  
Singers, instrumentalists, spectators, and players come together to form and transform the 
ambience of place, deliberately engineering the potentialities for movement, play and 
contact.  In doing so, capoeira, like bike trials and parkour, has the potential to form long 
lasting connections with places, people, movements and sounds.  In short, it holds many 
possibilities for cultivating trust between players, whom one might initially think have 
every reason to distrust one another.   
 
Primarily this thesis research has been based around a general sense of wonder 
experienced when making new kinds of contact.  And here I must concede, unlike many 
PhD theses, I do not have three, four or even five main questions (although this may have 
been the case when I was writing funding applications), but a wholly innumerable 
quantity of questions, that do not stop going on.  Just as contact with the world remains, 
neither do the questions desist – they are constantly generated and explored.  And I also 
have to admit, that most all of them remain inarticulable questions, all be it in an 
expanded, more varied and detailed form.   
 
All three activities suggest, to me, that we might find value in types of knowledge that 
account for contact.  Taken together, the case studies outline the way in which the mobile 
body is in contact and in a sense inseparable from the places in which they practice.  Each 
activity feeds into a re-assertion of the importance of play in making new kinds of contact 
with place.  I frame this as a methodological point which suggests the importance of an 
approach which values not only linguistic knowledge, but those embodied ways of 
knowing that are forged through playfully seeking out new contact - contact that always 
exceeds our attempts to represent it.  As I show, however, while such practices may fall 
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outside of our descriptive and linguistic grasp, there is a good deal we can do to improve, 
try, reflect upon, and share them.   
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Within play practice is the ever-present possibility of a new “we” being evoked from 
the “you” and “I”. (Donaldson 1993: 32). 
 
What is Play? 
 
In this chapter I begin to consider theories of ‘play’, a theme which runs through 
subsequent chapters.  In doing so I draw on my empirical research and experiences, 
traditional ‘play theory’, and the more radical notion of ‘original play’ as advocated by O. 
Fred Donaldson
13
 (1993).  For Donaldson, original play is a birthright of all human 
beings, who enter the world with a sense of wonder and the innate faculties to connect 
with the ‘others’ they find around them.  Donaldson’s theories chime well with non-
representational theory, which has similarly grown from dissatisfaction with modes of 
knowledge production which attempt to find meaning or truth by recording, representing, 
categorising, and fixing the process of the world.  It is a comparable and deep-rooted 
unease with such institutionally stagnant methodology that prompted Donaldson to leave 
his position in the academy and begin a personal quest to redress the culture in which his 
life had become a ‘will to power’ rather than a ‘will to play’ (ibid. 110).    
                                                 
13
 O. Fred Donaldson, hailing from California, and now resident of Sweden, has published numerous 
articles relating to the practice of what he calls ‘original play’.  Following a career in academia, it appears 
that Donaldson came to his concept of original play firstly through his long term practice of the Japanese 
martial art, Aikido.  In an article On Aikido, Wolves and Other Wildlife published in the edited book, Aikido 
and the New Warrior (1985), Donaldson reveals some of his first experiences of playing with wolves and 
other wildlife, describing the way that Aikido and its graceful movements and philosophy of flow were a 
fundamental and indistinguishable part of his play.   
 
Donaldson has travelled widely, describing himself as a ‘play specialist’ (1993: 116) and running practice 
based workshops for people of all ages and abilities.  His work (or rather play), while certainly 
unconventional, has largely remained apart from academia.  His writing is motivated by a belief in the 
innate goodness of un-cultured play amongst both animals and humans and a deep desire to promote the 
‘re-connective’ potential of play.  Like emotions, talk in academia of such intimate feelings of connection, 
have tended to be considered as ‘soft’ and somewhat ‘unspeakable’, and it is only recently that it is being 




The word ‘play’ can be taken to mean many different things. One can play with puppies, 
with ideas, data sets, combinations of materials, words and scales.  In short, given a 
certain ‘spirit’, feeling or mindset, almost any activity can be described as a type of play.  
What all this play has in common is that it is done, and furthermore it is done with.  Be it 
another person, a tangible object, a space, or an illusive idea, play, however defined is 
always with something.  It always involves an expansive (re)forming of connections with 
the world.  As one of the champions of play, Johan Huizinga
14
 (1970), has it: play goes 
beyond conventionally understood physiological phenomena.  The reason is that to play 
is to expansively make contact, and involve oneself with place.              
 
Even in its simplest form on the animal level, play is more than a mere physiological 
phenomenon or a psychological reflex.  It goes beyond the confines of purely 
physical or purely biological activity.  It is a significant function – that is to say, there 
is some sense to it.  In play there is something “at play” which transcends the 
immediate needs of life and imparts meaning and action. All play means something.  
(Huizinga 1970: 1, emphasis original).          
  
The human body that is incessantly moving, always means something (Desmond 1997), 
but more specifically what does play mean?  The obvious answer is that it means 
different things, in different times and places, to different people.  The experience of play 
is certainly very different from the observation of play, and play will be different when it 
is done with different things or people.  How do we talk about such a wide dispersal of 
subjective positions – such richly various meanings?  Perhaps the answer could be to 
supplant the abstract notion of ‘meaning’ with a new concept ‘affect’ that might be more 
amenable to presentation, as opposed to representation (Thrift 2004d, Thrift and French 
2002). In this way ‘meaning’ can be unfixed and fluid and our talk about fixed identities 
begins to become meaningless.  We can but strive for the notion of what play might be, 
                                                 
14
 Huizinga’s Homo Ludens has been used by many writers as something of a benchmark text on play (see 
Bauman 1993, Kane 2004, Thrift 1997). It is significant that Huizinga, a professor of History, wrote his 
theories of play (as being the primary constituent of culture) while he was imprisoned by the Nazis from 
1942 until his death in 1945. 
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what we want it to be.  It is in a continual state of becoming and always capable of 
escaping closed systems and outdoing absolute meanings.  Here meaning becomes 
provisional.     
         
Play’s unique and slippery capacity for the inventive, imaginative and ever shifting has 
historically resulted in it being treated with a high degree of suspicion amongst scholars 
and ‘sensible’, right-thinking folk alike.  In modernity’s project it might be excused as a 
‘developmental tool’ (Hartup 1974), imparting an ‘evolutionary advantage’ in our young 
children
15
, but it has no place in society for anyone else.  For many theorists of play it is a 
moment of waste.  It is not productive in economic, social, or material ways.  One might 
begin here, to see play being defined, not in its own terms, but in opposition to work
16
, a 
distinction that, as I argue, does not stand up to scrutiny.  In the experience of play, we 
are told, there is very little that endures, is of use, or purpose.   
 
A characteristic of play, in fact, is that it creates no wealth or goods, thus differing 
from work or art. At the end of the game all can and must start over again at the same 
point. Nothing has been harvested or manufactured, no masterpiece has been created, 
no capital has accrued.  Play is an occasion of pure waste: waste of time, energy, 
ingenuity, skill, and often of money for the purchase of gambling equipment or 
eventually to pay for establishment.  (Caillois 1961: 6). 
  
Such an assertion is based on a very narrowly construed notion of wealth and capital. The 
distinction between, and oft-assumed opposition of ‘play’ to ‘work’, can be undermined 
and broken down with relative ease.  For those that make a living ‘playing’ football, or 
for the computer programmers who might say “I have been playing around with a section 
of code this morning”, or for many others who ‘produce’ playfully, this distinction 
clearly does not stand.  The category ‘work’ has never quite completely and irrevocably 
expelled ‘play’.  Neither, I wish to argue, has the ‘adult’, been totally separated from the 
                                                 
15
 Play teaching the idea and principles of ‘competition’, and the social and the physiological motor skills 
that allows the child to better integrate into competition based society.  This kind of play is a way for 
children to ‘practice’ adult roles (cf. Barnett 1990, Isenberg and Quisenberry 1988).         
16
 Interestingly, Karl Marx has relatively little to say about ‘play’ itself (see Small 2005, particularly 
chapter 6)  
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playfulness of childhood.  Here we can make a distinction between what we typically call 
play from the more fundamental practice that is playful (whether or not traditionally 
termed ‘play’). This thesis is more concerned with the playful, than any rigidly 
constituted notion of ‘play’.        
 
Parkour, bike trials and capoeira can, and have, all been described as forms of play. Yet 
all three involve a systematic investment of time and energy, which by some schemas of 
thought could be considered ‘wasted’.  I want to argue that this is not so.  Indeed, in most 
cases the energy put into these activities is redoubled as the process of play with other 
people and spaces occurs and is experienced.  In playful practice the body gains and 
creates knowledge which exceeds the bounds of traditional representation and 
categorization. Through play one can and does gain; moments and physical forms are 
opened out to accrued possibilities.  In other words, play has the ability to seriously and 
enduringly affect the body and the body’s contact with the world.  As the chapters that 
follow demonstrate, in contrast to Huizinga’s theory of play, I argue that play’s impact on 
the body and its relationality with the world is very often cumulative.  Not in the sense 
that it ‘adds up’ or makes cohesive sense, but in that play can build upon its own stories: 
its intensities are often enduring and shape worlds. 
 
Play is presented to us as an “interlude in our daily lives” (Huizinga 1970: 25), as a 
dissociated frivolity.  Similarly in geography literature, it is often segmented off into 
activities such as tourism that are not ‘everyday’.  Despite having vast economic 
repercussions, play - and certainly play that is not competitive - is routinely treated with 
cynicism and some degree of fear.  
 
As a regularly recurring relaxation however it becomes the accompaniment, the 
complement, in fact an integral part of everyday life in general. It adorns life, 
amplifies it, and is to that extent necessary both for the individual – as a life function 
– and for society by reason of the meaning it contains, its significance, its expressive 
value, its spatial and social association, in short as a cultural function. (Huizinga 
1970: 27).    
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Such a view may well have been heartily accepted by academics and educators in regard 
to children (there is, for example, a large literature that ascribes utility value to play as an 
activity necessary for correct childhood development (Fein 1981, Piaget 1999 
originally1951, Singer and Singer 1990).  And yet play amongst older people (not 
children) is still treated as purposeless, regressive or worse.  Why then, is play “regarded 
as peripheral to the real business of life, at best adorning a little oil to the wheels of social 
structure, at worst a trivial distraction” (Thrift 1997: 145)?  Possibly because, as Thrift 
suggests in his essay, play - that is freeform play that has not been co-opted to serve the 
needs of capital - has the potential to completely undermine the logic of representational, 
hierarchical, competitive, ‘adult’ life.  And yet, this element of play has been all but 
neglected, not just in geography, but in academic literature in general
17
.             
 
Even Huizinga, whose famous work Homo Ludens was perhaps the first to convincingly 
argue the significance of play, focuses his attention almost exclusively towards what he 
sees as ‘higher’ cultural forms of play.  Yet it is clear play does not require culture, 
“animals have not waited for man [sic] to teach their playing.” (Huizinga 1970: 19).  And 
of course, neither does the child need any tutorage to play with the environments they 
find themselves in.  Despite this, competitive rule based play (or sport), which comprises 
the bulk of what we might call cultural play, has all but dominated the attention of 
theorists, writers, analysts, and pundits alike.  It is easy to see why: rarely do adults play 
outside of structuring institutions, in an ‘uncultured’ way.  For Huizinga and many others, 
a more ‘primitive’ play – that is play that is poorly defined by rules, language and 
convention - evades and resists all forms of logical analysis, and has therefore been left a 
closed box.                   
    
…in interpreting primitive play we immediately come up against that irreducible 
quality of pure playfulness which is not, in my opinion, amenable to further analysis. 
[Instead] we shall have to speak of contest and races, of performance and exhibitions, 
                                                 
17
 So much so that O. Fred Donaldson, for example, felt it necessary to quit his academic institution to 
pursue this research.  Since then however, non-representational theory and other movements in academic 
thought have opened up possibilities for engaging such taken for granted activities.        
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of dancing and music, pageants, masquerades, and tournaments. (Huizinga 1970: 25-
26).  
 
In fact, such a distinction is based upon a falsely construed dichotomy between the 
perfectly ‘primitive’ or ‘natural’ body (something I argue cannot exist) and a ‘civilized’ 
or ‘cultural’ one.  As with so much academic knowledge, here ‘interpreting’ and 
exploring, has required that the process under investigation be amenable to, or frozen 
solid by, representations (Harrison 2000).  It may well be difficult to talk about the ‘fun’ 
of playing or the ‘creative’ in playing, as they slip away in each moment we try and say 
of it, it is this thing or that thing – too soon it has become something else.  “As a concept, 
it cannot be reduced to any other mental category” (Huizinga 1970: 21).  Here though, 
and in the spirit of non-representational theory, the goal is certainly not reduction, nor 
categorisation.  Rather it is to ask: can I, and what happens if I do, explode the ‘concept’ 
or ‘category’ and set forth more possibilities for play? 
 
As such, in this section the reader will not be able to find a definitive version of what 
play ‘is’, or for that matter what play is ‘not’.  Rather, I will attempt to develop the 
manifesto for play, as advanced by Donaldson (1993), which admits that play cannot be 
shown, taught, or given – rather it is an unfolding of multiple possibilities which have the 
potential to “transform commonplace into heart-warming spaces.” (ibid: 139).  It has no 
clear boundaries, often being a question in itself, play allows “a process of performative 
experiment” (Thrift 1997: 145).  
 
What I explore throughout is the way play involves contact and, in many forms, a de-
centring of the human subject.  In the process, play makes clear that our complex and 
evolving networks are not zero-sum.  In competitive sport ‘the game’ encourages us to 
assume the opposite.  Sports have fairly rigid rules, which may on occasion be 
transgressed and change over time but still to a great extent govern the activity of 
participants.  If sports have their own rules, their own delineated spaces (a pitch, court, 
pool, ring…) and times, it does not fit together easily with the notion of gratuitous 
freedom (cf. Bauman 1993).  Many commentators on play, including those that consider 
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mostly ‘cultural play’ and sport, assert that it must be a ‘free’ activity (cf. Caillois 1961, 
Huizinga 1970, Thrift 1997).  
 
As an obligation or simply an order, it would lose one of its basic characteristics: the 
fact that the player devotes himself [sic] spontaneously to the game, of his free will 
and for his pleasure, each time completely free to choose retreat, silence, meditation, 
idle solitude, or creative activity. (Caillois 1961: 6).   
 
But play as both an expression of freedom and a purposeful activity can have its own 
discipline.  If we affirm play as an activity that must be with places, animals, things or 
people (in other words playmates) then where does this leave our freedom?  A ‘pure’ 
freedom cannot exist while we are acting in contact with the world.  Moments of 
encounter always possess the capacity to exceed (Dewsbury 2000, Dewsbury, et al. 
2002). Playmates inevitably constrain as well as create possibilities. In contrast, Huizinga 
claims that “play can be deferred or suspended at any time. It is never imposed physical 
or moral duty.” (1970: 26).  Asserting the completeness of freedom as Huizinga does, 
denies the possibility for intimate contact and valorises the passer; the tourist that plays 
from on high, remaining apart and emotionally disentangled.  To become engaged in play 
is to accept that, at least in part, you will become a decentred subject and therefore not 
‘free’ to choose all the conditions of play.  Contemporary tourism, a perversion of play 
for Bauman, tries to unhitch the body from this contact with the world, with ethically 
significant consequences.      
 
Tourism is no longer something one practices when on holiday… Ideally one should 
be a tourist everywhere and everyday. In, but not of. Physically close, spiritually 
remote.  Aloof.  Free – the exemption from all non-contractual duties having been 
paid for in advance.  Ideally, with the moral conscience having been fed a sure-fire 
dose of sleeping pills.  (Bauman 1993: 242-3)   
 
 I deal with the issue of ‘free’ play more in the following chapters, for now what is 
important is the way in which play is free only in the sense that it has the capacity to 
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perceive and act beyond socially constructed and accepted norms of behaviour.  Such 
play, as a practice, does not rule out anything, but searches for wonder in embodied 
engagement.  Rather than ‘free’, we might talk of how play is ‘enabling’ of both 
imagination and possibility, as it brings us into fresh contact with the world.           
 
Play as subversive habit?   
 
The ‘routine’ way we experience day to day existence and form more or less solidified 
patterns of movements and relations with the world has been critiqued by an array of 
scholars, from numerous methodological angles.  Social conventions and habits of 
movement and bodily comportment are held up as a distinctly harmful obstacle to 
positive change (cf. Butler 1990, Harrison 2000, Johnston 1998, Rose 1995, Young 
1990).      
 
Conventions make life comfortable: they safeguard life lived in the pursuit of self-
interest. It only seems, on the surface that following conventional courtesy is the 
instrument of togetherness. In fact, separation is the effect.  We use conventions as a 
means for keeping aloof from one another and for insulating ourselves. (Bauman 
1993: 78)      
 
For Bauman, it is our taken for granted, routinised relations with each other that detract 
from something more primordial: the ‘unspoken demand’
18
 that the Other makes of us to 
care and ‘be for’.  Like play, for him, this demand operates outside the function of social 
conventions.  In this way it does not allow one to know with certainty if they are right or 
wrong.  It forces a consideration, and ethical evaluation absent from routinised behaviour.  
“‘Everyone does it’, ‘This is how things are done’ is the preventative, and effective, 
medicine for guilty conscience.” (ibid: 79).  Instead of social norms, he argues, any 
foundation for the practice of ethics must be more elusive and non-codifiable.  
 
                                                 
18
 Here he draws on Kund E. Logstrup’s (1971) work, The Ethical Demand.  
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Traditional ‘ethical systems’ it would seem, are deeply problematic, because they are not 
animated by life, but frozen solid by habitual representational based knowledges 
(McCormack 2003).  For Donaldson, this characterises the way that play has been 
‘corrupted’ by rule based systems.  “When ‘ethics’ arrived, we played fairly- to win at 
any cost.  When kindness dissolved, we played for keeps.” (Donaldson 1993: 93).  
 
Activity, movements and ways of thinking, like play, that allow or even valorise, 
experimentation and uncertainty are an about-turn on traditional value judgments of 
‘wrong’ or ‘right’ behaviour.  As such, there are difficult questions to be confronted.  
Bauman’s commitment to an ‘un-spoken demand’ does not sit easy with our traditional 
means of communicating what we want to happen, and what we feel about the way things 
have gone and are going.  How do we make space for ‘enabled’ thought and doings 
unfamiliar to us, whilst also coping with the dangers, necessities, and desires of everyday 
life?  In general we make a huge number of implicit assumptions and judgments based on 
un-thought activity, which are entirely necessary to function as we do. The door is 
opened before we step through, familiar friends are acknowledged with a particular 
gesture, to consume food our hands wield utensils ‘the way they are always wielded’.  
Where is the place of play here?   
 
“Do not play with your food!”  Survival, one might surmise, is much too serious an 
activity to play about with.  In asserting play, one can be immediately accused of being a 
malcontent, of being unhappy with the way things are.  After all what is wrong with 
letting habit, our embodied, comfortable, implicit (and often assumed to be ‘expert’) 
knowledge do what it does best?  Play is possibly unique in its desire for change for 
change’s sake.  There does not need to be dissatisfaction with the current situation for the 
workings of imagination.  Yet play is often seen as a behaviour which is deliberately and 
contemplatively subversive; ‘a preformative critique’ or ‘challenging’ for example (cf. 
Borden 2001, Briginshaw 2001).   
 
“This is not a playground area!” 
“This is a cricket pitch, for cricket, not […words fail] whatever it is you’re doing.” 
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“Get Down from there!” 
(Three of many reprimands recorded in parkour and bike trials diary extracts. All in 
Aberystwyth area).        
 
While all these events may have been construed as being in some small way ‘subversive’, 
they were certainly not done with a subversive intent.  Envisaging possibilities, can excite 
and incite, without any particular gripe.  Breaking with the comfort of conventionality 
can in fact become an effortless habit in itself.       
 
‘Common sense’, it seems, while arguably a necessity for survival, is a jealous 
knowledge.  Transgressions, or experiments in thinking and doing otherwise, as new and 
evolving embodied movements can show, are not always welcome (cf. Cresswell 2006).  
Being playful with ‘everyday’, taken for granted, spaces and objects forces a re-
conceptualisation, it undermines essentialist positions, proving the pluralism and 
diversity with which people can engage the world.  It reminds us of the doubt, which may 
be experienced as debilitating, but as non-representational theorists (cf. Harrison 2000, 
2008) and pragmatists (cf. Diggins 1995, Jones 2008) alike have shown, can invigorate 
and energise.  Doubt asserts that our engagements with the world are not firmly closed 
and finished, but that we remain receptive to other ways of inhabiting spaces, other 
modes of mobility, and other ideas and political and ethical positions.  
 
It is reasonable to suggest, that doubt about ones own capabilities and potentiality, can at 
times be ‘found’ through the imaginings of other ways to be. “Could I do that?”, “Would 
it be possible to balance on this?”, “What will happen if I do…?” are all calls to doubt, 
that are not necessarily malcontent, but hold a playful curiosity toward time-spaces that 
necessitates a continuous re-assessment.  While peppered with doubt, play is not ‘free’ in 
the Huizingarian sense (and therefore is, for him not play at all).  This research argues 
that it is through this process of re-assessment that we find the ability to sense place as a 
playground.               
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To find a playground, for Donaldson, one must forget the conventional, and the 
categories and labels which can mask all other ways to perceive the world.  It is also quite 
a personal affair, in which being open and vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of place can 
equally bring forth the specificities of ones own embodiment.  
 
Each playground has qualities found only by being there… I cannot tell you where 
this will be, you will know when you open up to the possibilities of such places... 
Playgrounds enchant, teach and astound; follow humbly or you shall learn nothing.  
Finding a playground is a mutual choosing; it chooses you as you choose it. 
(Donaldson 1993: 127).         
 
From an individual’s perspective this kind of play could, at a push, be considered a form 
of ‘reality-testing’ (cf. Winnicott 1971: 131).  But the search for a playground, as 
Donaldson describes it, is less coherently centred and less scientific.  Rather it is a move 
that makes evident the fuzziness which can be too easily forgotten when we use the 
designator ‘I’: It chooses you as you choose it.  Reality-changing or making, then, might 
be more accurate a phrase than Winnicott’s ‘reality-testing’.  
 
Donaldson’s ‘original play’ is a departure from social norms and conventions; it is a way 
of exploring, but also unfolding, the relationship and contact with the other.  For him 
original play seeks escape from culture (however impossible a task), which tends towards 
apperception rather than perception.  For the participant of original play, each interaction 
should be unfettered by inter-subjective convention.  For Donaldson, play is truly ‘play’, 
when one is empty of pre-conceptions and approaches situations as a beginner (1993).       
 
How does this fit with activities that can evidently become a fundamental part of people’s 
identity and everyday existence?  For some kinds of play, it might seem reasonable to say 
that it is somehow a separate reality, cordoned off by rules and conventions.  But the 
assumption that we have the ability to dip in and out of the game at will, to restart 
without consequence (see Bauman 1993, Huizinga 1970), and forget completely any 
previous game, is to underestimate the enduring affectivity play has on the body.       
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If reality is oozy, ubiquitous, straggly, splattered all over the place – play is securely 
protected behind its temporal and spatial walls.  Play has its beginning and end, both 
well marked – with a bell, a whistle, a starter shot, a finish line, the rise and fall of the 
curtain. It does not begin before it begins and it does not go on after it has ended. 
(Bauman 1993: 170-1).  
 
And yet Parkour, for example, is not something you do in the morning and put away in 
the afternoon, it is a move toward an affective state that captures the body and seeks to 
perceive the world in a different and ever changing way.  Here play is not forgotten, or 
left behind after practice or with the coming of age.  Rather it develops, as the 
practitioner finds new playgrounds, and their body begins to encompass a kinaesthetic 
sense for listening to places.  In parkour, as with many other activities, play is not, 
cannot, be constricted by time intervals and boundary lines.  In parkour, in particular, 
play is seeking always to move the lines, the play itself could, in fact, be with the lines.  
Here play is a reality.  It is not separable, or existent in an isolated present.  It does build 
up and upon the time that becomes spatialised - manifest in the cells of the body, the 
synapses of the muscles, the blocks of a wall, and the relative positions of things.        
 
The process of play is thus a fully embodied engagement with the world.  Even the play 
of our make-believe or imaginations is grounded in experiential time-space.  In such play 
the tried and tested ‘rules’ that constitute ‘reality’, can be bent and broken, but the 
elements – the space and time – that constitute that reality still shape the experience.  
Similarly cultural ‘rules’ endure, even if only through the excitement elected by their 
absence.  As I explore in chapter 5, riders often dream they can do impossible feats on a 
bike, but all these dreams are dreams made in relation to their intense experiences of 
contact with the world.    
 
It is clear that imaginary make-believe play - that is sometimes characterised as being a 
completely free unbound reality unto itself (cf. Dovey and Kennedy 2006) - is in fact, a 
form of embodiment that cannot be fully abstracted from our ‘withness’ to the physical 
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world.  As theorized here, play involves a contact that tends towards experimentation and 
discovery.  It incessantly asks of reality, “what are you and how can we play together?”  
In the case of parkour, bike trials and capoeira, each has a historical trajectory that puts a 
specific spin on these questions but each does not stop.  Each of the activities is a 
committed quest to find new ways to pose and enact the questions. 
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Playing with discipline 
 
 
By the time we reach five or so, what was once universally appreciated as our way of 
being and doing is reserved for recess at school and leftover time at home.  Very early 
in life children learn two things: first, to separate play and work, and secondly that 




Nothing I do is expressive, and it feels like I am shackled with a device that has been 
designed to sense the enjoyment in movement and respond by sending a shock to the 
unfortunate wearer. My feet cry in protest with every pivot, squat, or spin.  An 
unbearable strain from a small patch of failed skin.  Despite continuing with the play, 
all my movements are curtailed.  What keeps me going on?  (Capoeira diary 7/7/07).    
 
Reflecting on those moments when it seemed pain should have called a stop and 
prevented me going on with the activity (and therefore forgoing further physical damage 
to myself), it was the non-singularity of the moment that carried me forward.  The pain, 
while immediate and intensely present, was not enough to jettison those times and places 
that inhabit the body, letting it know that this particular pain will be something else: 
enabling.  The past and future times, persistently folding into the living form, have the 
capacity to make playful even pain.  In this instance the screaming from the ball of my 
foot could not drive out the feeling that what I was doing was worth something, because 
it was going to be ‘fun’.  Not only that, but voluntarily enduring the pain would somehow 
make it more fun
20
.  The expectation was that it would make me more proficient, and 
better able to play with the others. 
 
At first, any claim that suggests that play can include elements of pain and effort may 
appear to be counterintuitive (Dovey and Kennedy 2006; Lindquist 2001), and quite a 
different thing to Donaldson’s original play which asks us to be open, in the moment, not 
                                                 
19
 Like Donaldson, I believe that this is the case in the majority of Western schools, but is worth pointing 
out that there are alternative educational systems, like Steiner schools, that put more value on play.       
20
 See chapter 4 for more on the way future times inhabit the moment. 
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clouded by the past or held captive by the ‘cultural’.  And yet play does present us with 
possibilities and futures in which we invest energy. Dissolved in every moment of playful 
action, however liberated, is our corporeal knowledge of time.  We feel the way things 
are going (Dreyfus 2005), and in doing so we have a kinaesthetic sense of the future.  As 
one feels more, and as certain pains become more familiar – for example regular 
stretching sessions in capoeira – the unpleasantness of them can change quite drastically.  
Perhaps one might say they cease being pain at all, but become a managed sensation; part 
of an embodied strategy (Spinney 2006) in which the emotionality of pain moves in line 
with the body’s knowledge and engagement in play.  Play is thus a learning in which 
(contra to Huizinga and others) spontaneous desire does not reign supreme.  Like almost 
all activities, play is a journey in which we are continually sensing, evaluating
21
 and re-
defining both our destinations and origins.       
 
When I began playing, I felt like a cube trying to become a sphere. I kept bumping 
my elbows, knees, shoulders and head. My corners were in need of rounding off.  I 
couldn’t roll or fall; I clunked and banged. I got up slowly and went home sore each 
day.  (Donaldson 1993: 51).      
 
 
It has been said that without discipline and persistent practice in parkour, what you have 
left is ‘reckless jumping around’
22
.  Similarly, to participate in both capoeira and bike 
trials in all but the most superficial way requires that the body undergoes some 
modification.  A willingness to train comes dangerously close to the idea of ‘working’ 
towards some desired embodied potentiality.  Play has a very real sensibility and logic of 
its own – it is not necessarily fearless in a ‘reckless jumping around’ sense.  Indeed, it is 
only by ignoring the regularly denied cumulative element of play that one could think 
otherwise.  Rather play can, and does, become a quest, such that it forces a 
reconsideration of its stereotypically ‘presentist’ or ‘moment-based’ conception. 
 
                                                 
21
 All be it in a non-cognitive way. 
22
 See, ESPN (2007): E:60 Parkour Documentary Accessed: 23/8/08 available from: 
http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=3097213&categoryid=null 
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That is not to say that play does not take place in the moment in quite an intense way, 
instead, and in a quite non-linear way, past and future occupy, and cannot be excluded 
from that ‘now-moment’.  For practitioners of parkour, capoeira and bike trials, new 
situations provide a way to develop the body’s capacity to play more.  While repetition of 
movements (drilling) can be considered through a distinctly anti-playful lens, the flip side 
is that not only is each ‘repetition’ slightly different, but each opens out a small 
(sometimes imperceptibly small) field of new possibility.  Taken cumulatively, not only 
can such ‘training’ become play in and of itself, but it can also create the conditions for 
making new playful connections with people and places.  
 
I really enjoyed the roda today.  It has taken a while but I was starting to be able to do 
some more moves, so I felt I could play a bit with some of the people who have been 
doing it for a while – it’s just getting that confidence.  That was really fun, because 
they can do things that then mean you can do even more moves.  (Jane, in 
conversation, recorded in capoeira diary 12/6/08).                          
 
It is about doing everything you can to prepare for a movement, not training until you 
get it right, but training again and again until it is almost impossible to fail the move.  
So being a traceur is not about what you can do already, it’s about how determined 
you are to get there, to add to your parkour.  (Josh, in The Pilgrimage Project’ 
Documentary (Germain 2008)).   
 
The activities considered here require a large personal investment, in terms of time, 
energy and perhaps even emotionality, to achieve sufficient competency to allow for 
freeform play. Discipline is a way the body learns to cope with the tremendous variety of 
situations thrown up in play practice.  Being an activity that is always ‘with’, each play 
situation presents many different questions.  What will that feel like?  How will x react 
when I do this or that?  Of course, in many instances these questions and their answers, 
felt intuitively, are never given linguistic form.  This embodied intuition is supported by 
our ability to exist in the more-than-now moment, so that play can merge with the 




Discipline gives some kind of order to play.  But this is an order that “never hangs over 
the heads of the players as the laws of society or nature do, but one which is born anew, 
together with the players’ willingness to obey it” (Bauman 1993: 172).  How is it then 
that pain is a familiar friend (or foe) to the individual seeking to develop skills and bodily 
capacities in these kinds of activities?  My assertion is that it is possible to play with pain 
and fear - both are able to cast startlingly vibrant colour on the familiar. As one parkour 
practitioner put it to me, “If it is the few seconds of victory you want, winning a race that 
sort of thing, then there is not much point in doing this stuff. But if you like practicing 
and trying new things and working things out, falling off a lot [jokingly laughs], then it 
ticks all the boxes.” (Gavin, parkour diary 7/1/2006).    
 
Such hardship and ‘order’ is entered into freely and empowers the individual, allowing 
them to connect in ways that have the potential to re-invigorate their environment.  After 
skills and capacities have developed – when we decide to rest upon our laurels – this 
element of experience can wither to nothing.  Of all three activities researched, none stop, 
none cease pushing, refining, twisting in new directions, grasping at inspiration from 
elsewhere, pulling in fortunate mistakes, consciously re-inventing.  There is no 




Beyond Scripted Play 
 
Discipline makes possible a type of play that can be progressive, and that can be slowly 
and intimately worked upon.  In our absorption and dedication to this or that play we are 
incrementally improving our mastery at moving in space and manipulating the materiality 
of the world (Sennett 2008).  Discipline of play enables a creativeness that can 
overwhelm our best efforts to predict it.  Play is difficult to command and control, not 
because it is deliberately subversive, but because it is not made from fixed means-ends 
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relationships (Huizinga 1970, see also Thrift 1997).  The discipline that underpins and 
becomes so much play is not therefore prescriptive, though it can be suggestive.  What 
makes it different to the discipline that one receives from institutional powers, is that is 
comes from intimacy with the world and a practical dedication to some activity.  The 
discipline of the school master’s rod or verbal lashing is a world away from the driving 
urge that can encourage one to undergo hardship in order to experience new sensuous 
encounters with things.  Ironically, play, an undervalued form of knowledge creation, has 
the potential for real and enduring discipline, that is far more attentive and focused 
toward the other than any form of order that is steeped with oppression.  
 
Questing is education at its most intensive – at the depth where the self dissolves – 
and expansive – at the width where the self merges with the world. Within such 
octaves of meaning, the real interests of the universe are met, and not superficial, 
narrow interests of a self and society. There is an urgent need to develop such a 
belonging consciousness – an awareness of our connection with and participation in 
the larger world. (Donaldson 1993: 117-18).   
 
It is precisely our participation with the world that is at stake when we dismiss play as 
purposeless and childish.  Writing critically of large planned public spaces Richard 
Sennett, in his 1977 book The fall of public man, discussed the death of public space.  For 
Sennett, public space has become a ‘traffic-flow-support-nexus’, rather than a space to be 
savoured, enjoyed or played in. These spaces, we are told, are now to be moved through – 
utilitarian areas that allow the citizen to go from one indoor space to another
23
. In short 
these spaces, for Sennett, do not fulfil the needs of the modern day flâneur.  As Bauman 
notes, not all places are equally suited to the activity of the flâneur.   
 
Not all streets are […] the proper grazing ground for the flâneur’s imagination. 
First, the pavements must be physically wide enough so that ‘hanging around’, 
‘stopping once in a while to look around’, be physically possible.  Second, there 
must be enough interest in the street and houses that flank it to allure those who 
have the time and urge to hang around.  (Bauman 1993: 175) 
 
                                                 
23
 We might draw parallels here with, Augé (1995).  
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Robbed of the conditions for fine flâneuring pastures we are left with meticulously 
‘managed playgrounds’.  Places planned with singularly ruthless attention to the 
movement of people for the purposes of profit.  These spaces are managed or engineered 
with an understanding of the affective potential of things. Signposts, flooring materials, 
lighting, smells, surveillance, and seating – those things that the living body responds to, 
that do work on our states of fatigue, anxiety, hunger, restlessness, etc. are carefully 
arranged for the unseen owners of ‘public space’.  “Definitely, the street is no longer the 
flâneur’s hunting ground.” (Bauman 1993: 177).  And yet the same is true of the indoor 
spaces specifically connected by these new public highways (cf. Adey 2008).   
 
These indoor spaces, rather than fulfilling the criteria set out above - ‘good to hang 
around’, ‘correct width’, considered and interesting views, and so on - become, Bauman 
argues, places in which it remains difficult to retain any sort of multiplicity
24
.  Shopping, 
and little else is the order of the day. 
 
In fact, the new in-walls haunts are the places of the flâneur’s ultimate defeat. The 
most cherished of flâneurisme seductions – the right to write the script and to direct 
the play of surfaces – has been expropriated by the designers and the managers and 
the profit-makers of the shopping malls.  The scripts are now ready-made, and 
expert-made, discrete yet precise, and leaving little to the imagination and less still 
to the spectator’s freedom.  (Bauman 1993: 177). 
 
The sanitization of space to allow properly regulated movement, or the regulation of the 
body by space has other, unexpected effects.  Parkour, for example draws off a narrative 
of freedom, which could in part, be considered to have grown from those padded, risk 
averse spaces, and from a suspicion of ‘accident equals blame’ mentality.  How ‘they’ 
want you to move is unimportant, finding your own way is crucial – risk assessment 
becomes personal.  This has not escaped the notice of corporate media producers, 
advertisers and other companies that sell ‘play’.  Mirror’s Edge, for example - a computer 
game in which parkour features heavily - invites you to play out the story of a 
                                                 
24
 This is an idea that is now quite well contested.  See, for example, Cresswell (2006), Merriman (2007).   
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courier/freerunner, who subverts the evils of a restrictive totalitarian regime (a caricature 
of the current and real pressures to conform felt by individuals).          
 
Once this city used to pulse with energy; dirty and dangerous but alive and 
wonderful.  Now it is something else. The changes came slowly at first.  Most did 
not realise or did not care, and accepted them.  They chose a comfortable life. Some 
didn’t… They became our clients.  (Mirror’s Edge website 2008). 
 
In this dystopian vision of the sterile city (the ‘mirror’), play has been rendered lifeless 
and illegal.  Yet the game is also a portrayal of play itself: it is at the ‘edge’, ‘dirty’, 
‘dangerous’ – in other words the ‘wonderful’ gritty stuff of life itself.  To experience this 
aliveness, is to reject the discipline of the state, and to impose one’s own discipline – to 
reject the easy or ‘comfortable’ path.   
 
Thus, with a good measure of contradiction we are now regularly sold ‘games’ with a 
ready-made map for this freedom.  We are invited to play along at playing.  To take up 
someone else’s playful discipline from the sedentary and secure comfort of our homes.  
What Bauman calls ‘second-level play’, is the most ironic promise of play, stripped of its 
capacity for particular types of sensuous encounter.  In such simulations we are given 
something quite different.  While we explore and possibly enjoy the game world, testing 
to see what types of virtual movement the games designers now reward, in an obvious 
way we are, none the less, restricted to playing out someone else’s script.  The producers 
and designers take us on their journey, and we play along: ‘direction is constant and 
ubiquitous, though carefully disguised as (managed) spontaneity’ (Bauman 1993: 177).  
And yet, just like the carefully crafted shopping malls, our play is not completely 
determined.  In making contact we are involved in such a way that our imagination can 
still re-script, and other times and places can also lend a hand in the process.                 
 
One of the things we do when we play computer games is work out the rule set, “but in a 
wider sense we are also figuring out what the game engine
25
 does, what it wants us to do, 
how far we can ‘get away’ with testing the limits of the game code.” (Dovey and 
                                                 
25
 ‘Game engine’ simply refers to the core programme or code that is used to run the game.  
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Kennedy 2006: 41).  Probing the edges of this ultimate authority may be entertaining for 
some time, but its clear cut unfuzziness, betrays its all too impersonal fixity – there are 
only a limited number of ways to approach objects in the game world.  Coins may be 
used to trade, but rarely can they be juggled with, stacked into a funny shaped tower, 
thrown about, or jangled round - in many games they remain a non-object – a crucial but 
dull numeric code displayed in the corner of the screen.  This kind of ‘second-level’ play, 
it seems to me, is more open to the managing and controlling tendencies (cf. Thrift 
2004a) of corporate authority and does not fit so well with the liberal promise of play’
26
.                 
 
Play eludes power, rather than confronts it and for two reasons.  First, because, as a 
world of virtual forms, it cannot be commanded in the way that is true of work, 
since it is not made up of means-ends relationships.  Second, because, as a world of 
virtual forms, it can be described by words but ultimately it cannot be written or 
spoken. (Thrift 1997: 149) 
 
When embodied discipline is evacuated from play, we may be given a new and 
imaginative set of possibilities, but all are limiting in their form.  It remains a tremendous 
technical challenge, and something of an ongoing race to develop more sensuously 
interactive computer games (and interfaces), that better represent and assume our 
physical and playful encounters.  So called ‘massively multiplayer online role-playing 
games’ (MMORPG) are admittedly a step towards this, in which the unpredictability and 
idiosyncrasies of human controlled players can be interacted with.   
 
Still there is at least some truth in the adage ‘the media is the message’, and while this 
play wrestles with technological methods to closer approximate (and in some instances 
entangle with
27
) reality, it is worth considering what is excluded from such ‘play’.  Thus 
far, computer games have been hugely successful at enchanting players across the world, 
and in instances they throw open a whole new politics.  And yet, aside from the negative 
health implications, these games remain more narrowly connected to the sensuous world 
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 See Patricia Masters’ (2008) critique of the scholar’s ‘romantic play’ which, she argues, conveniently 
forgets the cruelty, power relations and danger of play.     
27
 For example, it is common for online games to link/lock into capitalist systems by having an exchange 
rate between National currency (real money) and in game currency.      
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than most.  While writers like Bauman might begrudge the lack of participation that new 
kinds of playground afford us, it is clear that they are captivating for those that apply 
themselves fully and ‘live out the script’ of their imagined characters (even if it is 
directed from behind the scenes).  In this instance then, they can multiply possibilities.  
Steven Poole puts it thus:  
 
And children have always made up their own ‘explorations games’, playing, for 
instance, in a deserted house and imbuing it with magical qualities. Now 
technological prosthesis afforded by video games such as Tomb Raider or Zelda 64 
allow such activity to be far more complex and cognitively challenging, so that the 
game really can, in Walter Benjamin’s phrase, ‘calmly and adventurously go 
travelling’.  (Poole 2000: 176)  
 
We might argue over the ability of a scripted game to enhance complexity and adventure 
to the extent that Poole claims, but these virtual forms are indisputably created and 
formed with imagination, and retain that creative power.  Whether for the individual they 
become all consuming games that rule all others (thus forgoing the chance for 
imaginative encounters elsewhere) or simply another exciting chance to experience that 
which is unlikely, seems next to impossible to determine and remains a hugely important 
question, packed with value judgments.          
 
Play, as conceived here, evokes discipline effortlessly because of our desire to involve 
ourselves with the world and to play a part within it.  As Sennett  (2008) argues, our play 
operates in such a way that we can and do build relationships with things as well as 
modifying the things themselves.  Just as the bike trials practitioner can develop 
attachment to the materiality of a well made bike component - one which allows them to 
ask new questions about space sensed through the bike - so do they move forward 
embodying the play that had gone before.  Their arranging and rearranging of bike 
configuration, is done as a play that seizes knowledge from engineering, geometry and 
physics to practical embodied feelings and spatiotemporal competencies.  Each 
incarnation of the modified bike is as much an excited play as the practice of the riders 
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themselves.  Both have no solid end in sight but a commotion of hopes, possibilities and 
questions that might be raised.                     
 
 
The reality of Wonderland, and the disciplined chaos of play are impossible to 
penetrate with logical reasoning. These are processes designed to stop thinking. 
They must be grasped with in terms of another awareness. The most important step 
in this process is being open to the possibility. Not a given possibility, but any 
possibility.  (Donaldson 1993: 120).  
 
The possibility of play is not ‘given’ but is enacted through contact with the world.  It is 
our so routinely devalued vulnerability that makes this possible.  When we do 
vulnerability we valorise the here-and-now realness of that which surrounds us.  In the 
process our play can begin to find new rules.  When the entities around us get the first say 
our perceptions of them can be negotiated and changed.  In the pursuit of ‘any possibility’ 
and the vulnerability it entails, that can draw out the unusual in the everyday – the extra-
ordinary from the ordinary.  “It is the individual’s perception with, and acceptance of, the 
uncertainties of existence that moves the ordinary toward the ‘extra’” (Teal 2008: 15, 
emphasis added).  
 
In an ‘everyday’ and fully socialized world, uncertainties can become harder to find.  
Spaces become prescriptive through our certain and confident recognition of them.  ‘This 
is a main street’, ‘this is a football field’, ‘a cafeteria’, ‘a car park’; all invoke 
recognizable use patterns and modes of perception and tend to restrict possibility.  For 
some, play and an emotional attraction to the extraordinary, lead inevitably to a 
disciplined practice of responding to the ‘any possibility’.  In parkour, for example, 
practitioners make ‘training’ devices from all kinds of everyday objects, in order to 
develop possibilities.   
  
Discipline is all the time: the way you eat, the way you talk, the way you breathe, 
the way you stand, the way you think etc...discipline is not so much about imposing 
something than focusing on what you do and try to give what you do some 
efficiency and style. So there's no, ‘I focus now because I'm training’.  Training is 
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all the time and never ends, especially regarding the little details of life. If we take a 
seat, we try to be as silent and light as possible. If we open a door, same... We want 




            
Play is not in opposition to discipline and order, rather “play emerges out of the harmony 
of spontaneity and discipline.” (Donaldson 1993: 112, emphasis mine).  As one commits 
to play, freedom becomes a continual paradox: “a commitment does not get a grip of me 
if I am always free to revoke it.” (Dreyfus 2001: 85)  Yet a commitment to certain body 
practices and open attitudes towards space (disciplined vulnerability) can give the 
individual renewed sensitivity, and bring back the astonishment one might feel upon 
experiencing certain spaces.  This is not a harking toward romantic notions of being 
authentic; rather it is asserting that possibilities are given by the world to the individual 
through a continued and practiced openness. In such a way the seemingly dull and 
insignificant things or relations ‘light up’ when we apply our attention and embodied 
vulnerability to them (Teal 2008).   
 
We might argue over much of Huizinga’s definition and theorisation of play but his 
ultimate conclusion rings true: that play is a crucial footing upon which civilized society 
is built, and that in contemporary times (for him the 1940s) these have been eroded by the 
shift from organic games that are played in communities, towards closed and closely 
controlled ‘professional’ sports.  Not only is this shift notable for the reasons I have 
outlined above (that such ‘play’ is very much rule bound, tightly goal orientated and 
scripted), but Huizinga’s assertion has merit in that professional sport is the domain of 
winners and losers, who take their morality from the game rules, rather than the contact 
developed in play.                
 
                                                 
28
 Washington Parkour Forum post accessed from 
http://www.washingtonparkour.com/Parkour/parcours/habrey1.htm. 
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The winner takes all 
 
 
We decry violence on the one hand, and promote contests that perpetuate it on the 
other. (Donaldson 1993 :105). 
 
He is just so serious about how he plays, and certainly has a scary glint in his eye.  I 
guess the intimidation can all be considered part of the capoeira game, but he does 
seem to carry a lot of the unspoken threat through into the actual movements.  One 
bout he was in descended into something approaching out and out fighting – all 
poise was lost, and Edy stepped in to peal the pair apart - their play turned into 
close quarters grappling.  My sense is that most people, particularly the girls (or at 




This game, which, while not entirely exceptional, was thankfully one of the only ones I 
witnessed turning sour.  Perceptible during this experience, was the way that each 
movement tried to dominate and win over the other, each fed into the vigour and violence 
of the game.  The competition, the desire to ‘win’ and the emotions that go with such an 
interaction became all consuming.  As with parkour and bike trials, capoeira can be 
understood, framed and even practiced as a competition.  Indeed it might seem 
unintuitive to think of capoeira as anything other than a competition.  And yet my work 
here is something of a treatise for understanding them as forms of play that accord little 
or no value to the competitive.    
                           
Competition, regardless of the form it takes, is for Huizinga, always play.  In the board 
room, the football pitch or the school quiz, participants are playing with purpose.           
Similarly, in his influential book Man, Play and Games, Roger Caillois (1961) outlines a 
type of play that wholly relies on the desire of individuals to win. Here playing games is a 
way of providing a structure that is supposedly absent in ‘everyday’ life.  This structure 
makes participants into contestants while also levelling the playing field with ‘fair’ rules.  
The outcome of such games should be based on merit and chance, but the virtuous player 
will swing towards the former, by their desire to win and therefore the practice and effort 
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they exert.  With good rules and proper regulation, Caillois asserts, play, just like the 
free-market dream, becomes a perfect meritocracy where the best, the deserving, and the 
‘self-made’ will take the spoils.  This, it might be argued, is as it should be – the fastest, 
bravest, the most intelligent win the game, progress to the next level, take humanity 
forward.  The losers, whom the ‘winner’ both creates and depends upon, are demoted, put 
down, and ridiculed accordingly.   
 
For Caillois (1961), competition instils virtue, promotes discipline, loyalty, teamwork and 
mastery.  Essentially it is the mechanism by which we learn the traits most prized, and 
rewarded in our society.  This way of understanding and describing play (competitive 
developmental) ‘is such that to not accept it would make us seem weak, unsuccessful and 
even unpatriotic.’ (Donaldson 1993: 72).   We are left with a rhetoric of play as progress 
(Dovey and Kennedy 2006), that fits neatly into a paradigm of global competition.  To 
play for fun or for the moment of encounter itself, rather than the final prestige has 
become, as Thrift (1997) suggests, almost a deviant act.  ‘We have assumed contest to be 
the basis of life, its moral order and cohesion as well as the source of its vitality and 
creative powers’ (Donaldson 1993: 105).  But if we think of play as a method of making 
new contact and encounter we require no adversary, teams, or sides.  Instead, in play the 
rules are dissolved and often our dichotomous enemy along with them. 
   
Contests are a centrifugal force, scattering and atomizing people as groups or 
individuals whose self-awareness depends on identifying others as outsiders. Our 
very identity is confirmed by the “Game”. Families, clans, tribes, gangs, teams, 
countries, the list of groups to which we can belong is endless. In order not to be 
thrown back on our own meagre resources, we cling desperately to those with 
whom we identify.  In a society of contests, people must somehow counteract the 
experience of their day-to-day existence as losers.  The contestant comes to be 
defined as the sane, well adjusted person.  (Donaldson 1993: 73). 
    
As we have seen, play so easily becomes absorbed by capitalist culture, and subverted 
into work.  As easily as computer game gold flows into ‘real-world’ currency exchange 
rates, other forms of play can, almost imperceptibly, become work - for the next best 
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bike, car or clothes.  Here playgrounds are not made, or discovered, but earned by the 
well accepted virtue of the contestant.                           
 
Playgrounds though, need not be so.  Tim Edensor (2005), for example, writes of derelict 
industrial ruins, often considered a ‘wasted space’ by right thinking citizens, but which 
are used for many forms of alternative adventurous play.  These playgrounds; 
unregulated and in many cases unsurveilled, give a trove of playful opportunity (see 
figure 1).  They are spaces and things in which the meanings of material objects are 
unfixed, they can be unclear in their function and ‘talk to’ our embodiment in inventive 
ways.  
 
Fitting into neither symbolic nor practical orders, these things have escaped the 
assignations which previously delineated their meaning and purpose and so we are 
able to relate to them in an imaginative, sensual, conjectural and playful fashion. 
(Edensor 2005: 123).  
 
By being in places in a way that allows them to snatch the attention of the inhabitant, that 
removes us of the often taken for granted context of competition, we become aware of 
play’s productivity.  Play allows new surfaces and depths to reveal themselves to us.  To 
play outside of ‘the game’ we are putting ourselves on the line, we are taking risks 
because we often do not know just what the world has to say when released from our 





Table 1:  What can play be? 
Majority of educational, scientific, 
therapeutic understandings of play 
   Play with emphasis on finding contact  
Valued because useful in:  development of 
child’s motor skills’; understanding and 
integration into competitive ‘adult’ world 
(and thus important for economic reasons); 
helps understanding of social hierarchies; 
uses up excess energy (a bemusing 
functionalist assertion, see Hyder 2005);          
‘Use’ always being redefined.  ‘Value’ is in 
process and is granted to a player through 
their contact with the world.   
Disrupts the ‘adult’/‘child’ binary – player 
becomes a perpetual beginner.   
Winner/loser Player 
Life occurs in zero sum systems World always being made, infinite 
possibilities   
‘Strong individual’ goal orientated  Goals emerge and morph through 
discovery of playgrounds 
Winning, particularly when the odds are in 
someone else’s favour is more or less equal 
to virtue 
Virtue is extrapolated through quality of 
contact  
Competitive  Experimental 










In play the beauty of the human body in motion reaches its zenith.  (Huizinga 1970: 
25). 
 
Play is commonly not a time for children and adults to be together. Even though 
adults walk around the same space, there are essentially two different worlds on the 
playground.  Children play, adults have playground “duty”, which is to police and 
manage children…  Adults stand around as if nothing below eye level interests 
them, wandering aimlessly through children at play, as if all that is called for is 
judging and warning. Otherwise it is taken for granted that our commitment or 
participation is never called for.  From their vantage points, adults can’t see play.  
(Donaldson 1993: 45-6).   
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Many theories of play, as Huizinga notes, start from the false assumption that play serves 
some purpose other than play itself.  Be it a biological need, a way to learn skills of 
adulthood, or whatever.  Most critics that have asked the ‘why?’ of play have sought the 
answer through a fixation on the logic of functionality.  In general the question has been 
set firmly in the paradigm of its time.  Here, following Donaldson, I depart from the raft 
of literature analysing play as ‘something’.  Instead this work is concerned with the ways 
in which we connect in new, unknown, experimental ways, with the environments and 
places we play in.  This ‘play’ is a non-representational wellspring which provides 
contact with the world.  Rather than ask, ‘why play?’ we might well wonder ‘what is life 
without play?’        
 
It is precisely, the ‘primitive’, ‘irreducible’ play which lays at the root, the beginning of 
contact with the world.  Rather than proclaim it off limits, we must ask: how, for so long, 
have we ignored this vital element: the purely playful, which marks us as beings alive?  
Donaldson’s caricature of the playground as a space for children, while a tad overstated, 
has purchase in a society that sees it as distinctly odd for an adult to play outside of 
organised sports.  How do we look over play?  How do we ‘forget’ how to play?  
 
Much of the remainder of this thesis is a concerted effort to learn to play.  Paradoxically 
though, ‘effort’, for most, remains caught up with the notion that we first have clear and 
well defined goals
29
 and as such has no place being associated with play.  As I have 
argued in this chapter, play as described here is always a learning, questing event.  It does 
not annihilate past or future time-space in its process, and while it is never captive to a 
singular or static vision, it is paradoxically intertwined, and shares a commitment to 
produce new worlds.               
 
Playing towards contact, my research has both been a discipline and required discipline.  
That is because I have not found it easy; I am far from being a perfect player: I find it 
hard to discover new qualities of contact, being part of a world that harbours so much 
aggression, misguided fear, hierarchical assumptions and competitively defined identity.  
                                                 
29
 It is interesting to note the breadth of different fields of endeavour in which so called SMART action 
plans are now relatively ubiquitous.   
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For so many people my age play is like a fight, it is being the best.  Much of this is 
reflected in my own flawed actions and embodiment.  Still, my involvement in capoeira, 
parkour and bike trials has been compromising, has changed the shape, size and 
comportment of my body and in turn it has helped ‘open’ the places that I now inhabit for 
different types of contact.                  
 
I know Chris is far better than me, but each kick, each dodge and snippet of 
[capoeira movement] dialogue is still somehow encouraging.  I feel like I have 
learned to read his body language fairly well, and he obviously has me sussed.  
Though we surprise each other still, they are positive surprises.  It is just really 
enjoyable to play with him.  It doesn’t feel anything like a fight, and I feel so much 
less uneasy.  Even the occasions we have hit each other just seem to reinforce that 
we are playing – fierce, in that we have little to hold back, but also completely like 
we are helping each other. Creating this movement, feeling, that is exciting, because 
it is always on the edge of what we can create together. On the edge of what we can 
do. (Capoeira diary 3/9/07).                                    
 
“The more we play, the more we let go of those allegiances based on fear. This is exactly 
what makes play an act of insurrection in a dehumanised world.” (Donaldson 1993: 74). 
Here Donaldson is talking of a specific type of fear. A fear which springs from isolation, 
rather than contact with place. A fear which prevents other types of emotional 
engagements (including other fearful engagements).  What if, however, we consider types 
of fear that connect us to outside entities and environments?  Then perhaps fear itself 
could become an instrument of play, a tool of freedom, rather than slavery.  In chapter 4 I 
consider how fear might become a playmate, an emotional engagement that can and does 
connect.  In Parkour practice, this form of fear becomes a familiar part of practice, which 
can playfully guide.
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The writing tries not only to accept the risk of sprouting deviant, but to invite it. Take 
joy in your digressions. Because that is where the unexpected arises. That is the 
experimental aspect. If you know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has 
happened in the meantime. You have to be willing to surprise yourself writing things 
you didn’t think you thought. (Massumi 2002: 20,21). 
 
 
For many scholars, the unambiguous starting point for a methodological approach should 
be a good appreciation of what the research is aiming to achieve (cf. Shurmer-Smith 
2003).  Such an attitude sits more than a little awkwardly next to human embodied 
experience, which is rarely so straightforward.  Neither is it a good bedfellow to recent 
calls in the social sciences that suggest we remain flexible in approach, and do not 
assume that we can have, at the outset, found ‘the question’; often in its formulation we 
have in mind ‘the answer’.  In making such assumptions, we risk foreclosing further 
possibilities and brutalise the multiple nature of knowledge.  Non-representational theory, 
for example, attempts to multiply questions, and to experiment with methods (Thrift 
2004d).  
 
In this chapter I attempt to elucidate some of that experimentation, starting with a 
discussion about the connected nature of embodiment, which is always in contact and 
vulnerable, but variably so.  I then argue that our theories about the world are very much 
a part of that contact, and consider some of the ways they have mixed with the movement 
involved in my research.  Rather than try to account for or otherwise excuse this 
intermingling of knowledge and doing I conceive of knowledge as a doing.  In the 
process of ‘knowing’ the world, so we are ‘doing it’.  This process is both our legacy and 
our responsibility and here I consider some ethical implications of whole-heartedly 
engaging in contact with those networks involved in my research.  Following non-
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representational theory, this research ‘is an attempt to move off onto new ground where 
the witness must become an observant participant rather than a participant observer’ 
(Thrift 2004d: 556).  Lastly I consider some flexible principles, which have in truth, 
developed over this research period, as much as they have offered a guiding focus.                                      
 
Objectivity and Subjectivity in Method: Experiments without a control 
 
I am suddenly and unexpectedly struck so that my mind stops dead and my neck 
prickles. The tone of sound engulfs me. Gathered in a circle I am practically 
overwhelmed by the Mestre’s first vocals.  Despite sounding like an unintelligible 
cry, an animal roar to my ears, it resonates within me.  (Capoeira Diary 4/7/07). 
 
 
Academics, throughout history and in all fields of research have been moved like this 
before.  Not that one could tell from the average text; it is not (or at least, was not) good 
practice to become so involved, to lose one’s professional distance.  Without a critical 
distance, what distinguishes between our observations (and hence our opinions, 
theorisations and ethical positions) and the ‘lay-person’s’?  Perhaps, as the proponents of 
‘public’ or ‘participatory’ geography
30
 would have it; we as academics are obliged to use 
our accrued wisdom (that presumably comes from having ‘knowledge’ as a profession?) 
to help improve and guide the people and lives we research.  On the other hand, while we 
are researching and learning in a particular area it is we who often need guidance.  In the 
unknown lands the academic may find themselves in, it can be they who might need 
lessons in order to learn an unfamiliar technique or method for living or even to maintain 
their personal safety.  We are often, and sometimes uncomfortably, in the hands of those 
with whom we research.  In learning the activities discussed here, I have been both 
complete novice and guide.  The dynamic processes of these multiple positions have been 
at the centre of my investigation.  As the body learns and tries to engage in new realms of 
interaction, it exposes the experimental quality of life and social interaction.  And it is 
                                                 
30
 For many references see the Participatory Geographies Research Group (PyGyRG) website: 
http://www.pygywg.org/index.html  
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perhaps this experimentation that characterises my research methodology and process 
best.    
 
If my method has been experimental body learning, it seems fitting to start this chapter 
with a consideration of that which gives us the ability to intervene in, observe, and make 
judgments about the world around us: the body.  This kind of discussion often starts by 
making the self evident and apparently obvious point: we all ‘have’, ’are’, ‘cannot do 
without’ a body (see for example Imrie 2003, Landzelius 2004, Longhurst 1997, Nast and 
Pile 1998, Shilling 1993).  To be doing beings we have a body, one which is alive by 
virtue of its movement.  From tissue cells and body fluids, to arms, legs or posture - every 
‘substance’ of the body can, in some way, be considered as a movement.  Indeed it is 
perhaps strange that we think of ‘a body’ as a thing rather than a doing, a process – life 
itself.  As discussed previously, the plethora of (particularly feminist) research during the 
1990s has brought ‘the differentiated body’ more fully to the attention of human 
geography.  To an arguable extent this has re-invigorated methodological practice, by 
forcing the academic to consider their own subject position (see Bell and Valentine 1995, 
Parr 1998, Rose 1997).  
 
The implications, of being a body, being affective and being in place, have also led to a 
somewhat common (perhaps even compulsory) afterthought in the ‘write up’ stage of 
research: that is, qualifying ‘findings’ with one’s subjective position.  Making allowances 
and trying to adjust for the ‘partiality’ of ones own taken for granted subjectivity.  While 
this has done a lot to make us aware of the kinds of bodies making academic knowledge, 
it also led to something of a tolerance towards the personal and individualised (so long as 
it was mentioned in the write up).  This qualification varies from a ‘standard apology’, to 
a thorough discussion of methodological positionality.  As a feminist driven political 
stepping stone this was crucially important in contesting the taken for granted 
universality of knowledge.  It did not, however, do a great deal to change the way we 
research and participate in the world.  It did little, for example, to stimulate research that 
would be valued for its continued intervention in the ‘outside’ world as well as the 
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academy.  The way we do research and its ‘products’ has lagged behind our theories of 
‘participation’, ‘non-representation’ and ‘embodiment’ (Latham 2003b, Pratt 2000).     
 
Another reaction to the growing awareness of ‘embodiment’ has been to rigorously 
interrogate the ‘self’; how one’s own subjectivity skews the data becomes important 
research data in and of itself.  Attempts at honest research on the subjective experiences 
and emotions of being a researcher (Blee 1998, Longhurst, et al. 2008), have made 
important headway in this regard, helping emotional experience to be taken seriously 
within the academy (Anderson and Harrison 2006, Anderson and Smith 2001).  And yet 
such attempts are often limited by the process of ‘writing up’.  At the final stage they 
suffer the tragic split, in which a person is divided, able to examine their ‘emotional’ 
selves from outside and to some degree objectify them, and apply ‘rigour’ and truth 
(albeit emotional truth) claims.  To make ‘data’ of ourselves and our process implies an 
evacuation of lived significance and value, so that, we ‘the data’ might then be evaluated 
even-headedly.   
 
This method, however curiously paradoxical, persists because it does have some utility.  
If we can detach ourselves from our ‘research position’ we might be more willing to form 
conclusions that are ‘de-centred’ and thus make changes to the world that might be less 
self interested.  Still, methods that seek a singular objective truth brutalise the world as 
they separate us from it.  In fact, in attempting to ‘manage’ one’s own subjectivity, the 
danger is that we create another ‘us’ that is once again freed from earthly engagements 
and can look down upon the ‘self’ which is being and acting subjectively.  This sort of 
reflexivity is neatly metaphored by the image of a painter trying to paint a picture of 
themselves painting that same picture (Heshusius 1994). In such ‘recursive paintings’, 
each time, as they try to grasp and represent the scene, it slips further and further into the 
distance.       
 
A way through this research trap, for Lous Heshusius (1994), can be found in adapting a 
‘participatory consciousness’.  With such an attitude we can escape the pitfall of 
attempting, but failing to be either objective or qualifiedly subjective.  Subjectivity, she 
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says, cannot be easily accounted for or explicitly mitigated against so that knowledge can 
be more closely identified with reality.  In other words, by creating ‘another us’ we are 
still not able to offer an objective commentary on the accuracy of our methods (ibid 
1994).  However ‘adjusted’ or ‘unbiased’ an account we try to produce it always comes 
from somewhere, namely: our own unique embodiment (Haraway 1988, Rose 1997).    
 
Heshusius makes a good point then; we have no such splitting capacity other than those 
we falsely invent.  But in the passage of time, can we not create a distance from our 
former selves and their entanglements with the world which might open the possibility 
for more balanced reflection?  In the act of writing about something, some event, we are 
involved in not only presenting it, but in re-enacting and rethinking it.  We are telling 
stories and enacting worlds (Mol and Law 2004).  This way of thinking about the written 
element of our research ‘product’ is participative in that it does not separate out our 
actions from those of which we might be speaking - thus we are in every sense, 
knowledge makers not recorders or representers.           
             
Of the three activities here, only capoeira has (as yet) received any significant academic 
attention.  In most of these accounts the body, while fore-grounded as the instrument of 
activity, is forgotten in a lived sense (Downey 2005 is a notable exception).  In much of 
this work the movements and gestures are carefully examined and codified, into abstract 
theorisations.  Being upside-down, for example, is read as an important cultural symbol 
signifying the inverted afterlife for African spirituality (see Browning 1997).  In this kind 
of research, movements are used to access some level of reality more real and meaningful 
than the experience itself.  Devoted as it is to delving for a root, a cause, a layer of reality 
that sits behind and pulls strings, such research can tend to neglect the embodied feelings 
of doing the activity and the significance of it which is quite literally ‘there’, in continual 
motion
31
.            
 
                                                 
31
 These movements, for some, might well signify certain things, but as embodied practices and in motion, 
these significances are very likely to change dramatically with time and space, and between practitioners.  
We might draw parallels here with Nash’s (2000) work on the changing practices of Tango.      
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The now well asserted mobility and movement ‘paradigm’ (Sheller and Urry 2006) 
brings us closer to this emergent realm while at the same time presenting academics with 
a difficult challenge.  How do we remain faithful to ‘process’ while respecting the 
institutionally embedded method of funding, research and publication?  We are called to 
ask if description is enough to justify the position society gives the academic
32
?  The 
pressure is on to ‘make sense’ of the world’s process, to analyse and come to a 
considered conclusion as to how things should progress.  In fact we do make sense of the 
world in a very literal way, with our corporeal senses, and we do tell stories about those 
sensuous experiences.  Inevitably this process involves us in the world: the starting point 
in coming to know is ‘not a subjectivity that one can explicitly account for, but is a direct 
participatory nature one cannot account for.’ (Heshusius 1994: 17).  It is, in other words, 
a contact that cannot be denied.  
 
Defused and Amongst 
 
You must be in it. (Thrift 2000c: 557) 
 
The methods that we use in research cannot be bracketed out from the knowledge 
itself (Carolan 2007: 1266).  
 
Since the turn of this century there have been various calls to ‘rematerialize’ human 
geography, to inject a more ‘bump-intoable’, ‘thingyness’ to our theoretical 
developments (Jackson 2000, Lees 2002). Certainly the solidity of a wall or the 
slipperiness of a wet railing were hugely significant for my research, but immediately we 
must temper such calls to ‘rematerialize’ with the knowledge that however hard or sharp 
‘things’ are, they do not exist or act alone.  Definitions of materiality cannot exclusively 
relate to the solid and concrete. For geographers like Alan Latham and Derek 
McCormack (2004), materiality is, from the start, shot through with the immaterial.  The 
                                                 
32
 One reading of thinkers like Latour is that, primarily, the academic’s role is to attempt to describe 
networks and little else (Latour 2005).  
 61 
way we think is not bounded by abstractions that separate off from the ‘real’.  The virtual 
and the imagined are always part of the ‘material’.     
 
Indeed, in resisting the temptation to cordon off and essentialise supposedly ‘concrete’ 
chunks of the world, we come across the fundamental inseparability of the material.  If 
attempts to keep our subjectivity under our own tight management would lead to our 
separation, and perhaps illusory control of it, so too might the atomization and separation 
of ‘things’.  If we can isolate ‘the material’ (narrowly construed), might it lend us some 
more control (and perhaps even ‘policy relevance’)?  Such a question turns away from 
that which lays undeniably at the heart of existence and life: ‘we’.  The so often bounded 
and boxed stuff of the world is mutated, and reconfigured by our knowledge making, just 
as it participates in the process itself (Latour 2000, 2004).  In other words, the way we 
think, feel, represent, and the attitudes we hold towards ‘stuff’, and the physical ‘bump-
into-ability’ that constitutes our existence, is an emulsion that cannot be separated out, 
though our attempts to do so clearly have a huge effect.        
 
Being fallible and embodied, as we are, it seems very likely that we cannot conceive of 
the totality in which we are entangled. Our ‘thoughtful’ atomisation of the world and its 
processes could arguably be a completely necessary coping strategy.  If processes and 
events are tied into almost infinitely extendable networks then how do we avoid being 
overwhelmed by our inability to fully grasp any process? Where do we draw the line, 
decide enough is enough, focus in and cordon off some element(s) in an attempt to 
understand them at the expense of others.  This surplus, the surplus of the object, extends 
in all directions, as evidenced by our always incomplete attempts to interrogate and 
conceptualise things from the subatomic to the infinitely huge.  Regardless of the angle 
we view from or the grip we take on an object, or even the time we spend pouring over its 
details and texture, our knowledge of it is always incomplete.  No object is ever fully 
assimilated.  No part of the object is ever us (Wilford 2008).  The surplus of the object 
will, according to Adorno, always be an intimidating threat to those attempting to 
apprehend the un-mediated reality of things.       
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In modern society, argues Adorno (1973), ‘the circle of identification – which in the 
end always identifies itself alone – was drawn by a thinking that tolerates nothing 
outside it; its imprisonment is its own handiwork’ (172). This imprisonment appears 
to the modern subject as freedom – the transcendental ego holds mastery over its 
world. (Wilford 2008: 414)   
 
It is very easy to say of the material object, that it is fully co-constituted with the 
immaterial- that is, value judgments, tacit knowledge of its ‘proper’ function or place.  
Interpretations are what makes certain objects appear as they do.  But, as Adorno would 
argue, it is possible instead that it is the subject who is constituted through its engagement 
with the material. Can there be consciousness without anything to perceive and be 
conscious of?  Whilst intuitively it would seem that objects do exist without our 
objectifying of them (‘things’ continue to exist and events transpire in relation to other 
things even when we are not there to keep an eye on them (Abram 1996)), can the same 
be said of the Subject?  Most obviously, and on a practical level, sustained existence is 
impossible without the material environments which support every aspect of our lives.  
 
The objects of the world are not a passive backdrop animated only by unfolding human 
actions.  Rather the world exists as a continuous flow of events, each showing the falsity 
of stable or separable objects.  We are both defused and amongst the stuff of the world, in 
such a way that our sense of what is going on, and our judgments about the world can 
easily slip into being a judgment about ourselves without us realising it.  On the other 
hand, neither would it seem a sensible idea to supplant our subjectivity with a fixation on 
the object alone (as if such a thing was possible).  Rather it is from the relations and 
process between, that this research attempts to consider the moments of contact in which 




Every movement made necessitates a movement in my partner, and yet every move 
they make forces me to move differently.  Each time I play, I am not sure what 
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makes me do what movement, though I have noticed snippets of trends: I know fast 
music makes me want to jump about more, and I often follow a kick unthinkingly 
with a sweep (though sometimes I wish I wouldn’t).  (Capoeira Diary 12/10/08) 
     
The slipperiness of the boulder adds an interesting twist, such that for once I do not 
wish for sunny days.  Remembered terror is a faint echo now, but still niggles at my 
forearms and braking fingers. (Bike Trials diary 17/5/2006) 
 
… A small chipping jutting out a few millimetres more than the rest has made a 
decent sized gash on my hand…  Some pain, more anger.  I do the move again 
hoping for calluses to hold up. 
(Parkour Diary 13/7/07) 
 
Contact is a common starting point in my research experiences. Indeed, contact in 
method more broadly seems somewhat inevitable
33
, and yet is so often taken away from 
the traditional output of research.  Yet the intensity and durability of contact, the way we 
move in togetherness with objects and people, is clearly variable and open to dramatic 
revision.  Indeed, I argue that certain types of contact necessitate revision, and that as 
such, contact is a desirable (inevitable) quality for certain types of research.  
      
In an attempt to stay open to the possibilities of contact, my research was given to 
something of an unsettlingly unpredictable nature, as I let the people, things, activity and 
feelings guide me without attempting to maintain ‘critical distance’
34
.  Habitual embodied 
knowledge sits in creative tension with contact, for such practical knowledge must surely 
shape a good deal of our everyday perceptions and interactions (see for example, Giddens 
1984, Seamon 1980).  What happens though, when we are deliberately of the intent to 
augment and modify our practical embodied knowledge?  This is one of the main 
questions addressed in subsequent chapters, but in general, and for the methodology of 
this research this is not quite rightly phrased because while I was attempting this revision, 
to various degrees I was also allowing it to happen to me.  The processes of the groups of 
people, the friends made, and the objects encountered all directed my changing body.             
                                                 
33
 As some researchers have rightly argued, the nature of our embodied existence means that affective 
contact is inevitable, even for example, when research is archival based (Rose 1997).      
34
 Though I did find this hard, particularly in the evenings when writing my diary.  It seemed almost that 
the act of writing itself ‘turned on’ an insurmountable distance between myself and the days contact, that 
encouraged me to look down and judge.        
 64 
 
While I did find myself adopting certain pre-conceived (and sometimes naïve) ideas 
about how I would do/train/move in what I thought was an appropriate way, the nature of 
contact is such that it can exceed embodied ‘projects’, however coherent we think they 
might be.  What will become is never certain (Thrift 2004c).  Creativity happens through 
enchanting contact with the material and immaterial, as histories of once ‘unusual’ 
activities can show (see, for example, Borden 2001).  J B Jackson (1957) discusses the 
‘discovery’ of different types of mobility through new (at the time) sports like water 
skiing and sky diving and reflects on the way participants experience the landscape 
afresh.  This newness, this nowness, where time ceases to become cyclical, is the 
experience we remember for time to come.  Such moments have emotional intensity that 
flips the body away from unthought routinized mobility.  New sensations and aspects of 
our surroundings become part of our consciousness, movements and gestures, texture of 
surfaces, distances, and orientations.   
 
As I see it, those who adopted those sports did so because they had had enough of 
contemplation, and of the old sublimities which a century of poets and painters and 
musicians had interpreted over and over again.  They may have resented the 
persistent loyalty of their parents to these things, but subconsciously what they 
wanted was a contact with nature less familiar and less pedestrian in both senses of 
those words – a chance to experience nature freshly and directly.  (Jackson 1957: 
p203-4). 
     
Here Jackson writes of a sort of reaction against ‘sedentary representations’, and a move 
to a more participatory mode in which the landscape is remade.  Yet Jackson is also 
careful to clarify that the body is also changed in the process (perhaps the ‘point’ of these 
kinds of activity) – it is not a one-way assertion of agency over the landscape: 
 
In short, the traditional perspective, the traditional way of seeing and experiencing 
the world is abandoned; in its stead we become active participants, the shifting focus 
of a moving abstract world; our nerves and muscles are all of them brought into play. 
To the perceptive individual there can be an almost mystical quality to the 
experience; his [sic] identity seems for the moment to be transmuted. (Jackson 1957). 
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The ability of contact to ‘transmute’ and essentially modify the body may be the basis of 
some of our most useful and communally necessary emotional resonances, such as 
empathy.  To make contact with another is to invoke a shifting of perspective; it is to 
become a de-centred subject.  As such, undergoing contact involves unsettling the normal 
networks, the taken for granted homeliness of the everyday - as in Jackson’s example, 
contact hits you.  It becomes and moves you.              
 
The process in which things, people, animals, sounds, or ‘objects’ reach out and effect is 
central to the way the body perceives, and goes on (or not) with practices like bike trials, 
parkour and capoeira.  Following Adorno, Wilford (2008) theorises subject-object 
relationships, suggesting that objects have the potential to turn subjects into ‘nonidentity’.  
Nonidentity, for Adorno, is the desirable moments in which object comes to inhabit the 
subject, and can best be achieved by viewing great works of art or listening to classical 
masterworks (ibid).  We might say that many more everyday objects (what now tend to 
be referred to as events) have this potential; the ability to startle and strip off 
preconceptions (or make nonidentity).  Certainly there were numerous occasions during 
my participation in bike trials, capoeira and parkour when I felt struck or moved by a 
movement, a sound, a bike component...  
 
It should be noted though, that this is not an essential feature of embodiment.  In some 
senses one must work to be moved by objects.  Though paradoxically trying - in the 
agency filled, forceful, linear, Western conception - can lead to quite the opposite affect.  
Deliberate and coherent action, it seems to me, is less easily surprised by events.  Having 
the intent to be moved is one thing, sitting back (in attitude) and letting stuff touch you is 
another. David Abrams (2006) describes the same kind of thing when talking about how 
to perceive the world from outside our cloudy preconceptions and linguistic 
interpretations:  “One way is to simply let things be alive. Or, if you don't want to let 
things be alive, just to allow that things have their own active agency, their own influence 
upon us, whether it be a slab of granite, storm clouds, a stream, a raven, a spider.” 
(Abrams 2006).  The embodied trying in this sense is like trying on an unfamiliar pair of 
trousers rather than having a goal in sight and trying to achieve it.   
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Vital here are the forms of knowing that fail – the ‘nonaccountable’ feeling for an 
organism or object.  The tacit ways of knowing that ‘want nothing but in their openness 
toward, and total turning of attention, can engender a passion beyond desire’ (Heshusius 
1994: 18).  These are the moments in which you forget yourself.  This does not claim that 
we are then able to remove ourselves, our embodiment, and make some claim of absolute 
truth or reality.  Rather in these moments of absorption, reality is no longer to be 
understood as a truth to be uncovered but as mutually evolving. (ibid. 1994). 
 
While openness to events can tend to circumvent our cultural preconceptions and habitual 
knowledge, this is not to say that they do not work with this knowledge.  For example the 
sudden surprise felt when an overinflated back tyre slips on a rock, is only a surprise in 
relation to the full expectation that usually the tyre would stick.  Paul Harrison draws on 
another example, that of a lost wallet.  “Imagine you are walking down the road with 
nothing much on your mind, perhaps it is the end of the day… You put your hand in your 
pocket and realise that your wallet is missing.” (2000: 503).  At this point, Harrison says, 
‘a gap opens up, and then an emergent order takes place’ (503).  This ‘interval’ contains 
an abundance of potential possibilities and ways to go on, precisely because the mode of 
consciousness it brings about is able to side step habitual thought and action (whilst at the 
same time being dependent on it).  
 
In traditions of science, and to a lesser but significant degree the humanities, such ways 
of knowing have been all but annihilated by the desire for ‘solid’ knowledge and fixed 
representation (Harrison 2000, Thrift 1996).  The interval is anomalous; it makes research 
difficult and increases error in the findings.  It is exactly what marks life as alive.  This 
research is thus concerned with the process of the anomaly, which is affective as much as 
it is difficult.  The interval is dispersion, it is amid ever-moving materiality, and it evades 
capture at every turn.  Yet it is in those moments in which we become ‘nonidentity’ that 
we are most susceptible and capable of resonating with changes.            
 
It is a similar affective empathy that I take as a starting point, towards de-centring my 
account.  Or to rephrase, I see no need to emphatically ‘de-centre’ an account that is only 
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possible by virtue of its immersion in the world.  Research undertaken in a spirit of open 
vulnerability, and research that is happy to be touched and moved, and to engage and 
play with materialities and imaginations, need not be doubt-ridden with questions of how 
to ‘write’ the more-than-human world.  When we hold out our experience as our ‘truth’, 
we go well beyond the ‘I’ that takes responsibility for the narrative.   
 
Of course it is I who have chosen to assemble the paper in this particular way; it was 
me who experienced these things, but not as an unaffected, unaffecting atom.  I am 
equally assembled and dispersed in this pathfinding process, I precipitate amid tones, 
topographies, theoretical discourses. (Wylie 2005: 245).  
 
We are necessarily in and with worlds rich in affect.  One way towards building new 
configurations within this world does not require a determined shift toward ‘anti-
humanism’ or even ‘trans-humanism’, but rather an aspiration to engage the ‘language of 
human experience’ (Entrikin and Tepple 2006), including their withness to the world as 
well as imagination, emotion, and the wild flights of fancy therein.  It seems that methods 
exploring the haptic (e.g. Obrador-Pons 2007, Paterson 2006) and the rich sensuousness 
of touch (Crouch 2001, Hetherington 2003a, Lewis 2000), but also those exploring what 
might be considered less traditionally ‘empirical’ or tangible (e.g. Anderson 2004, 
Holloway 2003, Latham 2003b) begin to do just that.  Here by exposing our experiences 
of togetherness and our openness and contact with the world it is becoming clear that 
“humans do not act as subjects in an object world but are constituted as perceiving beings 
at the interface between subject and object.” (Hetherington 2003a: 1938). 
 
 
Adapting to mobility in method  
 
As I write this entry, I wonder what exactly I am doing here.  What can I hope to 
know about capoeira compared to the people here who have been doing it for years?  
While I feel that I have begun to adapt to the new exercises quite well (past 
experiences definitely helping a lot!), I am so inept at the new movements… The 
Brazilian-Portuguese songs, the music making and ‘dancey’ element are so foreign to 
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me.  They feel great, when I can lose my self-conscious nerves, and some of the 
simple ‘chk chk - ding - dong dong’ tunes are stuck in my head.  I still feel a bit lost 
and far away from the movements and ways of interacting with people that I know.  I 
am quite out of my comfort zone in the capoeira hall; which is exciting, but also quite 
disconcerting. (Capoeira Diary 1
st
 July 07).              
 
Joining the dance 
 
The activities with which we are concerned here always involve the mobility of other 
materialities, be they living, inanimate, or intangible ideas, emotions or knowledge.  
Drawing on the work of actor network theory and hybridity (Haraway 1991, Latour 1993, 
2005), Cresswell suggests that “Looking at the mobile subject always involves looking at 
the prosthetic subject.” (2005: 448).  In this schema, mobility can be seen as breaking, 
shaping and making networks or assemblages. Comments on internet forums, videos 
recorded and posted on the internet, complex and dispersed representations, innovative 
new technologies and embodied techniques all fit into this mutating, growing network.  
 
Take the example of parkour.  From the carefully selected footwear, the bag and clothing, 
to the arrangements of concrete, brick, metal and grass that make possible any form of 
parkour, the term ‘traceur’ must always refer to more than the individual body.  The 
growth in popularity of parkour is first and foremost an idea, an imagination of what is, 
or could be, possible to do with place and the human body.  This idea has been 
technologically dispersed and augmented, primarily through television and the internet.  
The movements and actions of the traceur are totally dependent on (though not 
determined by) material objects that are relatively permanent. This raises the question, at 
what scale do we consider the prosthesis?  Or, in other words, just how far do we de-
centre the subject?  
 
There is a need for a phenomenology of the practices of mobility which foregrounds 
not only the body-subject at the centre of the lifeworld but also the objects which 
inform and shape its movements. Such an approach seeks to understand the 
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production of space in everyday mobility at the level of the body, but in conjunction 
with technology. (Spinney 2006: 715).  
 
In considering this Spinney (2006) presents to us his feelings of being a ‘cyclist’, the 
combined unit of body and bike.  In this vein he also talks to other cyclists in the saddle, 
to keep the context of riding.  In doing so the moving place; the heat, pain, rhythm, 
posture, and richness of cycling are not lost, and retain the potential to evoke. As with all 
others, this account bears the problem of representation, in that we will never feel the 
emotions, complexity and depth of the reality that the text attempts to portray.  Neither, 
for that matter, will the author when it is being written and edited.  In the words of 
Latour, “there is no in-formation, only trans-formation.”(2005: 149).  None the less, in 
the effort to be ‘truthful’ (or to try hard not to lie) we can hope to create, with the reader, 
more productive accounts based on empathy for the emotional contact with place.  It 
could be said of such an account, that it is not an account at all; rather it is a performative 
call to imagine – to see and to become through the Other.  
 
Throughout this research multiple techniques were used, not to apprehend the mobility in 
the activities, but to engage and enhance it (though what ‘enhance’ should mean exactly, 
was often not immediately clear).  In this performance, then, in which the mobile body is 
a crucial part, multiple, responsive and dynamic methods are called for.  Putting a shiny 
but hollow label such as ‘mobile ethnography’ (Sheller and Urry 2006: 217) to these 
methods seems a somewhat unimaginative way to proceed, given that the methods 
themselves are in fact continually under revision, and that ethnography has always been a 
fundamentally mobile technique
35
.  If we are concerned to learn of the continual 
transformation of movement, as in this case, joining in makes sense.  Unfortunately 
joining the metaphorical or literal ‘dance’, does not mean that we immediately pick up 
the correct step and flow effortlessly along into the action.  We stumble, try out 
movements, negotiate and wrestle with continually occurring ethical dilemmas and hope 
that other people and things do not obstruct us in our unsure wonderings too much.  
                                                 
35
 Indeed it seems to me that the process of ethnography has long been attentive to the mobile, even if this 
has not been explicitly written into papers and books (see for example, Herbert’s (2000) emphasis on 
process). 
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While the desire may be to unobtrusively flow into the everyday practices of those we 
research with, this is not normally possible (see section on apprentice methods).  In this 
case, it is also questionable whether such practice would be particularly useful, were it 
possible. 
 
As researchers that are fully human we change things, sometimes muddling up the 
already complicated.  People talk and respond to us and hopefully, at times, they adjust 
and adapt for us.  The figure of the non-affective, unobtrusive, objective, invisible yet 
microphone-wielding researcher now seems almost comic.  That people react to us is 
particularly crucial when we are first beginning research, when embodied competencies 
are relationally quite different to those we seek to research with.  Capoeira provides my 
obvious example: the beginner is most definitely not treated the same, they are carefully 
negotiated, a ‘task’ that even some experienced capoeiristas find difficult.  The way a 
capoeirista accommodates the ‘unknown’ elements
36
 of a beginner (or in fact of any 
participant) greatly affects the safety of both concerned.                                            
 
Yet for the researcher to be amenable to the possibilities of such interactions, still 
requires openness to difference and a willingness to experiment and ‘try on’ other 
people’s ways of doing things.  In other words, as a researcher, I invite the world to move 
me, while I understand or even enjoy the fact that, as it does so, I am also moving it.  My 
emotional engagement is a key part of this movement (see chapter 4).  This, along with 
embodied mobility more generally, highlights the difficulty in locking processes into 
fixed representations and theoretical structures.       
 
Feeling like gagging when we eat others’ food is one of those things that is likely to 
get written out of research and yet it is exactly the bodily reaction and emotion that 
needs to be written in… We situate ourselves not as autonomous, rational academics, 
but as people who sometimes experience irrational emotions… This enables 
geographers to begin to talk from an embodied place, rather than from a place on 
high. (Longhurst, et al. 2008: 213).   
 
                                                 
36
 Whether or not beginners will be very forceful, controlled, overly enthusiastic, or shy in their attacks and 
defences demands rapid assessment, ‘figuring out’ and adapting to.    
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Such research while often extremely revealing, challenges us with the difficult task of 
presenting our embodied emotions.  The experience of emotions are virtually impossible 
to disassociate from the context in which they occurred.  Thus for presentations such as 
this thesis, context is crucial, and emotions act as something of a bridge to context (and 
vice versa).  When I read through sections of my diary entries, or I look through my 
photographs, I am emotively engaged such that the context of places and events are given 
a life of their own.  As such I am involved in a complex process in which what has been 
is virtually and creatively re-played (in both senses of the word).               
 
I found myself leaning right forward, staring at the details of the pictures as they 
came up on my PC screen as if half hoping it was all going to come alive again.  I 
feel overwhelmed by each photograph. Why am I so moved? Why am I so 
concerned? Inevitably this is lived and personal, the divisions between the public and 
the professional and the private are breached.  This is the point and challenge of 
emotional geographies. (O Jones 2005: 217). 
 
Research that encounters the world in an emotionally mobile way has significant 
implications for the researcher.  It has the potential to teach the researcher more about 
their own embodiment as it does to inform the participants or the reader of resulting 
publications (Longhurst, et al. 2008: 14).  It gives the researcher the opportunity to re-
invent themselves and their relationships.  For me, research was not a seamless process or 
easy manoeuvre: in many instances it would have been far more comfortable to move in 
familiar ways, to embrace my embodied habitual knowledge.  And indeed that appears to 
be a significant barrier for others too.              
 
The difficulty many students encounter learning capoeira does not arise simply from 
the dexterity and strength demanded by the techniques; it results, too, from 
confronting learned inability, shamed inhibition and fearful reluctance to try the 
unfamiliar. (Downey 2005: 198). 
 
Trying the unfamiliar: such an intense and emotively mixed hurdle.  For a few people 
trying new things might be itself a piece of practical knowledge, acted out day to day, as 
they instinctively seek new experiences and have the ability to sense new opportunities - 
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if only vaguely and incoherently – they reach out to grasp them.  I am not one of these 
people; though through a conscious ‘effort’ perhaps I have been moving more towards 
this way of being in the world.  Rather I found that my ‘natural’ instincts tended towards 
the already known and safely familiar.  Much of the effort involved in my learning 
process was simply trying to forget, bypass and unlearn the habitual ways of moving and 
acting that prevented me from doing otherwise.  Here, adapting to mobility in method 
involves a determined shift from applying ready made theory to the processes of parkour, 
capoeira and bike trials, towards an attempt to try out the mobile practices, which 
included their own philosophies and concepts of movement.  As such, and in sympathy 
with non-representational theory, this research is an “attempt to fight against the 
terrorised imagination that characterises modern society” by “stressing the primacy of 
poetic invention” (Thrift 2004d: 89).  Because as Thrift argues, this “primacy of poetic 
invention is a crucial political move” (ibid: 89).  
 
It is impossible, however, to completely disassociate theoretical philosophies from the 
practice of research.  Indeed, I can easily identify my ‘geography’ reading through my 
diaries.  It is clear that many of the observations I made have been noted and recorded in 
such a way precisely because they ‘fit’ with certain theory.  Would I, for example, have 
been recording my own emotional conditions, or the way things made me feel, had I not 
had some familiarity with ‘emotional geographies’, or a sense that at some point it would 
be useful?  It seems inescapable that theory can and does affect our perceptions (indeed, 
the ‘point’ of theory).  And yet to be open and to allow the world to talk, it might well be 
useful to sense the goings on of the world in new and unconditioned ways (and no doubt 
a certain reading of non-representational theory can help here).  It is my feeling that by 
the nature of the activities themselves and by the dedication to being involved, I was able 
to mitigate against the view from above which is narrowed by the very expert theoretical 
perspective it takes up.  Similarly, though, the involvement and experiences of the pain, 
exhilaration, exhaustion, fear - the general intensity of the activities - helped ward off any 
theoretical burden (See for example Wylie’s (2005: 425) anxiety over carrying a rucksack 
full of hefty philosophy books on his walk).  Such a theory-laden body could simply not 
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have carried its burden through the moments when thought is suspended - the moments 
when physical demands of the whole body reconfigure its knowledge of space.  
 
Knowledge (is) making 
 
 
The ‘phone box to broken sign post’ is irritating me again.  It is near enough that it 
delights in the denigrating challenge; laughing at the edge of consciousness, so that I 
have to catch myself and stop from being baited. Its intrusive sharpness is 
antagonistic, and is felt not just through my bike’s soft back tyre, but all the really 
hard parts: the stem, the stupidly designed squarely machined brake leaver clamp, 
and the necessarily sharp pedals.  This time I am with my (non bike riding) flatmate 
and the casual neglect he shows each time we pass this place is always surprising to 
me, it reminds me that this is not the way it has to be. (Bike Trials Diary 12/6/2006).      
 
Incessantly Knowledge Producing  
 
Knowledge making is what we are inevitably involved with when we do research.  
Knowledge may not be plucked from the world and put on display, but is instead enacted 
and produced by more than the human body that routinely takes credit for it. Talk about 
maintaining rigour, which has been a benchmark of valid research for so long, has come 
to something of an impasse.  As discussed, there is no easy way of allowing for observer 
bias, no way to get a more self-conscious subjectivity or of monitoring one’s more 
subjective impulses or parts
37
.  When we tell stories about the world we are producing 
truths in the pragmatist sense of the word.    
 
What we do and what we plan to do, shapes what we perceive and thus what we know 
and the knowledge we produce about the world (Mol and Law 2004).  It follows that if 
our perceptions of the world are shaped by the training we undergo, the experiences and 
feelings we have, then so too will the types of knowledge we participate in.  When taken 
                                                 
37
 As Heshusius (1994) asks, is there any ‘part’ of us or action we undergo in our name that is not 
subjective?  
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up, each of the three activities discussed here have a profound effect on the body’s 
engagement with the world.  What is interesting about this is that the activities, despite 
facilitating knowledge that is not cognitive, are purposeful in their changes.  A Mestre of 
capoeira, for example, if asked, would not hesitate to exhort the changes practicing 
capoeira has on a person’s perceptions of the world, but more than this they will give 
quite specific examples.  These will vary from teacher to teacher, some saying it teaches 
a ‘black African’ aesthetic (cf. Downey 2005), but for others it could just as easily be 
‘malícia’
38
, ‘cunning’, ‘comradeship’, ‘confidence’, or ‘respect’.   
 
That these activities have the potential to instil such virtues is taken up in subsequent 
chapters.  For now the point is simply that while we engage with the world through 
movement, our body, perceptions, thoughts and opinions are in the making.  We are not 
dealing with a research object, or set of objects but are concerned with a process or set of 
processes, our role in which is always fluid and fuzzily defined.  Undoubtedly, getting to 
know the world is acting within it, and so we are immediately called upon to take account 
of our ethical position, and our potential for doing harm (all must be worked out in 
advance of course)
39
.  This is exceptionally tricky when we consider the embodied 
practical and enacted nature of ethical relations that, in practice, always maintain and 
reserve the right to surprise and exceed.  
 
That research often seeks out the ‘unknown’ will no doubt amplify the complexity of any 
moralising. What happens, though, to our methodology when our starting point is a belief 
that our changing relations amid the world are undeniably messy and life is 
fundamentally non-coherent?  Considering this, John Law asks: “would something less 
messy make a mess of describing it?” (Law 2003: 2).  For Law, most methods fall down 
because of their attempts to make order and coherent representations. “Somewhat 
strangely in a way, our instinct was to ask reality to adjust itself so that indeed it could be 
properly mapped.” (Law 2003: 4).  Law is not alone in this sort of critique of the core 
methods used in cultural geography (see for example, Pratt 2000, Thrift 2000b).   
                                                 
38
 This will be discussed further in chapter 6, it can be roughly translated as, deception, trickery and 
misdirection and awareness of those things in others.    
39
 See section ‘On being involved in the ethics of producing worlds’ below for a discussion of this. 
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Yet in recent years there has been a broadening spectrum of academic work, which varies 
a great deal in the nature of its engagement with the world.  Some still do crave ‘rigour’, 
repeatability, and universally applicable theorisations. Others are outright dismissive of 
our ability to make any kind of communicative sense of the world.  Another way of 
thinking, acting and knowing, and the one pursued here, associates truth not with fact, but 
with a quality of contact.  Here in a pragmatist move, holding tightly to the notion of 
accuracy of representation is not the highest goal, rather the inevitability of our 
inventiveness is accepted and the stories we tell about the world are formulated and 
judged for the quality of their truth in a pragmatic way. Taking a similar line of thought 
Owain Jones (2008) demonstrates the compatibility of non-representational theory with 
pragmatist philosophy.        
 
“Any brief, faint traces of knowledge, politics and ethics which can exist, only take 
place in and through encounters embedded in temporal flows.  In light of this non-
modern ontology, ArT tries to de-represent knowledge in order to free it up for 
action.” (Jones 2008: 1605) 
 
Here ArT, what Jones terms ‘anti-representational theory’, is in essence concerned with 
breaking down habitual knowledge or ‘truth’, removing representations that have had 
their say, but keep on talking.  Rather in a pragmatist line of thinking we ‘try’ to know 
something, perhaps, when it is that that knowing or belief enhances our interaction with 
the world – this sort of ‘truth’ ‘works’ for us (Rorty 1991).  It is part of our embodied 
corporeal technique for living in and with the world.  In our body’s relations to things and 
living entities there exists knowledge, which is acted out and in process.  As a priority, 
refining this knowledge represents a critically important and on-going effort.  It is not a 
coincidence that the three activities engaged with here, all have an important similarity, 
that is, a desire to change our ways of thinking; this involves outright destroying some 
knowledges (such as ‘the bike is unstable on the back wheel’, ‘riding a bike on that 
terrain is impossible’) and replacing them with those of ‘our’ making.  
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It could be argued that there are any number of such activities that are implicitly mixing 
up received wisdom and knowledge.  This is so, such that “we do not have any clear way 
to locate the boundary between the internal and the external.” (Rorty 2007: 58).  
Similarly the body is a blur of process (cf Longhurst 2005, Whatmore 2002) and indeed 
the lived body is incessant in its production of knowledge in almost all its activities.  Yet 
the extent to which these knowledges are a break with the norm and are a move towards 
new possibilities is exceptionally variable.              
 
Embracing our ability to make the world rather than to disclose or reveal it 
 
“I remember, soon after starting trials riding I was with a friend, Tom, practicing 
back-hops on a flat patch of grass. Nearby was a two foot high stone wall, which, as 
we were taking it in turns with a single bike, I sat on.  Tom asked me to move, so he 
could ride on it.  He explained that he was going to hop sideways off the wall, at the 
same time spinning 180 degrees to land facing the other way.  At that point I had not 
seen anything remotely like that before.  I thought it was impossible, I didn’t tell him 
though, I guess I was clinging to the thought that it just might be.  It was incredibly 
exciting, I couldn’t visualise it, and I really didn’t know what would happen. And 
when he did it, wow, I was like, ‘I have to learn that’.” (Conversation with Jack, 
essence of which recorded in Bike Trials Diary 22/08/2007).          
 
Rorty suggests we begin creating our own truths, our own distinctions, rather than 
working from tired and well trodden representations which have, for him, reproduced an 
unsatisfactory situation.  “We have given many of these traditional distinctions their 
chance. We have debated them ad infinitum, without that having had any practical 
upshot.  So I propose that from now on we focus on other distinctions.” (Rorty 2007: 59).  
Indeed, it has become apparent that hand-me-down knowledge and truths are very often 
questionable.  They do not make a good foundation for a method of living or for that 
matter ethical practice because they unthinkingly reproduce (Bauman 1993).         
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“A civilization that relentlessly destroys the living land it inhabits is not well 
acquainted with truth, regardless of how many supposed facts it has amassed 
regarding the calculable properties of the world.” (Abram 1996: 264).  
 
It seems that what we are left with is the need to tell stories about the world – always 
imperfect representations (in the traditional sense of the word) that have intent.  A story 
with intent is a performance, in that it is a participant; it is imbued with transformative 
potential.  Of course, not all stories are equal; there are good ones and not so good ones.  
How do we judge a story, when the benchmark of ‘real’ accuracy is removed and the 
story, or research piece can be conceived as a performance?  My approach to this, like 
Abram’s, is to be less concerned with literal truths, as with being faithful to the ‘sensuous 
world itself, and to the life and process that surround us’ (ibid 265).  And to make a 
performance that honours the sensuous, in both the activities under research, but also the 
audience.  In this way metaphor, image, sound and the poetic, all become attractive as 
performative devices that have the potential to evoke.         
 
This performance cannot be dissociated from the elements of the world that helped bring 
it into being.  Thus while this research has made the world (a grand claim) it does so only 
in a very partial way, with the world.  That is to say, it becomes one small ingredient that 
changes the taste of the material world.  Almost overwhelmingly, the rails, walls, drums 
and handlebars have been participants in this research process, and should therefore be 
‘allowed’ in this performance.  But in what form?  It is clear that one person’s handlebar 
is another’s indistinct scrap metal.  The process and movement is key to contextualizing 
the stuff of the world.           
 
To be committed to presenting the sensuous world, we should be involved with the way 
in which our body makes contact with its environment.  Out perceptions, our ‘making 
sense’ is not static, we have a good deal of embodied knowledge that is involved with 
making contact. Thus a ‘pure’ phenomenological epoché is disallowed; we cannot exist 
without our body’s intelligence.  I am therefore concerned not just with the sensuous in 
this thesis, but the way the sensuous interacts and is co-constituted with the materiality of 
the world.  Through an appreciation for this body knowledge making process (contact), 
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we are hopefully granted more possibilities for making different and new types of 
contact.        
 
What are the consequences of this knowing? That is the pragmatist question.  The 
logical positivist notion of verification still ‘half stands’ but within other forms of 
verification.  The ‘truth’ of a piece of knowledge is more or less the same as the 
usefulness of knowledge.  (Jones 2008: 1607). 
 
This is not to say accuracy is no longer important - in general it is likely that the accuracy 
of perception will be a key constituent of the value of knowledge in any given context.  
What it does mean is that accuracy evacuated of process, creativity or context becomes 
very much less desirable.  Here the multiplicity and paradox that abounds in the world are 
not denied, in favour of the neat and complete.  It is a type of knowledge that inhabits the 
body, enacts changes, and enables actions previously impossible or un-thought: it is a 
way of amplifying questions and possibilities (Thrift 2004d).  
 
When the purpose of a research performance is to open rather than close down 
possibilities, when the ‘answer’ to any element of the world is so often an emphatic “it is 
fascinating, it is complicated, I don’t know for sure”, how do we claim authority?  How 
do we reply to the critic who demands to know the ‘point’ of our research?  In a classic 
poststructuralist move we might ask what is ‘the point’ anyway?  While I have grappled 
with the purpose of this research from the start, I think I have finally (and here I must 
admit I write this after some years of ‘fieldwork’) accepted (perhaps even come to rely 
on) this persistent anxiety.  Essentially, the ‘purpose’ has been exceptionally multiple, 
and has been distributed amongst the large number of people who became involved in its 
doing.  I have been following, with wonder, three activities that, for me at least, have the 
potential to continually surprise and enchant the places they take myself and others.  Very 
often it has been an indistinct collection of feelings of ‘how things were going’ that kept 
me moving on, sharing in the testing, and experimentation of these evolving activities.   
 




I’ve been trying to teach Mike how to do a meia-lua de compasso
40
 for weeks.  He 
has managed many variants of movements, all of which only vaguely resemble the 
kick.  I have tried showing it from many different angles, and I have tried slowing it 
down (which is actually quite hard) and breaking it up into small steps.  In the 
process I feel myself understanding the move better.  I noticed that Mike was 
bending his leg when he shouldn’t have been, which led me to question whether I do 
the same - now I make a conscious effort to keep it straight.  (Capoeira Diary 
4/6/2008).  
 
When we do not know what we want the output of learning to be, and without concepts 
and theories to guide, how do we best go about learning something?  Eder and Hosnedl in 
their book Design Engineering: A Manual for Enhanced Creativity (2008), attempt to 
navigate this tricky question by adding creativity onto a complete understanding of 
conventional knowledge.  For them, designing in creativity seems to be an addition.      
 
Prerequisite knowledge and personal, psychological, and biological characteristics, 
possessed by a candidate for admission into the teaching/learning system should be 
defined. (Eder and Hosnedl 2008: 509). 
 
Caricaturing their proposals, one implication is that before we begin learning we need to 
know what it is we want to learn.  To be a good ‘learning person’ one should have well 
defined goals, ‘learning outcomes’ (ibid.).  While goals are clearly useful and necessary, 
it is paradoxically perhaps, in the formulation and alteration of these goals that the most 
creative aspect of learning exists.  Hand-me-down or tightly conscribed goals can be a 
useful starting point but inevitably cramp an individual’s potential for creative process; a 
perpetual challenge for educators, who often find themselves unable to react creatively to 
individual learners, but instead are liable to work through a pre-defined curriculum or 
syllabus.  At its most extreme the teacher finds that the way things are going does not in 
fact shape the way we move on at all.  There is a dislocation in time as pre-planned 
representations or goals set in paper, often much more durable than stone, steamroller on-
the-fly feelings and ideas.   
 
                                                 
40
 ‘Half moon in a compass’ – a spinning kick. 
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The capoeira experience described above is one of an almost infinite number in which I 
learned from the process of teaching practice.  In ‘trying’ out many different ways to 
teach a technique I was also playing with the movement itself, fiddling with speeds, 
focusing on edge-of-perception kinaesthetic details, experimenting with feelings. While 
always trying for the personal style and inventive movements, all three activities 
considered here are ones that simultaneously share and teach technique - and become 
refreshed through doing so.  In considering some of his philosophy of parkour, Sebastien 
Foucan
41
 suggests that a key principle is that traceurs should freely share what they learn.  
Yet learning is very often not a deliberate act of receiving technique, but of being open 
and with others (whether those others are human or not).  When I ride trials, it is nearly 
always with friends, and it also involves watching their technique, their interpretation of 
possibilities.  It involves contact both with them and the elements of space they ride 
on/over/around.  I am, particularly on good rides, continually affected, always reacting 
and trying
42
 what they propose.  They are doing the same, and as such the breakthroughs, 
the moments of creative redefinition, are distributed amongst us.  On good rides, every 
improvement in technique, and every opening up of the possible, is a shared victory and 
deserving of communal celebration.                                      
 
Whatever action we may be capable of is an action that is, as it were, already 
underway, not only or fully our action, but an action that is upon us already as we 
assume something called action in our name and for ourselves. Something is already 
underway by the time we act, and we cannot act without, in some sense, being acted 
upon.  (Butler 2005: p203). 
 
Knowledge here is a shared and creative endeavour.  Being more fully involved with who 
and what is researched means that one does not simply dissect things as they are using a 
phenomenological, post-phenomenological, poststructuralist, or any other methodology.  
Instead I have tried to bring capoeira, parkour and bike trials in contact with geography, 
and in doing so, it is from the practices themselves that I have found clues about what 
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 Sebastien Foucan is an influential traceur who is often contentiously cited, along with David Bell, as the 
‘co-founder’ of parkour (see chapter 4).   
42
 Whether that ‘trying’ is in ‘principle’, imagining the movement, considering the risks, or physically 
attempting to copy.  
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methods and theories to adapt and experiment with.  In a pragmatist sense, theories 
become “tools, metaphors to be used if we feel they are useful to us. They are not tools 
for revealing the world but for intervening in it. This applies to geography and all other 
forms of knowledge making.” (Jones 2008: 1601).   
 
Intelligence is about the capacity to lay out territories of intelligibility, environments 
which are predictable but which can also compel knowledge, can instruct, can teach, 
can make all manner of requests for significance. Environments are more than means 
of testing therefore. They are means of learning, of in-forming, if you like. (Thrift 
2005: 464).  
 
It is through our embeddedness in our environments that it becomes clear that learning 
and teaching are a mingled negotiation of knowledge: a never ending performance that, 
sooner or later, will shock you if you turn your back or look on with arrogant 
disinterest
43
.  Of course it can take effort to learn or teach, but through intermingling, as a 
process, they are hugely productive.  So much so that mood, emotion, energy and place 
itself can be creatively changed and augmented.  Learning in a way that does work on the 
body, and learning that involves encounters that enhance the possibilities for action, 
rather than constrain them, is the type of process aimed for here.  It is a process that takes 
heed of the adage accredited to Confucius (as cited by Eder and Hosnedl 2008):  
 
Tell me and I will forget 
Show me and I may remember  
Involve me and I will understand 
Take one step back and I will act 
 
Stepping back and turning a student loose does not necessarily mean they will act with 
competence, or with any sense for the possibilities that might be open to them.  Also 
problematic is the order of events, the order of this common (in educational circles) 
saying, which has been assumed as a given. Being allowed the room to act as a creative 
subject only comes after the necessary learning which must show pretty well how one 
should act.  And yet so much of learning is concerned with ‘trying out’.  How do we learn 
creativity?  Fuller participations with the materiality of place is one possibility.  If we 
                                                 
43
 See Bourdieu’s (2000) ‘scholastic distance’.   
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design methods that invite full embodied participation, that work on every level of 
sensuous existence, and that therefore demand the body to react with inventiveness, then 
perhaps we approach a type of education that actually enlivens what scholars have been 
saying for so long: that we need to overcome the mind-body split that so pervades our 
thinking (for an interesting example in a higher educational context see, Levine 1991, 
2006
44
).       
 
On being involved in the ethics of producing worlds 
 
A new political book of spells is being found… And if we are not to be smothered by 
a pervasive and insidious regime – the more pervasive and insidious because it relies 
on harnessing our own powers of invention to produce a new ‘post-personal’ 
distribution of intensities – we must become part of the search for new feats of 
matter… Can we form a new and uncommon sense? (Thrift 2004d: 96)  
 
Every experiment has an outcome.  It makes a mark on the world.  Many experiments are 
improvisations; they are a question of being part of a situation and acting without critical 
judgment.  ‘Without judgment’: the antithesis of ethical behaviour, and yet what we are 
called to take seriously as a way towards a ‘new politics of generosity’ (Thrift 2004d).  
The way the body acts when presented with a situation, before deliberative judgment has 
a look in, the flow of a body with its environment – these are not processes that we can 
easily cordon off from the domains of representation and critical thought.  
Representations make reality because they are always lived in a more-than 
representational way (Laurier and Philo 2006).  Thus to write, to spell a word on a page, 
any word, is quite literally to cast a spell:  
 
                                                 
44
 This is the description of a regular credit module run by Donald Levine in the Department of Sociology 
at The University of Chicago, in which the body is accorded an important place:  “20115/30115. Conflict 
Theory and Aikido. The practice of aikido offers a contemporary exemplar for dealing with conflict which 
has creative applications in many spheres. This course introduces the theory and practice of aikido together 
with literature on conflict by economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers. We ask: what is 
conflict? What forms does it take? Is conflict good or bad? What are the sources, dynamics, and 
consequences of social conflict? How can conflict be controlled? Physical training on the mat complements 
readings and discussion. Autumn, 2008” Source: http://collegecatalog.uchicago.edu/pdf_09/SOCI.pdf.    
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Today it is virtually impossible to for us to look at the printed word without seeing, 
or rather hearing, what "it says."  For our senses are now coupled, synesthetically, to 
these printed shapes as profoundly as they were once wedded to cedar trees, ravens, 
and the moon. As the hills and the bending grass once spoke to our tribal ancestors, 
so these written letters and words now speak to us. (Abram 1996: 138). 
 
Words and language are only some of the ‘things’ that ‘talk’ to us; there are many others 
- our perceptions are beleaguered by the types of contact we make with our situations.  
Don’t we all suddenly notice ‘new’ elements of the world after we become interested in 
those things/relations/politics?  How then, do we form ‘new and uncommon sense’?  
How do we release ourselves from outworn ways of speaking and doing – of making 
sense?  There are attempts at methods, ways to attune the consciousness and the senses – 
expertise that is able to ‘bypass deliberateness altogether’
45
 (Thrift 2004d: 94).  The 
body, though, remains in some senses deliberate
46
, even if rational judgment may be 
suspended.  While it is possible, with focused attention, to rejuvenate the senses and 
one’s felt awareness to the world (and this has incredible transformative potential), this is 
ever through the body’s knowledge which is, in general and to greater and lesser extents, 
resistant to instantaneous change (hence people have more or less predictable 
personalities).         
 
This research is concerned with making those changes, and how to make them well.  The 
ethical dimension of this is to be found in the character of such change.  It is in making a 
change toward the world, extending our senses and possibilities to sense.  In doing so this 
research has experimented, taken risks, and thrown up emotionally intense moments.  
The same could be said of all but the most inert research.  In subsequent chapters I deal 
further with some of the specifics of these risks and relationships.  Enough for now to 
consider some principles of ethical research that remained throughout.         
 
‘Prevention of harm’ is held up as the ‘gold standard’ of ethical behaviour within 
academia (Herrera 1999).  Yet the ‘prevention of harm’ can as easily become a utilitarian 
justification for a callused ‘prime directive’ mentality, dressed up as objectivity or 
                                                 
45
 Here Thrift is talking about disciplines like Buddhism and its focus on the ‘now’ moment.     
46
 Even if this is a ‘deliberateness’ which is a propensity towards spontaneity and ‘withness’. 
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righteousness.  Unmasked though, it is a self-denying and negative retreat from the 
contact which calls us to be involved in the lives of those we encounter.   
 
It doesn’t seem so clear, for example, that researchers are compelled to engage in 
fieldwork, and that the options are either disturb or conceal. They don’t have to 
conduct the study at all. (Herrera 1999: 39-40). 
 
As a centrepiece for our ethical stance towards the world, the ‘prevention of harm’ is 
based on a logic of negation: that I do all in my power not to do harm.  Whilst this is 
immediately problematic due to the subjectivities of harm and harmfulness, this is not 
primarily what I take issue with.  Rather what is so wrong is the absence of any humanity 
and emotional sophistication.  Why is it that we should base our ethical discussions 
around the prevention of harm, rather than for example, ‘love’, ‘generosity’ or ‘trust’? 
 
Trust, hope and imagination can, and very often are, profoundly unsettling.  Just as 
visions and performances of utopia inevitably contain an element of danger and risk 
(Kraftl 2007), engaging openly in a positive relationship requires newness and 
vulnerability, which open us (and others) up to ‘harm’.  Or, in other words, it allows us to 
engage.  ‘The prevention of harm’, as mantra, is wholeheartedly backward-looking, and 
rooted in a fear that is swollen with homely comfort, fixity, and privilege. 
 
Ethics as rule following demands both that one knows in advance how to conduct 
one’s self in particular situations, and that action is evaluated on the basis of moral 
codes, ethics as sensibility or ethos demands an openness to the uncertain affective 
potentiality of the eventful encounter as that from which new ways of going on in the 
world might emerge. (McCormack 2003: 503). 
 
With the activities of parkour, capoeira and bike trials, in the move from not-being to 
being, one must risk or there can be no activity.  While this ‘trying’ never turns its back 
on the past, which would quickly lead to disaster, its embodiment is characterised by 
openness, and play with surroundings that invite what might-be, and what can be 




Chapter 4: Doing Research 
 
 
What might a new ethics of movement look like in practice?  For one, it would recognise 
that a traditional discussion of ethical issues is somewhat defunct.  It seems clear that 
levels of disclosure, the extent to which those you research with know exactly what you 
are doing, is a good thing.  And yet in practice, as I found with my research, the concept 
is extremely problematic.  As Thrift and others continually assert, to tell a participant, 
exactly what you are up to, what you plan to write, how you will portray a person, 
whether you will use certain experiences as evidence, and so on, assumes a rational and 
future knowing subject, one who is determinedly underway with a perfect vision, a 
distinct goal orientated plan of action.  I certainly cannot claim such a position – indeed 
as I argue throughout this is somewhat antithetical to my ethical imperative to make 
contact.   
 
How then do I let participants know, what it is I am doing?  First, in the majority of cases 
it is open for them to see – being a research subject myself, mans that in doing 
movements and actively participating it is clear that I am doing parkour, bike trials, or 
capoeira, like them.  That I am also researching was known to almost all, as it rapidly 
came up in conversation upon meeting someone.  What exactly this meant, I am sure they 
had only a fuzzy (and probably in some instances wildly inaccurate) concept, but this is 
to be expected, for much of the time so did I.  Indeed, in many instances the research 
became clearer as I discussed ideas and possible avenues of investigation with them.  For 
participants who were interested, talk about the activities, theorisations of them, and even 
their relation to theories in geography, were a regularly discussed during practice.  It 
would be wrong to think that practitioners of these activities have no interest in 
philosophising, theorising and exploring the ‘whys?’ of there practice.  The practice of 
bike trials, just for example, is almost never an uninterrupted stream of physical activity.  
Time is often spent in communal reflection and consideration – there were more than a 
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few occasions when our talk meandered on late into the night, well past the time that 
diminishing light made the actual ridding impossible.
47
   
 
This ‘working out’ was, by necessity, all but over during the process of ‘writing up’.  A 
process in which words were put to the experiences I had had with people and places.  
Photos and diary extracts were deployed, and as in all stories, re-created with a slightly 
different context.  As standard practice, this de or re-contextualisation was furthered by 
an anonymization of people’s names.  When selecting photos, or screen captures, I asked 
the permission of anyone that featured, as their identities were plane to see.  For photos 
that were not taken by myself, credit is given in the text.    
 
My diary entries, which were written the evening, or the morning directly preceding days 
of practice, were similarly used.  It should be noted that my diaries, while stretching to 
many volumes, were not exhaustive accounts of everything that happened.  Instead, they 
were a record of what I deemed significant (and often I had no speakable reason why I 
thought certain things were significant), much of the time this was simply what I 
remembered at the end of the day.  They were also a medium in which I reflected, on 




Quotes used throughout this thesis which were taken from my diary, thus do not claim 
linguistic precision, but do, I believe, bear the communicative truth of events.  Journalists 
the world over (and some academics) are notorious for removing context form quotes, 
sensationalising, switching a single word to create the meaning they desire.  All written 
quotes taken from oral language, looses perhaps what is most important about 
communication, the ‘paralanguage’ (Trager 1958): that is, the language in sound that is 
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 I did experiment with more formal recorded interviews.  These were granted and grounded by my 
practical experiences and I was able to relate personally to much of what interviewees were telling me, and 
respond with feelings of my own.  While there is a sparse smattering of quotes from these more formal 
interviews in this thesis, my preference was towards diary ‘recorded’ experiences, as described.  This way 
of researching moved lightly with the practice itself and did not give me the feeling that I was contriving to 
make academic what should be playful.  Similarly I experimented with video methods, but decided that the 
insertion of the recording technology during practice was too intrusive.              
48
 Here we can see the absolutely fundamental role played by emotions in research outcomes, as what is 
remembered is so very closely tied with that which stimulates us emotionally.             
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not made up from words.  The tone, pitch, intensity and tempo of speech can and often do 
mean far more than the words themselves.  By putting this aside, as we do when we 
write, radically different stories can be told.  My aim with this, as I go on to discuss in my 
guiding principles of research, was to write as ‘truthful’ a story as I could, while 




Working Research Principles 
 
What follows are a number of underlying principles that have been under revision and in-
process throughout this project.  They have been embodied (some more than others) and 
have played a significant part in the directions this research found itself going.  Each of 
these ‘theories’ could also be described as a commitment or belief.  Such beliefs, as with 
belief in general, have a profound ability to enact and amplify their abstraction.  It was 
important to be as a ‘sceptic’ to these principles, to keep any ‘principles’ flexible, and 
under continual scrutiny as they were engulfed in the complexity and process of the 
world.  Throughout the research these principles have been treated in the same way this 
presentation asks to be: as a fluid process.  This process helps augment our sensibilities, 
but remains elastic, asks not for fixation on particular words or sentences or entrapment 
by any discrete element.  In short, it begs us to treat it as if it would change, given the 
chance, transform from a representation that is forever orphaned from context, into an 
animate body, able to move and become emplaced.  
 
 
i)  Playing with method 
 
Play is an invitation to unlearn, to be a beginner.  The greatest obstacle to my play is 
thinking that I already know how. (Donaldson 1985: 140)  
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As a perpetual beginner, the phenomenologist is one who maintains the constant 
vigilance which would not let us forget the source and resource of all knowledge and 
action in life – worldly experience. (Jung 1996: 1, emphasis added) 
 
 
My attraction to both the concept and practice of play has been continually ‘discovered’ 
and was a driving force in this project.  As I discussed in the previous chapter, the 
potential productivity of play abounds.  For completeness I will also consider it briefly 
here, thinking through how (or if) we go about ‘using’ play as a method - how can it be 
strategically deployed to improve lives?  If play eludes categorical, economic, and 
scientific measurement and rationale, can it ever be manipulated in such a way as to be 
‘strategically’ deployed?  We might say that this would depend on the kind of strategy 
one was interested in pursuing.  In this case, a playful method that attempts to enhance 
the possible is matched by the activity’s desire for inventive exploration of movement.     
 
The danger is that being truly playful and thus emptied of motive might allow enchanting 
new possibilities, but what guarantee do we have that these will be positive possibilities?  
Without a serious and carefully reasoned analysis of situations, don’t we foreclose the 
chance to influence emerging processes to our liking?  Play relinquishes any complete 
control when it accepts that it can only exist by virtue of its ‘withness’.  While for play to 
happen one can ‘choose’ to make contact with a certain wall, tree, animal, or person, but 
when in process the choice is never just yours.  For me, true control is gladly given up, 
for the enchantment of ‘being with’.  After all, play is not blind to different times.  While 
we are in the process of playing with the world, we are not temporally isolated – the body 
remains susceptible to the future, and its feeling of the future.  Danger and consequence, 
becomes part of this play.                            
 
It is, in fact, seriousness that closes itself to consequence, for seriousness is a dread of 
the unpredictable outcome of open possibility. To be serious is to press for a specific 
conclusion. To be playful is to allow for possibility whatever the cost to myself.  
(Carse, J. cited in Kane 2004: 345) 
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‘Whatever the cost to oneself.’  For Kane, this is a key point – play here is a commitment 
to being aware
49
, an ‘everyday activism’ that can inventively destabilize the taken for 
granted structures and routines that on the face of it, maintain an individual’s identity and 
society more broadly.  “Once you begin to explore and develop your own ethos of play 
there is no telling where you will end up. Or who you’ll end up becoming.”  (Kane 2004: 
345).  While this might be something of an overstatement, the sentiment holds: there is a 
kind of freedom gained through play in which elements recognise and relate to each other 
as open and vulnerable to surprise.  As such, habits, structures, and ‘common sense’ is 
put into play and given new transformative potential.      
 
In this vein I wish to reject any fixed or static methodological standpoints, accepting 
wholeheartedly that I can be affected and must ‘act with’ as the world moves; rather than 
ask the world to move to fit my theoretical/methodological particularities and history.  In 
this case my methodology was experimental in approach, without such a stance place is 
‘already found before it is discovered’ (Thrift 2003: 2023). 
 
ii)  Vulnerable methods  
 
Silence, O, brother! Put learning and culture away:  
Till thou namedst culture, I knew no culture but Thee.  (Tabriz in Donaldson 1993: 
101). 
 
Emotionally we can engage in place in so many different ways.  One particularly bizarre, 
yet surprisingly common way, is to ignore place as ‘time-space-now’ in favour of re-
performing old beliefs and perceptions, almost regardless.  In such process, doubt has 
ceased.  Indeed it is only recently that the social sciences have begun to recognize the 
value of the ‘unhomely’ – that which removes us from our theoretical, methodological, 
business as usual – our comfort zones – and demands us to ask questions (Harrison 2000, 
Jones 2008, Kraftl 2007).  Doubt opens a space for alternatives, it bids us hear other ideas 
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 Aware in the sense that contact can be made with ‘everyday’ elements that might otherwise go unnoticed.     
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and consider other ways of being in the world, no matter the strength of our current 
convictions.       
    
For Harrison, corporeal vulnerability is an unavoidable aspect of human embodiment.  
There is much to be said for this argument, but what is of interest here, is whether this is 
so to varying degrees.  It is the case that research can and is carried out in ways that 
demonstrate, or allow, very different vulnerabilities.  This project was continually 
inspired and moved on by its vulnerable engagement with people and places.  My 
experience has been that the grace of vulnerability is such that not only does it allow for 
the otherwise unheard or unfelt, but that by forgetting ‘myself’ I was able to participate 
more creatively and responsively.  If I want to discover, and if I want a shift in action and 
perception, then I must be willing to put aside my own personal truth and listen and feel 
truth as it is acted through other materialities.  In this way an attitude of vulnerability 
operates as an invitation for interaction.  When vulnerable, we open the door to 
difference.              
 
Hostage to and responsible for that which exceeds intention, corporeality is the first 
hospitality; it is the very model of hospitality. Before comprehension and 
recognition, however tacit and subliminal, before representation and thematisation, 
indeed, before all the phenomena we attribute to cognition and its structures - be they 
social, semiotic, or somatic - this is the signification or `signifyingness' of the 
sensible. (Harrison 2008: 440). 
 
The inescapable ‘sensible’ comes across as somewhat universal and essential in 
Harrison’s writing.  My contention is that it is highly variable, and can be, over time, 
deliberately fostered and shaped (it is itself vulnerable).  In such nurturing we can see the 
dynamic interplay between what Harrison considers a fundamental fact of corporeality 
and our thoughts, and more broadly our action in the world.  As discussed in the 
following chapters, our engagement with, and movement in, places has the ability to 
radically shape supposedly ‘fundamental’ facets of our embodiment.   
 
Promoting such open vulnerability during research can require methods of its own, and 
some of the most effective are, unsurprisingly, gleaned from the activities themselves.  
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These are neither foolproof nor static methods.  As a ‘politics of readiness’, being open 
and fallible initiates the prospect of ‘producing dispositions that are open to the moment, 
able to take hold of accidents and slips, able to draw on skills that can conjure up other 
wheres’ (Thrift 2004d: 97, my emphasis).  Being open to place is the ‘most social’ 
moment (see Harrison 2008: 442), when the body acts with and in contact.    
 
iii)  Placed methods  
 
As I have discussed, place in not just an arbitrary backdrop for human action, but is 
integral to all our ideas and knowledge.  Theory is only useful when given particularity 
and setting – when it is embodied and hence emplaced.  Abram (1996) argues that place-
specificity has been undermined by alphabetic writing systems. For him, as a form of 
participation, reading and writing language ‘displaces older participation between the 
human senses and the earthly terrain (effectively freeing human intention from the 
dictates of the land)’ (Abram 1996: 185).  Written and spoken language does not 
necessarily constitute the only way representationalist ways of thinking and doing 
distance us from the sensuousness of place.  Carolan (2007) discusses what he calls the 
creation of an ‘epistemic distance’ between people and their environment.  For Carolan, 
epistemic distance is perpetuated by several modes of embodiment all of which produce 
‘structurally constrained ways of knowing the world’.  These must be ‘“opened up” if we 
are to be able to make well informed decisions’ (2007: 1265). 
 
Becoming re-attentive to the richness of place, for Abram, involves recognising the 
‘language of places’: that is, the cracking noises of ice on a lake, the whisper of the wind 
in the trees, the feel of the grassy ferns underfoot, the songs of birds, callings of wildlife 
and so on.  More than this though, Abram argues that the living landscape is listening, 
hearing what we ‘say’.  There is a ‘clear sense that the animate terrain is not just speaking 
to us but also listening to us… to listen to the forrest is also, primordially, to feel oneself 
listened to by the forest, just as to gaze at the surrounding forest is to feel oneself exposed 
and visible, to feel oneself watched by the forest.’ (ibid: 153).  
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For both Abram and Carolan, there is an important environmental agenda for re-engaging 
people with place. Abram, in particular, begs for a shift of awareness from the more 
abstract human constructs (literature, technology, industry), towards a re-enchantment of 
‘nature’. In this research, however, place is re-enchanted and filled with wonderment 
through a change in attention that is quite different.  Bike trials in particular, while 
sometimes done in the woods, deliberately and creatively uses, perhaps even fetishises, 
technology (the trials bike) to encounter places.  Similarly, an appreciation for unusual 
spaces, industrial ruins for example, is fostered through parkour and bike trials.  Thus 
while place plays a crucial role in these activities, it is a place that is encountered in 
certain ways and has certain elements amplified through the activities.  As such, the 
texture and form of place most certainly does touch us as we touch them (as failed 
attempts attest), and more broadly it is in the contact the body has with place that both are 
given new significance.      
 
While bike trials, capoeira and parkour ‘make noise’ in place, they are all fully reliant on 
the fact that place makes sound back.  In short, place talks to us and a large part of the 
activities considered here are involved with learning to listen to and understand that talk.   
         
iv)  Apprentice methods 
 
…it is no longer enough to limit actors to the role of informers offering cases of some 
well-known types. You have to grant them back the ability to make up their own 
theories of what the social is made of. Your task is no longer to impose some order, 
to limit the range of acceptable entities, to teach actors what they are, or to add some 
reflexivity to their blind practice. Using a slogan from ANT, you have ‘to follow the 
actors themselves’, that is try to catch up with their often wild innovations in order to 
learn from them what the collective existence has become in their hands, which 
methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts could best 
define the new associations that they have been forced to establish. (Latour 2005 :11-
12).    
 
Being vulnerable to surprise and attentive to engagement with place is well and good, but 
this research was also, and in a sense paradoxically, concerned with becoming proficient, 
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learning techniques of mobility.  While much of this process might well be described as 
creative, it was not a creativity that one body could take credit for.  All three activities 
have a rich and overwhelmingly vast evolution, in which so many actors have played 
important roles
50
.  An apprentice method meant taking the time to carefully watch other 
people doing the activity.  It meant being a perpetual beginner, attempting to start from 
‘empty’ and then closely observing and trying other people’s knowledge.  Such a method, 
involved searching out movements and analysing them: relating them in detail to one’s 
own body.  This could just as easily be pouring over the photos and descriptions of a 
movement in a book, as repeatedly watching and pausing a youtube video, as it could 
copying a teacher in person.  
 
Every movement that I saw and engaged with was slowly reinvented as I claimed them as 
my own (cf. Downey 2005).  Being an apprentice is not just about blindly following, but 
about striving for proficiency.  It is acknowledging that, no matter how good you think 
you are, many others have much to teach you, and to move towards perfection in any 
discipline requires teachers; whether they are a renowned exponent of the art, a concrete 
block, or a musical instrument.  Being an apprentice is knowing with certainty that you 
don’t know.                     
 
Using the process of apprenticeship as a method is not just a way of learning about a 
certain activity or group, but is a way of learning about the process of learning.  It 
involves working through many instruments of embodiment which, along the way are 
loosened, toned, and made more versatile.  Being an apprentice is questing towards an 
ever-moving competence, for this kind of apprentice is not content to be a clone – the 
same as one ‘master’ - but is instead actively seeking out new mobilities, methods and 
knowledge.  It is an attitude that incessantly throws up questions: ‘what might that 
movement feel like?’, ‘what are my beliefs about this kind of movement?’, ‘what might it 
be possible to do from there?’, ‘how does that work?’…  
 
                                                 
50
 Despite their relatively recent and rapid growth parkour and bike trials have a long and extensive set of 
inspirations.      
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The mistaken danger is that the apprentice uncritically holds up a singular person, as a 
guru or idol.  My use of this metaphor involves very little attachment to singular people 
or things.  Instead, recognising the multiplicity of movement, apprenticeship involves a 
wonderment that does not draw clear limits to possibilities or potentialities.  Essentially, 
such a flexibility and unsatisfied craving for knowledge leads to the notion of place 
apprenticeship, in which nothing in place is excluded from becoming a teacher.  Through 
a commitment to ‘learn from’ we can adapt techniques of mimicry, experimentation and 
repetition: techniques of movement that have the potential to expose and escape worlds 
of mirage, of elusory power and shadowy fear.  ‘Doing’ and feeling as a body-in-the-
moment, or in other words, being fully in place, can help generate more truthful (in the 
pragmatist sense) realities. 
v)  Involvement 
 
This research has been based upon involvement with activities, people and places, a lot of 
which is inevitably lost in a ‘write up’ performance of this kind.  Organising workshops, 
running regular informal classes, and the shared everyday learning and teaching of doing 
the activities, can easily get forgotten.  As I type, the ‘talk’ with the world becomes very 
different: contact, it seems, is not really what a PhD thesis structure is setup for
51
. 
Though the activist-scholar is no longer such a peculiarity (see for example, research 
from members of the RGS Participatory Geographies Research Group), it is arguably still 
marginal, and sits uneasily with institutionalised procedures and research routes.   
 
Being involved in this project forced me to consider (confront) the taken-for-granted 
institutional separations that exist between ‘the academic’, their work, and ‘everyday 
activities’. As Castree suggests, we can have somewhat separate identities “as ‘ordinary 
people’ who must shop, eat, rest and play.” (2008: 685).  Amongst many of those which 
do participate, there is a desire to begin this participation with the intent to give the 
‘public’ a geographical perspective.  From a knowledgeable starting point, that of the 
                                                 
51
 It is often quipped, that the PhD thesis will, at best, be read by a handful of people, most of whom will be 
concentrating on finding mistakes.  This might be the case.  For me, this further emphasises the importance 
of the contact and encounter that makes a thesis possible.   
 95 
‘professional geographer’, our job, we are told, is to muck in, to show people on the 
ground what they could do better, how they could change.             
 
Academic/scholar-activism, participatory geographies, and public geographies are all 
underlined by the desire to study and change the intergroup and personal relations 
that create unequal, uneven, unjust and exploitative geographies.  In varying degrees 
they espouse the need to come together with, to come into contact with, be welcomed 
by, become affiliated to and/or work alongside publics. (Fuller 2008: 689, original 
emphasis).              
 
My involved research did not fit easily with that model.  It was not driven by an agenda 
of critique.  I cannot claim to have set out with the intention of rectifying ‘exploitative 
geographies’, for example.  What I was doing, I realise, was affirming types of practices 
that had enchanted my experiences of place.  While much of this involved a lot of 
questions, they were not derived for the purpose of critique, but emerged because they 
possessed – or at least I believed they possessed - in and of themselves, radical potential.            
 
Through participating, “however esoteric our research may be, it acts as a material force 
within wider society, rather than being - as many of us habitually think - enclaved in 
obscure journals and monographs.” (Castree 2008: 684).  This has been a source of 
perpetual surprise for me, as people interpret the contact I have with them in their own 
way, as they live out changing embodied knowledge and identities (see Error! 
Reference source not found.).  Through communication (often non-verbal) we were 
creating alternatives together.  Here my research did not cease when the clock struck 
5:30, rather I ‘lived it’ every day, reflections of readings mingling into daily practice of 
the activities, and vice versa.        
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Figure 2: Capoeira in student kitchen. I was surprised to see photos on a friend’s facebook page 
showing him (after a ‘Halloween night out’!) sharing with his flatmates some of the practices I had 
taught him.  In turn the photos are now commented on and viewed by many others.   
 
 
What counts as valid research output is being expanded (see Kindon, et al. 2007) and 
involvement in research must be measured by more than the ability to achieve some 
predefined goal (though that is very often a valuable contribution, for example Gibson-
Graham 2006).  The question is, how else do we judge research?  I have no good answer 
to this question.  This thesis presentation is, while perhaps unusual in some modest ways, 
unexceptional in most others.  It is a write up of my experiences, mingled with theoretical 
ideas that have jostled for attention.  The strength of this PhD is ultimately likely to be 
broken or made through my command of concepts and language.  Perhaps, though, 
writing does reflect something of the quality of our relationships, which in this case were 
formed with more than ‘a public’.          
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Either way, when engaged in research with a ‘participatory consciousness’, assessment 
from many different actors (not just judgment from ‘above’) is valuable in moving 
forward.  The emergent relationships formed during research practice have enriched my 
goings on in the world.  As I have participated, I have joined in with the production of 
knowledge.  “If one merges, one can come to know even from silence.” (Heshusius 1994: 
18).  As I have extended my embodied knowledge into new realms of mobility and made 
contact in different ways, I have also helped re-invent people (including myself) and 
places, with new capacities for shared contact and new horizons of imagination.       
 
vi)  Inventiveness  
 
In a typically pragmatist move, solidarity within humanity is a truth we can invent for 
ourselves, it is not given a priori, and this to me makes it, and any ethics which might 
flow from it more powerful, valuable and worth defending, than if it is received, as 
somehow given from ‘beyond’.  (Jones 2008: 1608, emphasis original). 
 
There is no ‘true name’ for things; rather everything is, by virtue of its moving 
togetherness, available for re-definition, for new kinds of contact.  And yet the 
possibilities for this are undeniably limited by a whole range of factors.  While the 
materiality of the world enables our existence, it also constrains it.  The question is: to 
what degree?  With any accuracy the answer appears unknowable because of our ability, 
and the ability of the animate world, to invent.  While it takes an imaginative fiction to 
conceive of a situation in which we ‘could not do otherwise’, there are hugely varying 
degrees to which we can act (incarceration being one of the most obvious ways in which 
possibilities are constrained, but even then there remains the ability to act in a range of 
different ways).                            
 
Being inventive means not just coping with, but revelling in the force of things and the 
inventive liveliness in which we participate. In methodological terms it means 
acknowledging what everyone already knows: that the lively process of the world cannot 
be sufficiently clamped for mechanistic, law-based ‘truths’ to be relied upon, and thus we 
 98 
are never relieved of the need to make knowledge.  ‘Emergence must be understood as a 
property of the whole that is not shared by, or reducible to its constituent parts’ (Braun 
2008: 669).  In other words, it is the ‘interaction between’ that constitutes the world.  In 
this way every question is an invention – there are no pre-givens.  Every moment of 
wonder is an experiment, whether it is carried through or not.  In interacting with the 
world, as all its parts are, we are inventing.   
 
Philosophy is not separated from, and experimentations can operate in and between, 
social science, natural science, poetry, art, politics and literature. The 
epistemological/methodological divides which currently isolate these approaches are 
seen as merely 'institutional and pedagogical'.  (Jones 2008: 1609) 
 
By remaining flexible in our thinking, not abstract ‘rule forming’, but instead being in 
wonder as we are ‘with’, we can bring hitherto unexpected parts of knowledge and the 
world together in productive encounter.  We are, with varying degrees of freedom, 
mixing perceptual elements of the world and forming new lives.  What ingredients do we 
choose to produce that mix?  And indeed, how we go about attempting to choose those 
perceptual ingredients, becomes the question, and one that remains at the centre of this 
performance.
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Chapter 5 - Playing with Fear:  





On Wednesday the 17
th
 of May 2006, David Belle, a man heralded as a founder of 
parkour, and now international celebrity, runs towards a solid wall that cordons off an 
underpass.  His movement is purposeful and practiced.  All eyes are turned towards him.  
As he closes on the barrier and jumps, his calloused hands reach out, pushing off the top 
to propel him over.  His trailing foot does not clear the wall; it hits.  It pulls his body out 
of alignment.  Travelling at speed and out of control David Belle’s back makes contact 
with the far wall of the underpass and he falls… 
 
He was pleased and excited.  After the ‘fakeness’ of Californian media appeasing 
performances, the Frenchman said he felt more ‘real’. 
 
This scene, watched and discussed worldwide amongst parkour practitioners and 
enthusiasts, gives us pause. How could the hero of parkour, the symbolic superhuman 
fail?  Watching Belle’s body moving in pixilated slow motion, repeatedly crashing on so 
many thousands of monitor screens, how does this event shape the way traceurs (parkour 
practitioners) or indeed geographers understand and enact places?  How might such two-
dimensional clips influence and reveal our emotional, and specifically our fearful, 
engagements with place?   
 
In this chapter I address to some of these questions by conceiving of parkour as a utopian 
practice, which while enacted, constitutes an emotionally playful engagement with place.  
Here the utopia of parkour is a movement primarily involving the imagination’s 
intertwining with place.  I seek to explore some emotional sense of what connects this 
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imagination with places, and what makes parkour a powerfully engaging utopic practice.  
In doing so, I hope to give the reader a feel for the sensuous connectedness of the 
emotional body; one which can be thrilled after a fall (as with Belle’s example above), 
and one that can laugh with friends after the most demanding and painful experiences.  I 
also hope that in the process I will dispel a seemingly common understanding of parkour 
as a spectacular finished product (see for example figure 3).  By considering some of the 
emotional specificities of being a traceur that plays with place, I draw attention to what is 
often overshadowed by a symbolic or visual ‘reading’ of parkour.  The changing 
embodied movements of parkour can be both motivated by different kinds of fear, as well 
as a ‘method’ for altering, unveiling, refining, and layering emotional engagements with 
places.  Emotions here are more than simply something that ‘happen to’ a body.  Rather, 
when fear is a lived and mobile process it can be considered, cultivated and sometimes 
even enjoyed.  Indeed, in the case of parkour, I argue that fear can be an important 
element of any notion of the utopic that takes seriously embodied practice and contact 
with the world.    
 
 
Figure 3: Sebastian Foucan jumps the Millennium Stadium roof. A typical media representation of 
parkour (image source: UrbanFreeflow.com) 
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As Spinney (2006: 713) notes there has been little research carried out that focuses on the 
sensuous and embodied experiences of different cultures of mobility.  While there has 
been some significant work on practices such as skateboarding (Borden 2001), driving 
(Edensor 2004, Merriman 2007, Sheller 2004), cycling (P Jones 2005) and walking 
(Wylie 2005), the practice of parkour gives us an excellent opportunity to examine a 
rapidly emerging social and cultural phenomenon that is focused on finding new ways of 
moving the body and of inhabiting public and private space. In this chapter I have three 
main aims.  First, to develop a concept of the ‘parkour body’: an unfinished, ever 
learning, emotional body that will move away from an understanding of 
maturity/immaturity as a positive/negative binary.  The traceur is ever questing towards 
new and often fearful movements, many of which are predicated on the attainment of 
bodily skill.  Here, mobile possibilities arise, and new unsure contact is made as spatial 
imaginings are drawn forth from previous experience and the prior development of bodily 
maturity and habit.  In this case a habitual mobile maturity can come before and 
ceaselessly blur into a kind of playful immaturity in place.  Drawing on the theorisation 
of the playful in the previous chapter, this chapter considers what it might mean for the 
playful to begin to be ‘purposefully’ pursued.   
 
Secondly, I wish to show how such playful practice is characterised by a ‘trying’ that is 
intent on creating futures which dare.  The way movements are tried in parkour reveals 
some of the intimate and profoundly emotional connections traceurs have with their 
material environments.  By considering this changing contact, and describing it in some 
detail, I hope to work towards a ‘re-enchanting’ of the body in place (Massey and Thrift 
2003, Thrift 2004d).  Further to this and responding to growing calls in geography that 
bid us attend to emotions (Anderson and Smith 2001, Bondi, et al. 2005, Davidson and 
Milligan 2004) and to distinguish between ‘types’ of, and subtleties within emotions 
(Anderson and Harrison 2006), I consider the flux of experiences that could be described 
as fear.  In parkour, fear can take us in numerous directions; avoiding giving it a purely 
negative polarity, or defining it in terms of opposites (to hope or fearlessness, for 
example) (Solomon and Stone 2002), I show how fear can be a highly complex 
 102 
engagement with place, which can in some circumstances be considered more a playmate 
than paralyzing overlord.  Here affect is mobilised and animated - by way of its contact 
with place - into emotion, feeling and movement.  
 
Third, a participatory study of parkour and ‘types’ of fear can illuminate the way we 
move with the materiality of the world.  Things - that is walls, rails, roofs, trees, etc. - as 
David Belle hints at in the opening example, can become ‘real’ and raw when we move 
in new ways with them.  I wish to present some new ways people are finding to make 
contact with their environments.  Despite being hugely diverse, the way traceurs practice 
parkour holds some common threads.  In drawing these out I consider how parkour can 
be a utopian practice, and what it might lend to theories of utopia that have recently 
started to engage with non-representational theories (see Anderson 2006b, Kraftl 2007, 
Pinder 2005).  The past and future of parkour remains unwritten, and you will not find it 
here – as an individual practice and as a utopia it is a ceaseless evolution.   
 
Prizing ‘freedom’ of expression and movement, parkour is often intentionally formless, 
and as such, finding one’s ‘Way’
52
 is a key element of parkour practice.  There are few 
overarching or distinct goals and little set structure, and this opens an almost unparalleled 
space for play and creative engagements with architecture.  I wish to mirror this play, and 
aside from giving the reader a flavour of the practice of parkour and setting up some 
theoretical footings, this chapter is an attempt to make a playful, possibly risky, 
intervention in our almost universally negative understandings of fear in place. 
 
While this chapter is primarily informed by my learning of and immersion in parkour 
movements and practice, it is impossible to separate this out from the more or less 
inspiring representations, philosophising
53
, stories, images and signs, that always have an 
affective materiality (Latham and McCormack 2004).  In other words, such 
                                                 
52
 Talk about one’s ‘Way’ in parkour is almost wholly borrowed from Japanese forms of Budo, in which 
certain bodily practices and disciplines (archery, aikido, kendo etc.) come to possess spiritual significance.  
While ‘The Way’ in Japanese practices is normally quite prescribed, master to student, in parkour this is 
much less the case. 
53
 Parkour practitioners often refer to the philosophy of parkour.  This philosophy is espoused variously by 
different traceurs across the globe, drawing on a variety of cultural references, particularly from what can 
be broadly identified as Eastern philosophies. 
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representations are often encountered in a way that is not representational (Laurier and 
Philo 2006).  They can, for example, evoke unbidden memories, thoughts and feelings 
(Crang and Travlou 2001, Edensor 2005). What is clear, is that my engagement with 
parkour, as much as anyone’s, is a composite affair, connected much more than one 
might think through international assemblages of technology (television broadcasting, 
internet, etc.), which, far from delivering a bland disembodied representation, have stirred 
up a new world-wide phenomena. 
 
Yet although these representations are important, in this chapter I am not so concerned 
with ‘reading off’ some part of this mass of distributed media, but with the body practices 
themselves, through which this media gains most if not all of its evocative power (for the 
traceur). Texts permeate the practice of parkour, but are primarily interesting in relation 
to the practice itself (which includes the ‘practice’ of such media) – the embodied 
grounding of their affective potential.   
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Parkour as utopian practice 
 
 
I go to meet the parkour group here in Sydney for the first time today.  I am nervous 
about what to expect, even after practicing many of the movements at home, 
watching many videos and reading about it on the net, there is still quite an unknown 
element.  Their replies to my making contact on the forum beforehand all seemed 
positive, so that helps.  (Parkour diary, morning 5
th
 January 2006)        
 
That was really incredible.  Seeing ‘good’ parkour in the flesh is so very different to 
watching it on video.  Very impressed.  It was clear that they knew the areas we went 
quite well - had practiced there before... For me, all is change: I feel inspired; they 
have not only shown me space anew, but were willing to share it with me, helping 
with techniques, suggesting lines, and taking me to ‘parkour spots’ I would not 
otherwise find.  While much of what they did seemed completely out of reach for the 
moment, I feel I have many exciting possibilities to work towards while I am here.  
(Parkour diary, evening 5/1/2006)     
 
Emancipatory politics calls for a living Utopianism of process as opposed to the dead 
Utopianism of spatial forms. (Harvey 1996: 436). 
 
   
Parkour has been variously described as free-running, a type of play, the art of 
displacement, the discipline of moving from A to B as fast and efficiently as possible, 
and even as a way of life.  In the UK it began to grow in popularity following a BBC 
ident
54
 which showed a traceur running and leaping across the rooftops of London.  This 
was followed by one of the most defining and enduring depictions of parkour: the 
documentary film Jump London, which first aired in the United Kingdom on Channel 4 
in September 2003.  It combined stylised footage of a group of French traceurs to 
fabricate a narrative of three heroes who journeyed to London, revitalizing and 
transforming the architecture of the city as they went.  Early on, the authoritative narrator 
tells us what parkour is:             
                                                 
54
 This short clip named “Rush Hour”, first aired in 2002, in order to showcase the new ‘dynamic’ character 
of BBC 1.  This marked a shift in the format of advertising, which also began showing clips of capoeira 
and salsa dancing on the rooftops.        
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Imagine living in a city where you didn’t have to rely on overcrowded trains, 
gridlocked roads and packed pavements.  Imagine having superhero abilities, able to 
leap from rooftop to rooftop as if nothing, not even buildings could stop you.  This is 
parkour, the anarchic new sport of freerunning. (Jump London Documentary)  
 
However much contested, the hugely influential documentary, along with other 
representations - from television advertisements and music videos, to blockbuster 
Hollywood movies and internet forums - has been responsible for propelling parkour into 
the public imagination.  Such depictions of parkour are almost always scripted through 
with heroic narratives of accomplishment; of highly skilled, mature bodies overcoming 
the constraints of the environment. The ‘armchair view’ that one might get of parkour 
from the media could be misleading because it is finished; it is a fearless and mature 
product.  Out of the many thousands of people practicing parkour worldwide, for the 
most part we only see images of the few most proficient and experienced individuals 
performing a highly rehearsed set of body movements in well considered and thoroughly 
explored environments.  Of course, the vast majority of parkour practice remains beyond 
the mainstream media’s focus.     
    
While there exists a great divergence in styles, practice and definition of parkour
55
 (many 
of which clash with sensational media representations), my contention is that it is 
essentially a utopian practice intent upon re-imagining place. Not utopian in the sense 
that it gives any particular clear or finished blueprint for action (as is often peddled by 
media interests), but that it constantly seeks new ways to playfully move with and re-
imagine place.  While arguments on internet forums (and in some cases in the flesh) 
range passionately, attempting to delineate what movements do or do not constitute 
‘parkour’, at base level these arguments seem to be over what form ‘parkour’ takes as an 
imperative for certain types of mobility.  That is, an imperative to move in, perceive and 
understand space in certain imaginative ways. We must, then, make a distinction here 
between parkour as imperative and parkour as practiced.  Yet the conception of parkour 
                                                 
55
 http://parkour.net/Differences-L-art-displacement-Parkour-t1056.html.  
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as a set of ideas and philosophies that can guide or shape future interactions and what 
ought to happen, is complicated by the strong sentiment of ‘freeform play’ ensconced in 
narratives of parkour.  Each individual’s progression and journey is their own we are 
told; there is no master plan.  
 
Table 2 - Words of a practice 
Pure Parkour Freerunning Freestyle Parkour Yamakasi 
To move efficiently 
over obstacles. 
Focus on practical 




movements, but with 
more emphasis on 
enjoyment, play and 




movements that are 
sometimes 
considered 
‘unnecessary’ for an 
efficient A to B run 
“The movement we 
are seeking is 
beyond limitations, 
beyond labels, even 
beyond simple 
definition. Only 
within such freedom 
is creativity 
unleashed, and so 
far that creativity 
has proven hard to 
restrain.”  (Extract 
from Urban 
freeflow’s original 
call for ‘freestyle 
parkour’)   
Both a group of 
influential French 
traceurs, and also 
sometimes used to 
describe a practice 




more emphasis on 
the aesthetics of 
movements.   
Associated with 





Sebastian Foucan.  





is a term coined by 
‘Urban freeflow’, 
and strongly allied 
with the team of 
sponsored 
practitioners often 
referred to as ‘UF 
Crew’. 
Enphasise the 
‘spirit of parkour’, 
and a dedication 
to constant 
training.  
Heavy influence of 
Method Naturel 
(as developed by 





capacity, so they 
are ready to help 
Foucan has 
consistently asserted 
a philosophy of ‘the 
freerun’, which is 
about following 
your own path.  This 
can involve long 
periods of 
practicing alone, 
and ‘for yourself’. 
Very much 











others in any given 
situation. His 
motto was “to be 
strong, to be 
useful.” 
But also shearing 
and showing what 
you learn.    
and events in 
London.   
 
 
Just as in the literature on urban planning, where what constitutes the ‘good’ or ‘healthy’ 
city has been a long lived debate (Campbell and Marshall 1998, Gunder and Hillier 
2007), so parkour practitioners have a distinctive ‘politics of imagination’, however 
paradoxical this may be. While there are many somewhat divergent views about what 
parkour is, and should be, there are still continuities (for a review of different terms and 
common usage see Table 2)
56
.  One important commonality is the desire to go beyond 
movements in space as they are, and to develop the capacity to imagine and do more with 
the body and its environment.  The actual doing of parkour - the practice of the 
movements themselves - is a tangled becoming of hopes and fears: dreams of movements 
(and therefore spaces) realised or diminished.  
                      
It is a utopian practice in that, by the very act of imagination, parkour is granted spatially 
transformative powers which can prevent comfortable closure (Parker, et al. 2007, Pinder 
2002). Common to some recent work on utopia (e.g. Kraftl 2007, Pinder 2005), parkour 
is an ongoing process that is inevitably unsettling in its dynamic re-imagination of 
movement and landscape.  Normative conceptions of ‘the good life’ and the ‘healthy 
functioning human’, permeate traditional utopian visions of space.  There is an ‘ought’, a 
‘must’, ‘should’, and ‘ensure’ in the imperatives of the utopian city, particularly evident 
in urban planning processes (Gunder and Hillier 2007).  Of course, these are very 
different from the spatial imperatives in parkour which, as with skateboarding and similar 
                                                 
56
 Interestingly, such debates are mostly played out when the parkour practitioner is in relative stasis, using 
a computer.  Here the traceur is able to quietly reflect, form allegiances with distant traceurs, and put 
forward opinions under anonymous pseudonyms. When the body is in motion and ‘doing’ parkour, such 
politics, though enacted, are harder to make out as interaction is primarily though the movement of the 
body, rather than spoken or written language.  Indeed many of the differences simply do not manifest 
through the moving practice, which perhaps has more difficulty delineating and categorising.  
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re-interpretative activities (Borden 2001), as well as many banal embodied practices
57
, 
exceed the designer’s vision of how space ‘should’ be inhabited.                 
 
As Ben Anderson (2006b) notes, utopia has typically been seen as a departure from the 
‘here and now’.  Being placed in the future, it is in this departure, he suggests, that we 
ascribe a negative or positive opinion (2006: 694). Locating utopia elsewhere than the 
time-space we inhabit functions to separate and cut us off from our emergent lives, as 
lived. Drawing on the volumous writings of Ernst Bloch (1986) Anderson suggests that 
utopia as a concept “cannot and does not have a unitary meaning or function. To fix it 
would be to reduce the multiplicity and heterogeneity of utopic processes.” (Anderson 
2006b: 695).  While such a definition remains remarkably open, this seems entirely 
necessary if we are to move utopia, from a singularly future oriented time-space (as in 
‘blueprint’ utopias), but rather have it occupying both past and present time as well.  
Certainly ‘opening out’ utopia in this way seems one necessary step to overcoming the 
historical ‘bad press’ of utopia, which has become associated with totalising authoritarian 
visions which in some instances have been brutally deployed and enforced (Jacoby 
2005). Instead, utopianism as an occurring process can challenge ‘common sense’ ways 
of living and moving in certain places, through its openness to alternatives (Pinder 2005).         
 
Here utopian can be concerned with historical failures and unrealised hopes as well as 
fulfilled potentials.  Thus, memories inhabit the ‘now’, breathing life into the possibilities 
for the future. The failures become important and necessary, in that they ‘enable’ the 
prospective imagination to create what still might be.  In parkour, for example, if every 
movement one tried was a conclusive success then there would be no parkour, no ‘Way’ - 
the end would be reached.  As I will go on to discuss, there would be no fear (or for that 
matter hope) with which to play. 
 
Such a notion of the utopic is not just a ‘vision’, but must incorporate a multi-sensual 
mobility which allows for compound temporalities.  It has room to include the hazy, 
                                                 
57
 See, for example, the activities of The Situationists International, but also activities as banal as taking a 
different route to work, attempting to cook something new without a recipe, etc.   
 109 
uncompleted, emotional, indeterminate, sensorial as well as the intuitive.  It is a version 
of utopian practice which does not stand still and “which can agonistically incorporate 
different voices and ways of being, which is a trajectory rather than a point and which 
becomes an immanent transcendence rather than a transcendent vision.” (Gunder and 
Hillier 2007: 478).  As such, feeling and contact with spaces is stretched beyond the now 
moment, to include the ‘not-yet’, immanent future.  By virtue of its playful, exploratory 
movement, the serious traceur is encouraged to think, move and feel the city in new 
ways.           
 
We need to dream in parkour. Because we are forerunners, so it’s necessary to 
continue practicing, searching, travelling to discover, meet and share. Compared to 
other groups, we deeply want to keep in our quest, to be in the right…. It’s the 
trajectory that interests me. If in each town there are traceurs, persons that feel this 
freedom sentiment, so it will be won. (Foucan 
58
, personal website).   
 
Here there are no ready made solutions, rather a fluid and uncertain sentiment that drives 
for exploration, potential, and play.  When the traceur attempts to master some 
movements through space, such mastery, as it occurs (or not), is always accompanied by 
an emotional refiguring of spatial possibilities.  In this sense, parkour as utopian process 
speaks quite forcefully to an enchanted notion of place which, through wonderment, 
imagination and participation, is in continuous composition (Crouch 2003, Edensor 2005, 
Fenton 2005, Thrift 2004d).  The extended and serious practice of parkour is always a 
questing, a search for new and more elaborate imaginings.  It is an opening out of 
possible, but not necessarily attainable, mobilities.   
 
As most parkour practitioners attest, it is not an ‘extreme sport’ or even a ‘sport’ 
amenable to organised competitions and rules.  Instead, the distancing of parkour from 
‘extreme sports’ (which are very often characterised by reckless juvenile behaviour (Le 
                                                 
58
 Sebastien Foucan is an influential traceur who is often contentiously cited, along with David Bell, as the 
‘co-founder’ of parkour.  He starred in the documentary films Jump London and its follow up Jump Britain, 




, has been a considered move that valorises parkour as a discipline and art 
form.  The philosophy espoused by Foucan, Belle and others is one that does not involve 
competition with anyone but ones self.  As with many physical/spiritual arts, such as 
yoga, aikido and meditation, the serious practice of parkour involves moves to transcend 
the ego, unlike many competitive sports that are geared towards building the self, by 




Figure 4 - Keep Parkour Free campaign signature 
 
 
The somewhat diverse but affective utopianism of parkour has been mobilised against 
commercial interests, and those agents who are perceived to commodify the ‘play’ and 
‘discipline’ of parkour. In efforts to resist competition, the ‘spirit’ of parkour is often 
invoked, as being opposed to competitive capitalist rule-based culture.  To be “pro 
parkour” is automatically to be ‘against competition’ (see figure 4).  Much of this 
campaign is directed against the Urban freeflow organisation
60 
which has made sustained 
moves to incorporate different forms of competitive game into the practice.  In an 
interview with Sebastien Foucan
61
, members of Urban freeflow asked: 
“Competition. At some point it’s going to happen. If big companies are going to get 
involved in parkour, they'll seek to set up comps. Good or bad?”  
To which Foucan answered: 
 “For me, it depends on what kind of competition.  I can tell somebody it’s bad 
because you have … my erm… my heart to be free. And if somebody wants to do 
competition, respect your body and your heart and if it’s a show, make it a show for 
everybody a good show, with my heart you know.  I don’t like competition.  If in the 
                                                 
59
 Although many traceurs will acknowledge that their practice requires an ‘extreme effort’. This is often 
involves “no struggle against a third party, only a commitment to going right to the limit of a personally 
imposed demand.” (Le Breton 2000: 1).   
60
 Having a large website, and being heavily involved with the media, has made UrbanFreeFlow something 
of an easy target for parkour purists.      
61
 Accessed from http://www.parkourpedia.com/index.php?id=1,12,0,0,1,0  
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future you have a competition maybe I will be like in the organisation.  For my 
philosophy, no competition for me, it’s not very good.  It’s a way for other people.” 
 
Freedom, play, discipline, personal journey - those ideas feed into the utopian practice of 
parkour and are implicitly dismissive of a capitalist, competitive, corporate, work ethic.  
As many would have it; the ‘spirit’ of parkour is one of cooperation rather than rivalry
62
.  
Here parkour is about helping each other towards some goal.  Georges Hébert's
63
 motto, 
“to be strong, to be useful”, has been taken up amongst practitioners with relative 
ubiquity.  Here ‘to be strong’ is not narrowly understood as muscular, but rather as 
encapsulating the embodied discipline, morality and free flexibility of parkour as a life 
choice.  Indeed, it is in the vague (and often paradoxical) nature of phrases such as this 
that parkour is granted the openness that allows creativity and diversity to flourish.                
 
Regardless of passionate internet debates, in its physical practice there are less hard and 
fast rules about what movements or spaces can be inhabited.  While the representations of 
what parkour ‘is’ certainly feed into its physical enactment they themselves take on new 
meanings as practitioners find new ways to move in and feel place.  As a global utopian 
practice parkour reminds practitioners of the need to develop and cultivate new embodied 
capacities, which surpass received capitalist subject positions as “entrepeneurs, or 
employees, or would-be-employees… investors in capitalist firms [or] consumers of 
(capitalist) commodities” (Gibson-Graham 2006: 9). 
   
“All play moves and has its being within a playground marked off beforehand either 
materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course.” (Huizinga 1970: 28).  Yet the 
shifting utopian practice of parkour never finalises a map of terrain as interpreted in one 
way, rather in its practice, it offers possibilities for trying new movements and spaces 
with the environment.  In practice, parkour strives for new feelings and emotions that are 
                                                 
62
 See for example, a complete statement against competition, made by the Australian Parkour Association 
at: http://www.parkourpedia.com/index.php?id=4,26,0,0,1,0    
63
 George Hébert was a French physical educator, who in the 1940s and 50s developed what he called the 
‘Natural Method” in which participants cultivated bodily powers by training on obstacle courses and in 
‘natural environment’.        
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normative and performative, sketchy and detailed, about futures which are always already 
in and of the present.  
    
It is necessary to prevent ‘the good’ solidifying and becoming reified as the exclusive 
and exclusionary vision of a dominant elite (whether planners, politicians, corporate 
business people, or residents).  (Gunder and Hillier 2007: 480). 
 
In not solidifying ‘the good’, utopia becomes a process in which the means are not 
disassociated from the ends, the journey that is enacted in the learning of movement and 
the striving has the power to actualize utopia, even as it extends and modifies it.  Parkour 
pushes us to consider what could be, and forces forward a negotiation of the ‘function’ of 
spaces.  Unlike many political movements, with set visions of how transport, personal 
mobility or comportment should be
64
, parkour is a continuing and unspecified 
questioning or ideology of the body moving free and finding new ways.   
 
It is a utopia that despite, and because of, its flexibility can actively challenge received 
wisdom about the seriousness of non-competitive play, as well as the nature of 
architecture.  As Huizinga notes, “Child and animal play because they enjoy playing, and 
therein lays their freedom.” (1970: 26).  And yet only the ‘child’ may practice Huizinga’s 
free-play.  Following the lead of Belle and Foucan and other ‘parkour celebrities’, 
parkour, while remaining a mostly male practiced art, does for some practitioners, present 
a life choice characterised by a utopian practice that is a radical departure from ‘sensible’, 
competitive, economic adulthood as it is normally understood.  
 
Before the internet had become part of the public domain, and before the first utterances 
of the word ‘Parkour’, several notable figures were doing remarkably similar things to 
contemporary traceurs.  Tony Wolf described to me his experiences with what he had 
called ‘Skywalking’ and ‘Urban Shugendo’ back in the 1980s.  
 
                                                 
64
 See, for example, the distinct utopian visions espoused by such movements as ‘critical mass’ bike rides 
(Furness 2007). 
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“In Japan, for example, there's the tradition of Shugendo, which basically translates as 
"enlightenment through accomplishment". It’s like Parkour in that it’s not really a 
religion, more a form of spirituality in which you test yourself through physical feats. 
Shugenja dangle headfirst off the tops of mountains and sit underneath icy waterfalls 
and things like that.” (Tony Wolf). 
 
For Wolf, both Skywalking and Urban Shugendo were different terms for a similar thing.  
Namely, disciplining the body and developing one’s skills; it “tested courage, and honed 
our balance and agility.” (Wolf).  What Wolf was doing was developing and testing 
himself: his everyday life was not ordinary, he craved escape from the mundane, the 
comfort that had slowly ceased being comfortable.  During this time he worked as a stunt 
man, and in his spare time used the urban architecture as a playground for Skywalking. 
 
Nowadays, amongst other things, Tony Wolf, actively promotes Parkour in New Zealand, 
Australia, and worldwide through the internet.  Another figure, not often acknowledged 
by either Belle or Foucan amongst their list of inspirations
65
, is the Frenchman Don Jean 
Haberey. The enigmatic Haberey, now in his sixties, was practicing a style of training in 
Paris, again in the 1980s, that is similar to what parkour is today. Certainly parkour 
practice has been, and continues to be, shaped by this man’s activities, which have 
primarily come to light in English speaking parts, through one of his self-described 
‘followers’: Erwan Le Corre 
66
.  Haberey began taking elements of Georges Hébert’s 
‘Natural Method’ into the urban environment, where creatively adding elements, he 
began to practice and teach an activity very similar to Wolf’s Urban Shugendo. Indeed, 
the physical practice of parkour-type movements has been with us in many different 
incantations well before the term ‘parkour’ became popularized. 
 
“The parkour, is what it is, it never changes, but our ability to connect with that, to 
think in that language is constantly evolving.”  (Germain 2008, The Pilgrimage 
Project DVD). 
 
                                                 
65
 This list includes sources as various as Bruce Lee, David Belle’s father, and the Tao Te Ching.   
66
 Erwan Le Corre is an influential French traceur and the founder of MovNat (an outdoor system similar to 
Georges Hébert’s ‘Natural Method’) 
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This style of training includes more than techniques or exercises.  Rather, it involved 
getting to know the self by entering into new situations that prevent habitual modes of 
embodiment, and through playful but cautious and present experimentation. Parkour has 
taken much of this sentiment, which is a disciplined act of play, a continual extension of 
the embodied learning - one that traditionally ends in the transition from childhood to 
adulthood. 
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Moving in disguise 
 
My first telling off doing parkour (why has it, until now, attracted less negative 
attention than doing bike trials?).   
I stand ready and mentally run through the general gist of the move I plan to do.  Start 
moving at a jogging pace towards the highest section of the wall.  Out of the corner of 
my eye I see a figure emerge from a doorway, watching.  It registers as a distraction, 
but I continue, picking up speed, launching towards the wall, foot kicks out and off 
the wall’s surface transforming horizontal to vertical momentum.  Just grasp the top 
with one set of figures.  Scrabble, scramble, up, on top. 
Now I have the time to look at the figure in the doorway, who comes closer with a 
scowling face and a prominent ID badge.  I quickly lower and jump down to the car 
park tarmac below.  He looks from James to me: two males, mid to late twenties. 
“What do you think your doing up there?” He’s addressing me. The scene so familiar 
from trials riding that the question should have been pre-empted.  It is not though.  It 
hits: what was I doing up there?  Confusion. A few moments… “What do you mean, 
you just saw every move I made while I was up there”, I want to say but don’t.  “We 
were just doing some  training” James chimes in – he’s a big presence, a big guy that 
somehow manages not to be intimidating that keeps a cordial manner despite the 
hostile body posturing of the scowling man. 
After asking us for our address, purpose and destination (?), which James seamlessly 
gives over (fictitiously), we are told to leave, in a savagely polite way that 
exaggerates every difference between us and this suited and serious man.  (Author’s 
diary 14
th
 August 2006) 
 
In general I would tend to suggest that parkour is not, or at very least much more than, a 
“performative critique of public space” (Borden 2001).  It is not, for example, a 
deliberately rebellious or subversive act when I vault over a rail or experiment with a 
movement across a wall - there is no malice or prejudice against walking around a railing 
or strolling by a fence.  These are movements traceurs do all the time, between more 
recognisably parkour movements.  Even when they are said to be out doing parkour, there 
is often much walking, crossing roads, waiting for another person to move out of the way, 
and so on.  Here, then is a key difference between parkour and BMXing, bike trials, or 
skateboarding. These other activities involve becoming identifiably something else: a 
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skateboarder or a cyclist.  The traceur though, can and very often does move in 
camouflage. 
 
While white running trainers are common to traceurs, their use is certainly not without 
exception
67
.  In general the clothing is loose, comfortable and casual.  Only rarely do 
practitioners wear clothing with specifically parkour related slogans or pictures (see for 
example, Urban freeflow’s ‘Glyph’
68
), and rarer still are these interpreted as such by the 
general public.  The relative indistinctness of the parkour practitioner is an important way 
in which the movement itself gains impact.  As Wolf noted, “no one expects it when a 
person leaps to a phone box roof and back flips off”.  It is a movement out of context, and 
without the usual warnings or signs of a street performer.  As an unexpected, unpredicted 
surprise, the traceur is well out of step with any place ballet (see Seamon 1980).  Can it 
be that this clashing expectation and the subsequent disjunctive meaning it creates in the 
observer, is doomed to create the moral polarisation of traceur and pedestrian?  For me, 
the experience above came as a shock, the question stuck – what was I doing up there? 
There was no point to my action.  Not only was I not participating as a good citizen, but 
neither was I critiquing, not deliberately resisting, nor performing for an audience.  
Because I did not have the answer, a logical reason, his question worked as the direct 
challenge it may well have been intended as. I was just playing, all be it in a quite 
focused and perhaps deliberate way. 
 
James’ response, though, made much more sense.  “Training”: here was something that 
could be understood and justified sensibly.  Training is a capital investment – a body 
project.  Yet this is somewhat disingenuous, there are many responses to parkour: what 
for some invites fear and anger, can for others be a source of inspiration and wonder.  
Perhaps, more than anything it is the unknown, unrecognisable quality that bids for a 
reaction, whether that be protest, deliberate avoidance, or pleasure.  Not so much that 
parkour is unknown, but the break, the stop or interval that it creates (Appelbaum 1995, 
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 Indeed, many traceurs interested in Hébert’s ‘Natural Method’ practice barefoot.  
68
 See, http://81.27.111.36/online_store/parkour_glyph_description.htm. This symbol is recognized world 
wide amongst traceurs, though its meaning varies wildly between groups – for some it has come to 
represent the ‘selling out’ of parkour to media and commercial interests. 
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Harrison 2000) unleashes latent affective potential in places.  The change of perspective 
that occurs through parkour movements is undoubtedly dramatic and brings a choice.  
Yet, there is no simple answer, no opposites to choose from as in the way that cyclists 
and cars (Furness 2007) and skateboarders and ‘suits’ (Borden 2001) have been 
characterised.  The traceur in disguise is a shock to behold because they are not examples 
of this or that.  The normal process of seeing is disrupted as expectations are separated 
from perception in a way that can be disquieting.  We need these preconceptions to 
operate in the world, our sensuous engagement with place is, most of the time at least, 
reliant on them to make sense of our surroundings.  Parkour, then, necessitates a shift in 
these preconceptions, a change in vision towards what some would consider a more 
‘childlike’ curiosity with the world, and the body’s abilities to move in it.               
    
Every kid wants to jump from a wall and climb a tree...it is an instinct of developing 
physical and mental skills. Why should this stop with our childhood? Because we 
were always told not to harm ourselves, then to be good at school, then to get a 
"real" job. uh? Bullshit! We want to feel fully alive, and to experience this fullness, 





The origins of parkour as utopian practice then, lay in its emotional and sensual depth.  
While not all movements are immediately pleasurable and very often require a degree of 
‘pain’ to learn, practice always includes the experience of moving with space in 
emotively powerful ways, and the promise of furthering such movements and spaces.  
Fear is one notable and crucially important emotion that traceurs experience, and it is one 
which connects them to spaces in very distinct and changing ways.   
 
Awakening from mundane everyday experience, through playful fear and vulnerability 
toward place, does not dictate or exclude particular styles of movement.  The traceur 
moves effortlessly from walking to running to jumping.  The point is that they have 
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 Originally posted on UrbanFreeFlow forum, now only available as an archive at 
http://www.washingtonparkour.com/Parkour/parcours/habrey1.htm  
 118 
expanded choice: in every barrier strolled around or overhanging wall passed while 
walking, there is the latent recognition of their art.  Similarly, the vision of the traceur 
does not act as a relay switch, recognizing new possibilities of possibility only when on 
the run.  Rather, the extraordinary and the possible in place can be embodied and seen in 
the backdrop of a chanced upon photograph, as easily as the spacings between a table and 
sofa or the brick wall immediately at hand.          
  
One does not need to be a traceur to recognise such possibilities, but in doing so, and 
being aware of the fact, we are granted a new insight into our own interaction with place 
– something that has not escaped the notice of media producers.  The computer game 
‘Mirror’s Edge’, for example, suggests that it is through this re-interpretation “on the 
edge of the city, you find out who you really are.” (Mirror’s Edge website
70
)  Through 
free running, we are told, you can get transcendental knowledge about reality and your 
place in it.  For the makers of Mirror’s Edge, this is a story based on breaking free from 
convention, but one in which they still felt obliged to give a real purpose: that is the 
character delivers messages.  The lead character, as a courier, can serve a client while still 
reserving the right to critique the conformity to societal norms of mobility: these norms 
are unambiguously depicted in the game as a prison
71
.   
 
Mirror’s Edge developers have coded space in what they call ‘runner’s vision’: a system 
in which the colour of objects represents the possibility of jumping to them.  A crane arm 
that is ‘in range’, for example, will be coloured red.  This ability develops throughout the 
game as your character progresses, turning more distant objects into potential landing 
platforms.  This seems to me to be quite a clever way of representing the changing places 
inhabited by a traceur.  Such games however, still misrepresent the process of parkour, in 
their search for the spectacular and instantly entertaining.  They have, as Bauman 
ironically argues (all be it in a different context), prioritised A to B speed along with 
wilful and agency filled action:          
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 http://www.mirrorsedge.com/ls/en/index.asp  
71
 Numerous ‘cultural products’ have appeared in recent times with similar messages, from The Matrix 
films to parkour documentaries.  
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The Arcades are no more… Today’s action is, after all, different: it is, mostly, about 
passing from here to there, as fast as one can manage, preferably without stopping, 
better still without looking around. Beautiful passers-by are no more to be seen 
moving; they hide inside cars with tinted windows. Those on the ground are waiters 
and sellers at best, but more often dangerous people pure and simple: layabouts, 
beggars, homeless conscience-soilers, drug pushers, pickpockets, muggers, child 
molesters and rapists waiting for prey.  To the innocent who has to leave for a 
moment the wheeled-up security of cars, or those others (still thinking of 
themselves as innocent) who cannot afford that security at all, the street is more a 
jungle than a theatre.  (Bauman 1993: 176, emphasis original). 
 
 
Movement, fear and place making 
 
 
Feeling so fragile all over. It was as if I could already begin to feel the jagged 
concrete below crunching through my spine, dislodging vertebrae.  Try as I might I 
could not focus my attention on the goal: a flat pink vertical wall which I wanted to 
jump to - gripping the top edge with my hands, letting my feet and legs absorb the 
speed of the impact, before pulling up and hopping over.  After some time here 
considering from different angles, testing the surfaces, watching JZ jump the gap, 
feeling more and more shaky and sick(!), I moved on without trying it. (Author’s 
diary 8
th
 February 2006)      
 
Natural disasters, transportation accidents, spies, famines and droughts, serial killers, 
sex addiction, fluoridation, terrorism, rock music, assassination, global warming, 
Willie Horton, wrinkles, ozone depletion, Satanism, ageing... What aspect of life, 
from the most momentous to the most trivial, has not become a workstation in the 
mass production line of fear? (Massumi 1993: vii) 
 
It is fair to say that the emotion of ‘fear’ has a terrible reputation.  From the well used 
mantra, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself”, to the common association of fear 
with terrorist tactics. Of all the emotions it has, in academic literature, received unrivalled 
attention (Tuan 1979) and in much of this analysis fear has been cast as the ultimate 
villain; something to be railed against, out thought, and surmounted so as to minimise its 
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unhealthy effects and immoral tendencies (see for example, Bannister and Fyfe 2001, 
Bauman 2006, Brownlow 2005, Katz 2008, Koskela 1997, Nayak 2003, Panelli, et al. 
2005, Valentine 1989).   In short, fear is very often taken to be the overgrown roots from 
which stems much human suffering. Some authors go further still.  
 
Evil and fear are Siamese twins. You can’t meet one without meeting the other.  Or 
perhaps they are but two names of one experience – one of the names referring to 
what you see or what you hear, the other to what you feel; one pointing ‘out there’, 
to the world, the other to the ‘in here’, to yourself.  What we fear, is evil; what is 
evil, we fear. (Bauman 2006: 54). 
 
Yet even so called ‘irrational fears’ often have some foundation in the material world, 
which is awash with real dangers.  Something akin to fear can be observed in almost all 
living animals and provides a useful and necessary survival mechanism (Tuan 1979).  In 
humans’ experience of fear, it is when there is a mismatch between ‘real’ dangers and the 
danger ‘perceived’, that the value of that emotion comes to question.  For Bauman, and 
many others, it is our inability to perceive risks and danger with good timing and 
precision that makes fear an emotion to warrant our concern.  When fear is defuse, vague 
and unidentifiable, it is at its most potent and harmful (Bauman 2006).  Our fearful 
inaccuracy – a fundamental characteristic of humans’ inability to know the future – is 
exploitable, and routinely deployed to bolster, maintain and change webs of global 
politics, and hierarchies of power and inequality (Robin 2004).  Whether specific fears 
are well founded or not, propagated through global networks or everyday activities or 
combinations of both, they have a very real materiality of their own (Pain and Smith 
2008).      
 
A racing heart, and sweaty, shivering sickness, reassure us that fear is ‘happening’, but 
these effects - manifest from molecular reactions in the body – are the feelings of fear, 
which are part of, but do not constitute the whole emotion ‘fear’ itself.  In contrast, 
William James’s (1884) famous theory, sees the emotion purely as the physiological 
bodily symptoms.  For James, emotion occurs not because of a danger or risk perceived, 
but as a consequence of our bodily reactions towards the danger; that is, the quickened 
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heart, shallow breathing, etc. “Common sense says… we meet a bear, are frightened and 
run… this order of sequence is incorrect.” (ibid: 190).  Rather, we meet a bear, and the 
body’s perception of the bear, before thought, causes us to tremble and run – for James 
the experience of the running and trembling is the emotion fear (James 1884).  For him, 
the movement of the body at various scales, whether it be muscular or cellular, is the 
emotion.      
 
Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its 
pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of 
personality that every one of us unfailingly carries with him [sic]. It is surprising 
what little items give accent to these complexes of sensibility. When worried by any 
slight trouble, one may find that the focus of one's bodily consciousness is the 
contraction, often quite inconsiderable, of the eyes and brows. When momentarily 
embarrassed, it is something in the pharynx that compels either a swallow, a 
clearing of the throat, or a slight cough; and so on for as many more instances as 
might be named. (James 1884: 192-3) 
 
In other words it is impossible to separate out and distinguish between the emotion and 
the embodied responses we commonly recognise as being a consequence of that emotion. 
While there is value in such an understanding, I treat emotions as quite a bit more than 
this. If I have a dry mouth, raised heart rate, and cold sweat, on their own, these do not 
tell us much. I could have one of a number of different illnesses, for example. The 
context in which these feelings arise is absolutely crucial. It is true that when I stand at 
the edge of a drop contemplating a jump, ‘my’ fear is indistinguishable from the 
shakiness I feel in my hands, my wobbly legs, and the watering of my doubt filled eyes. 
Yet fear is more than this, it includes the wall I propose to jump to, and the jumps that 
have come before and that register this one as a possibility.  While much of this emotion 
may well be ‘in action’ before thought and before consciously calculating and 
understanding the danger, this is not always the case. The emotion still includes more 
than the physiological feelings, instead I wish to consider fear as an engagement in place.     
 
As with other thinking on fear James’ theory of it easily becomes synonymous with 
negative, unhealthy physiological feelings.  Of course, they are only ‘unhealthy’ when 
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they are misguided. “If we abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops 
beating, and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate idea of danger can 
arise.” (James 1884: 196). If the form in the woods is our friend then the fear is 
misguided and our heart jolted for nothing. But if there is a real danger, an attacker that 
means us harm, then our fear may have served us well. None the less, our feelings might 
well be resented for casting us as a victim, or for overriding our cognitive function with 
freezing panic. Either way, paired with this conception is the implicit modernist 
imperative to overcome fear; through better judgment and more accurate perception, or 
better still some means that would allow us to wield power over the object ‘causing’ fear.       
 
Such an understanding of fear as an undesirable and negative emotion is built into the 
way parkour is misleadingly represented and valorised as the spectacular human conquest 
of fear. While it is not my intention to undermine the aims and strategies of much of the 
extremely important work that treats fear so (indeed continued research into, just for one 
example, fear of crime and violence, is clearly crucial), I do however, wish to push open 
what we take to be ‘fear’, and to make a preliminary attempt to talk about different 
‘types’, layerings and nuances of fear. My argument is that in our tracing of fear’s trail, 
which, by all accounts, has been stretched and broadened to near all pervasive 
magnitudes (evidenced by the now common usage of terms like ‘culture of fear’), we 
have as yet neglected the possibility that fear can be more dynamic, multiple and possibly 
productive than a survey of the literature might lead one to believe.   
 
During my research, as the initial shock of seeing and participating in movements which 
risked injury and in some cases death lessened, so the fear that accompanied my research 
changed.  My perceptions of the risks involved became clearer, as I practiced, and saw 
how practice and movement took place.  It would be inaccurate and too simplistic to say 
my fear lessened. As I will discuss, fear began to permeate every aspect of my daily 
experiences.  As with all practitioners of parkour, my emotional engagements with space 
changed along with my mobility in it.  To consider the richness and complexity of certain 
types of fear will inevitably involve a consideration of the mobility and movement of the 
parkour practitioner.  
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Modern life, we are told, is speeding up. It is more mobile and dynamic, in a state of 
continuous flux and fear inducing flow (Bauman 2006).  Indeed time itself pre-supposes 
movement in all things (Cresswell 2006, Dewsbury 2000).  Yet mobility is neither a 
universal ‘good’ (Bordo 1993, Massey 1991), nor are similar movements always 
understood or experienced in the same way.  Thus for many academics mobility and the 
power that it might exercise can only be understood as relational (e.g. Adey 2006, 
Cresswell 1999, Sheller and Urry 2006).  It is the differences in speeds and directions 
between objects, people, and landscape that affect our relative experiences of mobility 
and immobility.   
 
Relative velocities, vectors, directions, and momentums is one way of thinking and 
writing about variations in mobility. Bissell (2007) proposes another, by considering 
embodied action and inaction rather than relative mobility and immobility. One key 
difference here - besides Bissell’s interest in ‘inactivity’ that poses some difficult 
methodological questions – is in the scale of analysis, which for Bissell is the body. This 
is, of course, inescapably linked to the global mobility of people, technology, information 
and ideas, which is in turn bound up in changing geometries of power which do make 
significant impacts into peoples daily lives and emotional experiences (Massey 1991). 
But this should not mean that the corporeal (in)activities and emotions are understood 
through an overarching meta theory that automatically ascribes value or power to ‘more 
mobility’ at the cost of losing real life human experience (Bissell 2007). 
 
When we consider the emotional content of mobility, each and every movement (and 
indeed stillness) begins to gather significance. Emotion is entirely necessary to bring 
contrast to the differentiations, say between the movement of a passenger on a long haul 
flight, and the movements of a parkour practitioner over a meandering set of walls 
outside a council office. That is not to say that ‘mobility’ does not involve more than 
emotion, only that we find meaning in our experiences of mobility through emotion.  
 
 124 
Thus for the purposes of this chapter, emotion lies at the centre of this complex, 
unfolding and ambiguous relationality which connects the body and its surroundings. It is 
through movement that our emotions engage the world. In this engagement, emotions 
shift and change as new contact is made with configurations of materialities, which are 
themselves (re)formed by virtue of their continuing movement.            
 
Emotions play a crucial part of this ‘interface’.  They are a vital element of the 
connections we have to the world.  They are between, in motion and animated by the 
movements and contact the body has with its surroundings.  But emotions also 
encompass other times and places as they negotiate an engagement with the world.  An 
unforeseen cue, a remembered caress, a painful fall or a harsh word, and we are 
emotionally moving in a way that brings past movements and materials into the places we 
inhabit.  Emotion can comprise of a baffling complex of overlapping events that always 
have affective potential beyond the time and space in which they once occurred.  On the 
other hand, emotions can be quite fresh – being an experience that is impossible to 
describe in already available terms, or relate to anything we have felt before.   
 
“I can’t describe it, it just feels like…. Like I have done something… something 
new, that I didn’t think was possible a few days ago.  It’s like scary but not, because 
I have done it, it just makes me feel new, I can’t describe it. But it is good” – (John, 
attempting to articulate the feeling of doing a palm spin, recorded in author’s diary)               
 
What is clear is that parkour makes absolutely obvious the need for a consideration of an 
emotional basis of action.  Aside from the (misleading) high profile media activity, 
parkour befuddles any attempt to describe a rational, economic, or disembodied decision 
making actor.          
 
Take a very basic example.  As Tony Wolf demonstrates well in all his parkour 
workshops
72
, a bench becomes much more than an object for sitting or resting on.  As 
participants are encouraged to find as many ways of moving over, around, across and 
                                                 
72
 During my research I attended a ten day parkour workshop run by Tony Wolf as part of the 
‘StompingGround’ dance festival in New South Wales. 
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even under the bench as possible, it takes on a whole new feel.  Through continued 
contact and movement with the bench, the traceur slowly becomes more adventurous, 
attempting grand leaps and inverted vaults - their familiarity with the form takes on a new 
life altogether.  In this instance the bench facilitates exciting and as yet inexperienced 
bodily movements and postures in the world.  Their emotional disposition toward the 
bench changes as they watch others, and they themselves move over and about the bench.       
 
Emotions in parkour, as in many social and cultural practices, are not things that simply 
occur or ‘happen to’ the body as in James’ theorisation.  Neither, though, are we in 
complete control of our emotions, the way we feel and act is not as a sovereign subject, 
rather places can express more than their human inhabitants might wish from them 
(Hetherington 2003a, Hoskins 2007).  Indeed, it is readily observable that emotions are 
both mediated and expressed differently through different times, spaces and cultural 
groups.  For example, we tend to learn ‘display rules’ through which we express and 
cultivate our emotions in a way deemed socially appropriate (Hochschild 1983).  In this 
way, one can build up behavioural expectations, even of complete strangers, in certain 
time-spaces. 
 
To put this another way, many emotions are performed; very often habitually acted out 
without prior consideration.  Before we consciously realise it, we can be angry at a driver 
that pulls out in front of us, or sombre upon entering a quiet church yard.  As with much 
ethnographic research though, doing parkour was a departure from the more routine 
emotional interactions in daily life.  Different and new socio-cultural settings call for a 
re-examination and to some degree bring into conscious thought the negotiation of 
emotional relations (Blee 1998).  Similarly parkour as a relatively new phenomenon, by 
its very nature encourages the practitioner to begin this process in earnest.  During my 
research, emotional stances within place shifted rapidly. Engagements with benches, 
walls, fences and lampposts became charged with complex emotional play.  For the first 
week or so of meeting and practicing with parkour groups, the hours spent doing parkour 
could be characterised by an almost engulfing range of fears.  Here, emotional repertoires 
and bodily possibilities for movement are exceptionally fluid and interconnected.  They 
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are not so much something suffered by the body; rather we do emotions with our 
surroundings, through our capacity to move.  In this sense then any talk about emotional 
experience is a call for the contact between those people and things involved. No discrete 
or tidy theory of emotions can do justice to their continual emergence without attending 
to the mobile environments with which they engage.       
 
 
Breaking and making movements and fear  
 
 
The pink wall.  When I approach the edge this time it is quite a lot smaller.  Even the 
large steps below look less edgy, less sharp and less likely to do damage.  It is in 
those first instants that I know I will jump the gap, the fear intensifies somewhat, 
whilst at the same time changing its character dramatically.  Much more excitedly 
now the fear is almost pushing me toward the pink wall, rather than holding me back.  
I run.  Must get the takeoff right; near the edge but not too close, there cannot be a 
chance of my trainer slipping over the edge when kicking off.  But as I approach I 
cannot look down to check, for I need to focus on the far wall to make sure my hands 
find their mark and grip well.  I have to let up and hope my legs will take off from the 
right place, and this trust is accompanied by a new surge of fear, a last intense bolt 
that hits me in the leg as I jump. The first time around, the moments spent in the air 
are too brief and intense to recall, a haze of adrenaline and fears and pink.  After 
making it once, twice, five times, the fear begins to lessen, back down to ‘background 
levels’, but it has made a permanent mark on my body, which is now in love with 
flying toward the pink wall.  (Author’s diary 1
st
 March 2006)                     
 
The practitioner of parkour is encouraged towards ‘freedom’, to have vast possibilities 
for movement before them, from which they may playfully select and string together new 
improvisations in a flowing dance across the urban landscape.  Yet the paradox of 
parkour is that to have a sense for these spatial possibilities, as anything but terrifying 
dreams, one must drill particular moves repeatedly.  In general, the social sciences have 
considered similar processes of re-iteration, as productive of distinct and often negative 
performativities (Butler 1990).  Such spatial practice leads to habit, and to cycles of 
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repetition that dull and numb our relations with space.  Over time it has the capacity to 
make ‘normal’ the strange, and unconsidered our bodily comportment (Cresswell 2003, 
Edensor 2007, Seamon 1980, Young 1990).    
 
 
Figure 5: Pink Wall:  author jumping to wall, photo credit: Sam Saville. 
        
 
We have been warned of how easy it is to become complicit, to begin to narrow the focus 
of our attention to what we already know and are comfortable with (Harrison 2000, Thrift 
2004c).  To attain complete maturity, to be fully cured and set in our habits, is to forget 
the wonder that drives genuine creativity.  If performativity is body-training or the 
contraction of habit, then to what degree does it afford us ways to understand the 
possibility of creatively manipulating space and time?  We are called to ‘let go’ of 
regularly repeated relations/representations of space and to attend to the spark of newness 
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that marks a life as enchanted and lived (Thrift 2004d).  Of course, the difficulty is 
deciding: of what to let go, and of what to keep a hold?                   
  
Me: “Don’t you get bored of doing the same move many times?” 
James: “Well you know it is just practice, that’s why you’re here right?” 
Me: “yeah” 
James: “It’s good to train.  Each move is never the same anyway. You do it again and 
again and again, but trying different things.  And then it starts getting easy, then 
suddenly you will see this thing over here, and it might be really scary, but it is a 
possibility now.”  
 
 
Parkour as spatial practice is not always the super-mobile practice one might imagine.  
Hours spent in a relatively small area slowly ‘getting to know’ the space is the norm.  
Embodied knowledge and familiarity of place is gained as place is tried.  Here the body, 
while repeating similar movements many times, is slowly building embodied knowledge 
of itself and its relation to spatial forms.  Yet the doing of this knowledge is always 
provisional, and not repeatable with perfect accuracy.  The parkour body is creatively 
encountering spatial forms, producing new possibilities as it experiences textures, meets 
heights, distances, and shapes.  As it playfully tests, the body is closely intertwined with 




Figure 6: Getting to know space (author's photo) 
 
On occasion, people would not want to leave an area until they felt they had mastered a 
certain movement with an object.  Practitioners developed attachments to things and the 
movement possibilities they allow.  As I was told by many of the traceurs I researched 
with, after and during each parkour session, my vision changed.  New features popped up 
in unexpected places: an electricity box to vault, a ‘grippy’ wall to run up, a handy sized 
barrier with soft grass on the other side to try flipping over.  Of course, none of these 
‘new’ objects were really new. Rather they materialised into the consciousness as parkour 
practice permeated the body.  Such objects were inspected, tested, felt, rolled over, 
pushed off of, jumped on, vaulted over.  My parkour practice brought to the environment 
unexperienced transience; where success or partial success at moving in a specific way 
with a certain object, could lead to a sudden shift – new mobile possibilities unfolded – 
and more playful options arise. “The impossible recedes, like a horizon, never sets, like a 
sun. But as it recedes other regions of the world appear.” (Massumi 1997: 761) 
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Thus, a certain level of maturity of the body to know a certain sequence of movements in 
relation to some obstacle, leads to a type of immaturity, as the body in its excitement and 
playfulness finds new mobile relations with materialities.  These new relations are 
unsure, untested, they can even be unrealistic; fearful dreams that excite practice with 
renewed vigour.  Traceurs focused in on micro-detailed aspects of movements, trying 
again and again.  In trying, and being open to space, here ‘trying’ denotes the uncertainty, 
the imminence, through which the kinetic play of bodies in space are bringing about 
something new.  A tricky balance then: imaginative and playful becoming of mobility 
that is both ‘allowed’ and threatened by bodily maturity. 
 
“I am really keen on encouraging people to think outside the box, to think about pole 
swings, and cat walks, and subtle movements that don’t have buzz word names yet. 
Because, to me, it is not so much about the moves as it is about the movement itself.  
The moves are infinite, you know, there are a thousand variations on moves. The 
danger of stereotyping is that it becomes fossilised.”  (Tony Wolf, recorded 
interview) 
 
A degree of embodied maturity though, is needed to move in a way that enables the 
imagination to take a hold of spatial forms.  Bodily maturity, in parkour, is put to play 
immediately searching out new movements with space.  To practice parkour at any level 
is to be open and vulnerable to space which in turn requires the blurring together of 
bodily maturity and habit with play and spatial immaturity; neither maturity or 
immaturity ever being complete.   
 
“You develop what I call parkour vision, you know. Round here people might see just 
a pretty run down backside of a building, but it’s actually a great playground of rails 
and pipes, steps – it’s got it all. That’s what parkour does to you. I can’t go many 
places without seeing some nice looking obstacles.” (Josh, in conversation while 
showing me round one of his favourite practice areas) 
 
Yet, supposed ‘mastery’ of a certain set of movement cannot easily be tied to the 
banishment of fear, as was my simplistic assumption when beginning this research.  In 
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parkour, while successful practice (trying, trying, trying and doing) might make place 
more ‘certain’ for a time, the new perspective - accompanied by an immature playfulness 
- leads to greater subtleties and reveals further depth to emotional relations with place. 
The supposed ‘consumption’ of architecture is very much a productive activity (Lees 
2001; Borden 2001; Llewellyn 2003). 
 
As I practiced I discovered never before noticed architectural features, which came alive 
with a potential that lent them new emotional intensity.  This carried over into my life 
well beyond my research remit, and my participation in the practice of parkour began to 
radically affect my emotional engagements with place.  In figure 6, for example, as I 
began to consider the jump between the walls as a real possibility, I also began to 
cultivate quite a complex array of fears towards this roof gap.  During my research I 
passed this particular gap several times a day (it being right by the front door of the flat I 
was living in).  After first noticing it (in a parkour way), it would not leave.  At times, 
like an un-wanted spectre, it haunted my being in that place.  Fear laced every movement 
I made in its sensorial vicinity.  Such fear did not simply repel me though, nor in fact did 
it remain static for any length of time at all.  Here fear was not entirely unpleasant and 
unwelcome.  On occasion I would stand for long periods on the edge looking down, 
contemplating consequences, where fear helped to sketch out scenarios, some of which 
made me feel quite sick. Other times I would focus solely on the far edge with a sort of 
excited expectancy, or I would try to ignore it completely, walking past with a kind of 




Figure 7: Roof gap, haunting drops (author’s photo) 
 
 
It is not unusual in parkour to go through phases during your training where your 
progression slows down then speeds up. This occurs because it can take time for 
your mind to catch up with your physical ability. Your body's capability may have 
progressed to a point where you are aware that you are able to confront obstacles 
that are more challenging, or techniques that are more complex. However, the 
hardest part of progression is overcoming your fear -- no matter how capable you 
are. (Rowlands 2006) 
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Whilst parkour talk is often superficially about doing battle and overcoming a fearful 
alter ego, it seems that fear in parkour is more complicated than that.  It is dynamic and 
mobile and it can be layered with other times and spaces, but also other emotions. 
Emotions like anger, excitement, and joy can all be accompaniments to the fears 
encountered in parkour.  Such emotional layering cannot be totally contained by time or 
space.  And while fear usually proceeds unconsciously it can also be reflected upon, 
considered, compared and thought through.  On one occasion, for example, a traceur 
wanted to go straight to a very specific location because he had been thinking, and getting 
excited and anxious about a ‘gap to step to ledge’ move/architectural form, all day whilst 
at work.        
  
This makes understandable the zeal with which parkour practitioners declare their 
dedication to parkour - evidenced by signatures in parkour internet forums that so often 
take forms like: “Parkour for life!” or “Parkour is the art of movement. It is not a hobby, 
it is not a sport, parkour is a way of life”. Certainly then it is clear that like many other 
sports involving risk (see for example Le Breton 2000, Lewis 2000), fear, at least certain 
types of fear, can be enjoyed and can become enmeshed in everyday mobile relations.        
 
Rather than close the book on fear as a fairly simplistic survival mechanism that is 
relational to danger (produced or otherwise) or some ageless aversion to our own death, 
in some circumstances it is useful to think about the way we try to cultivate different 
‘types’ or layerings of fears.  Differences in fear are more than just variations in intensity. 
They can have fundamental and quite subtle differences which are crucial to the way we 
engage in contact with the world.  Emotions are a multiplicity of relational judgments, 
not just reducible to spatial simplicity (e.g. wanting to be distant from some dangerous 
object).  Through its intimate play with place, the practice of parkour is a good example 
of how people can begin to explore, refine and even enjoy fearful emotions.  They 







‘Contact fear’ and plastic concrete 
 
 
He has just made the jump.  It is a strange realisation; a ‘what am I doing here’ 
moment, when my stomach speaks up telling me this must be a madness inspired 
misadventure.  What I have seen looks impossible; it is genuinely shocking, it strikes 
at me and racks the body all over.  In an instant that person and that place take on a 
horrifying tint, a wrapping of coarse fear that grates away any bravado or rosy talk 
about what was planned or the risks involved. 
 
And now it is my turn.  The distance shrieks at me, shouts mockingly.  Two-facedly it 
beckons me to the edge, seduces me onward, only to smack back.  Eyes water, visual 
inputs begin to confound my other senses, just how far is it? Can my legs, arms and 
torso feel a jump of this distance as a possibility?  Uncertainty twitches in muscles.  
The harmony between kinaesthetic and visual experience begins to falter, instead I 
am made whole precariously, like overly elastic threads holding my ‘seeing’ and 
‘feeling’ together.  Can I trust their communication?  This will literally be a leap of 
faith, a moment that takes fear, hope and uncertainty so close that they blur into each 
other, even as my everyday senses seem to be coming apart. (Author’s diary 16
th
 
February 2006).  
 
 
When Merleau-Ponty (1968) talks about the intermingling of the senses, he suggests that 
we can see, understand and be with our environments in a haptic way.  Similarly and to 
varying degrees, touch can become a visual experience.  Either way, it is always the case 
that our visual perception is experienced primarily in connection with the rest of the 
body.  Before a linguistic understanding has a chance to take shape we are already feeling 
our environment through our eyes, as well as through our more proximate attuned 
sensory organs.  In this way solidity, texture, surface, and depth can all be felt at a 
distance.  Spatial forms have a haptic presence, and can ‘touch’ you long before you have 
come close enough to lay hands on the brick, grass, wall, rail or whatever.  
 
It is the past that comes at the body from the environment.  It is in this way a fence or 
wall can be ‘felt’ before the hand makes contact, rather the fence is involuntarily 
remembered. Yet there is uncertainty and misconnection between place and memory. 
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Multiple temporalities inhabit the present (Crang and Travlou 2001). The place and the 
intent of the presence in it can stimulate a metaphorical riot of memories jostling about 
the body, each demanding different perspectives on the same section of space.  Riding on 
the back of memory, fear can lurch up at the sight of what would otherwise be quite 
benign spaces.  At times this fear can drive me forward, experienced as an exhilaration, 
an enlivening of my body that expands forth and shrouds place in new and playful colour.             
 
Just as new technologies and computer interfaces that work upon the haptic senses can 
distort and elongate our capacity to ‘feel’, be touched, and essentially to make contact at 
a distance (see, for example, Paterson’s (2006) analysis of the first ‘transatlantic 
handshake’), so also do augmentations to our bodies – our weight, flexibility, strength, 
coordination.  While new technologies highlight well our changing capacities to feel the 
presence of virtual and distant objects or people, it is still the case that similar presences 
can be at least as intensely mutated, enchanted and refigured through decidedly ‘low-
tech’, raw experiences as described above.     
 
Here the experience of the senses do not always ‘join up’, rather it is left to the body and 
a ‘skilful coping’ (Dreyfus 1991) to make sense as best one can of a kinaesthetic 
experience that might fit jaggedly with the corresponding visual one.  Here in each 
moment “the feeling of how things are going motivates behaviour,” rather than any solid 
or complete idea, image or representation (Dreyfus 2005: 141).  Yet the notion that the 
body is only ever ‘coping’ can tend to neglect the important role of imagination, 
creativity and playful interaction.  With fear as an engagement with space, in parkour our 
emotions can be considered less a ‘coping’, and more a playmate.  While I do, to an 
extent, ‘cope’ with the disjointedness that can afflict my senses, it is a disjointedness that 
is sought, fought, rolled around, tugged about and quietly contemplated.      
 
There is a paradoxical element of freedom in this play with fear.  While fear moves you 
on, unsettles, prompts, calls and inhabits place, its callings make possible an answer.  
“Freedom becomes a form of embodied awareness: a choosing to sense and, more 
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specifically, a choosing to feel and touch an environment.” (Lewis 2000: 58).  Here, fear 
is felt in quite specific ways, and it is important to distinguish between them.  
 
There can, for example, be a profound ambiguity to the fear.  It can protect the body, 
discouraging it to take up positions or movements that will result in injury or death, yet 
for some parkour practitioners this type of fear can have quite the opposite effect.  It can 
cloud the senses and form a separator between body and environment.  In parkour it can 
also lead to unnecessary error and a lack of commitment, which jeopardises the success 
of a movement.  This has led many practitioners to suggest that one of the most 
dangerous aspects to parkour is fear itself (and of course here we are talking about a very 
specific type of fear).  It has an effect on the body that reduces control, composure and 
coordination.  This sentiment was repeatedly expressed by traceurs.  
 
Duncan: “The thing is I know I can make that, I have done stuff much bigger 
before.. It’s so annoying! There’s just something funny about the jutting out lip” 
Me: “Yeah, the height doesn’t help either.” 
Duncan: “No!  Haha.  If it was on ground level I would jump it straight off, no 
problem.  It’s so hard to just get over it and give it one hundred percent up here, 
that’s the problem.” 
 
 
Despite confusing and in some instances annoying the practitioner, fear is still ‘contact 
fear’- it is being and moving with entities that are termed ‘other’.  Configurations of 
materialities and the spaces between them become meaningful when they are jointed with 
emotions. They orient people’s movements, and perception.  As I have suggested, with an 
engagement that is, over time, more or less immature and open towards space, in parkour 
it is possible to unsettle, change and even wilfully modify this emotional contact.   
 
I had seen my friend jump the gap, and now replayed in my body it churns up my 
emotions towards the place.  The point here is that place is evocative by virtue of its 
ability to stretch, jump and scratch temporal lineage.  With fear as playmate, moments are 
exploded to include games that span large swathes of time.  As an ongoing project, an 
epic that plays with architecture and contact, parkour brings into awareness our capacity 
 138 
to cultivate types of emotional engagements. The contact itself is often motivator, but it is 
one that can be playfully and consciously focused upon and reworked. 
 
Parkour is full of events, where the world expands and shakes with intensity. This is the 
manipulation of affect. I do not use that term lightly, the danger is that ‘affect’ becomes a 
vitalist philosophy that posits an unchangeable, amorphous and atemporal field (Kraftl 
and Adey 2008).  Rather affect emerges, and is made malleable, by virtue of the 
continuous movement in the world.  In other words, affect is mobile along with the 
materialities of the world and not at all essential. Presupposing emotion, as a type of 
potentiality, there is a sense in which the continued practice of parkour, calls forth certain 
strands of affect and weaves them into the emotions that connect the traceur to place.              
 
Thus it is possible for parkour to become a way of retrieving fear from an abstracted, 
dispersed phenomena. Of wresting emotionality away from bureaucratic controls and 
complex systems, and placing it within reach, as something immediately ‘touchable’, that 
can be slowly and intimately worked upon.  As an artisan works with base material to 
shape something new, the traceur works with the environment to help cultivate their 
emotions.  There is a concerted effort to move away from the view of emotions as 
something that happens to them. Instead they are in a playful process of negotiation, 
between place and the body.  Immature practice produces new fears that connect body to 
textures, shapes and objects.  Such forms are touched and touch back. The practice of 
parkour encourages an immaturity that allows that touching.      
 
With this immature engagement the body is free to re-interpret space from many different 
angles, and mobile perspectives.  Parkour and emotional play with space makes architects 
of its practitioners, who can demonstrate well their emotional attachments to 
configurations of space, and the movements (imagined or otherwise) between them.  
Figure 8 (a-c) shows some of the many designs, made by various practitioners, for 
‘parkour parks’, which they hold little hope of ever seeing realised, but relish in the 
imaginative play of its virtual construction, whether with pen and paper or three 
dimensional CAD packages.   
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The traceur’s experience of place can be of a concrete, solid and brutal materiality, that at 
every turn betrays them, alarming the body and confining its playful aspirations. Yet 
those same scars can animate the parkour practitioner’s engagements, making walls into 
flow-full mobility, and rails into spinning leaps.  “You have to internalise the philosophy 
- An essential element of learning Parkour” (Sebastien Foucan).  Again, we see the way 
parkour assumes a utopic form: it inhabits the body in a way that orders and organises 
space.  The emotionality and intensity of movement does not cease with the action itself, 
but infuses the body, so that unpopulated and static lines on a screen become highly 
significant.   
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Figure 8 (a): Design and sketches. Made with a variety of different software packages, they vary 




FigureFigure 8 (b): Design and sketches 
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Figure 8 (c): Design and sketches.  
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Ethics of emotional engagement 
 
It was a fantastic sensation; I moved from one object to the next, uninterrupted, my 
focus was all about (I didn’t want to bang into a passer by) but never holding on to 
anything in particular for any period of time.  I moved from concrete posts, to the 
strange looking outdoor kitchen, up a wall and along some, through the higher 
narrower part of ‘the kitchen’, and slowly jogged out of flowfull steam. It felt 
amazing.  My hands touched, my body crumpled up small, expanded out, bent 
around. It was the contact; the contact I had with things was precious, but it never 
lingered, it was always letting go, moving from texture to texture, revelling in the 
roughness on hand, the shininess of the ‘kitchen’, the power of the leg, the 
frightening position of the body.  Looking back, it is a feeling that becomes 
surprisingly sharp when I turn my focus to any part:  the first vault over the kitchen; 
legs push off, body extends fully like superman flying for a split second. The 
padded bits of my palms go down, the stainless steel makes that noise that only thin 
sheet steel does, there is an only just perceptible slip on the smooth surface before 
my hands grip firm, this is unexpected and comes with a pang of panic but is 
somehow pleasant, knees tuck, hands lift off, fingertips pushing until the last, and 
I’m running again. (Author’s diary, 25th February 2006).    
 
While I completed much longer ‘runs’ between and through street furniture and 
buildings, this experience stuck out as a flash of effortlessness.  The kind of feeling that 
often comes, but is soon undermined as I attempt to latch onto it.  It was a moment of 
improvised movement that brought with it a new and welcome place, without prior 
contemplation and at a running pace.  Every part of the environment moved together in 
an emotionally charged continuum of shapes, textures and sensations.  Flow becomes the 
moment in which there is no longer any discernable ‘I’ that negotiates or plans paths 
around objects, rather there is a body that knows at each moment what to grasp, how to 




Figure 9: Kitchen vault.  Photo credit: Sam Saville. 
 
 
If flow is such a joining it raises awkward questions about ‘free will’ and with it lurks 
other equally difficult issues to do with ‘moral responsibility’.  Without a conscious ‘I’, 
distinguishable, and containing the agency to act, where or to whom do we look for the 
cause of certain movements? 
 
If affect is ‘a sense of push in the world’ (Thrift 2004b), then where might we find it 
other than in the moments that are animated in the contact we have with the world.  The 
encounters with people and things to which we turn more or less of our attention may 
flow and become before thought, but it is my contention that the togetherness is inlayed 
with emotional engagements - which go between movement and space.  While 
‘consciously’ we may not be aware of our movements within a given space, during such 
moments we have for guidance an emotional engagement.  For most of us this 
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engagement never ceases and while becoming and emergent, it is not haphazardly so.  
“Emotions, which have so often been treated as opposed to thinking, are paradoxically 
self-reflexive actions and experiences.  But the self-reflection in emotions is corporeal 
rather than a matter of discursive reasoning.” (Katz 1999: 7).  There is a sense in which 
the emotions themselves are an ethical stance towards space that can be evaluated.  
Indeed it is precisely our ability to look back and reflect upon our emotions, that gives 
them a degree of malleability. We can choose to practice or ‘train’ certain emotions. In 
parkour the emotional connections undone and formed through its embodied actions 
create new kinds of fear along with new modes of inhabiting place. 
 
Whistling to keep up courage is no mere figure of speech. On the other hand, sit all 
day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your 
melancholy lingers. There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this, 
as all who have experience know: if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional 
tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly, 
go through the outward motions of those contrary dispositions we prefer to cultivate. 
The reward of persistency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullenness or 
depression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and kindliness in their stead. Smooth 
the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of the 
frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment, and your heart must be 
frigid indeed if it do not gradually thaw! (James 1884: 198) 
 
While overstated perhaps, James’ writing has some pertinence. As he would have it, by 
practicing movements we engage in an engineering enterprise, where emotions are a 
becoming process, to varying degrees, under construction and revision. Unlike James’ 
theorisation, though, it is clear that in parkour emotions are practiced in an inescapably 
situated way that requires a consideration of the place. We never act alone when we ‘do’ 
emotions.  
 
Is it possible then to make emotional acts purposeful?  That we are in a world, 
bombarded with stimuli out of our control, seems to be beyond question.  How we 
encounter the word, the sense, habit and embodied utopic that we respond with is 
inevitably not wholly ours to manipulate.  What is clear, is that by deliberately eroding 
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spatial conventions, in a practice that calls always for ‘more’ ways to move, more ways 
to ‘progress’, to be ‘strong’ and to be useful, is a platform (however temporary) upon 
which moral practice can take place.   
 
To be what it is – moral practice – it must set itself standards which it cannot reach.  
And it can never placate itself with self-assurances, or other people’s assurances, that 
the standards have been reached. It is, ultimately, the lack of self-righteousness, and 
the self-indignation it breeds, that are morality’s most indomitable ramparts. (Bauman 
1993: 81)                  
 
Such moral practice takes and makes relationships that might seem unusual, precisely 
because it operates with an affinity for movements that break embodied habit (but also 
make habit in a purposive way).  The enduring connections traceurs form with space 
recur, are reinforced and diminished as practice persists.  Choice training spots and 
playgrounds are missed when they are removed.  Several parkour groups have held ‘on-
line’ funerals for sets of walls and rails and more generally public spaces that have been 
bulldozed and re-developed.  These mourning ‘ceremonies’ - usually compiled as a web 
page of photographs and video clips of the space being traversed and played in by 
traceurs - forms a visual testament to how grand and rich it was, and how gracious a host 
for the practice of parkour.            
 
 
Play with fear  
 
I have been one and a half hours on this one sheer grassy/rocky bank in the middle of 
the countryside.  I have gotten to know it well.  I shall call it ‘Tree-drop’, for it has a 
small ash at its highest point.  It is kinder than concrete, it has encouraged me to try 
more.  Twice though, I have fallen, the second time resulting in dirt getting in my 
mouth… For a time Tree-drop is all there is, just me and Tree-drop.  I feel I know it, 
better than most banks or trees.  I have felt its height rise and fall, been upside-down 
from low branches, spun off the top lip, gotten caught by the protruding root bit, then 
used the same root to push off and reach the second branch… I am alone and playing 
with Tree-drop and my fear is part of the play – we are juggling it between us.  It 
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keeps me going, taking small risks by trying new configurations until I am exhausted 
sweaty and getting cold. (Author’s diary, 20th December 2005).            
  
The practice of parkour has emotional purchase. As an idea, or ideal, it engages. With 
fear as playmate, emotion continually shifts in linguistic evading style, as something that 
moves us on, a craving, an asking, a demanding, a loving and a hoping. Fear can become 
a familiar link to space, a never ending riddle to solve. In parkour the answer is not to 
dispense with fear but is found in process, trying, testing, working out, and becoming 
fluid.   
 
My vulnerability, my existence as a corporeal being, demands this development be made 
in contact with the world.  I am never an isolated entity, cut off and un-affectable.  Who 
can tell what will tender a spark in the imagination next?  The mobility of emotionality is 
played out with unruly intermingling (cf. McCormack 2007). Here my progression and 
my play with space is made possible when I am open and vulnerable to that spark. But as 
the terrible and awesome things we are capable of flash before us, what takes hold? How 
does affect become manifest into emotional engagement? My contention is that by 
encouraging practitioners to find new ways to experience and move in places, parkour 
begins to render this process open to revision. Such revisions to our emotional 
engagements are ‘done’ through embodied movement. The way we build knowledge of 
these movements (as discussed in the previous sections), can bring depth and intimacy to 
our fear. This closeness can render fearful engagements grounded and purposeful, but 
also makes possible our play with space.    
 
What the moral tales of our time tell us is that blows hit at random, needing no reason 
and commanding no explanation; that there is but the weakest link (if any) between 
what men and women do and what befalls them; and that there is little or nothing they 
can do to make sure that suffering will be avoided. (Bauman 2006: 28). 
 
Here Bauman, reflecting on popular media and television, demonstrates how fear can 
become less touchable and less an engagement with the world. Parkour practice may 
reconnect the practitioner in a quite direct way, where the solidity of walls, rails and 
floors and movements of jumping, vaulting and rolling become, through subtle and 
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‘refined’ fear, something less shadowy, formless and diffuse, and more something that 
can be worked upon, played with, and examined. ‘Doing’ these emotions, as an 
engagement with place, give the traceur what has been considered by Lefebvre (1991) - 
and many others who have taken inspiration from him - a capacity to be ‘produced’, 
while they produce.  
 
Borden (2001), in writing a history of skateboarding and architecture, for example, shows 
how through skateboarding movements architecture can be “compositionally quite 
distinct from the ordered hierarchies of architecture-as-object, architecture-as-drawing, or 
architecture-as-idea; [instead] it is a rhythmical procedure, continually repeated yet 
forever new.” (2001: 262). Here the movement re-produces anew, the body, skateboard 
and the space.  
 
Architecture is at once erased and reborn in the phenomenal act of the skater’s 
move. Space, then, is produced dialectically – both outward from the body, and in 
relation to skateboard and skateboard terrain, each of the last two being erased 
within the process. (ibid: 108).  
 
Yet, for the scientist, the physical space actually changes very little during parkour - there 
may be some small traces of rubber sole deposited on the walls or a few grains of 
material dislodged, but, depending on the surface, such changes are often microscopic. 
But such small molecular changes can drastically influence a person’s contact with space. 
Rubber scuff marks on the wall can tell a profound and mobile story for those that have 
learned to ‘read’ them. While we might casually refer to this as ‘productive’ of space, 
actually it is the nature of our engagement with space that changes. When I attempt for 
the first time, but fail to vault a rail, the specifics of that event will cause a radical 
mutation in my perceptions, and contact with space. My fear forms a very important part 
of that mutation, as it is my emotional engagement with things that envelopes my 
perceptions of them. 
 
In experimentation and play there are breaks, fissures and interruptions in the seeming 
smoothness of emotional engagements with the world. Play in parkour has the potential 
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to destabilise both the emotion of fear, folding into it feelings of movements that can 
entice and draw one towards certain special forms and certain styles of mobility. Through 
my parkour practice I move around an environment in which fear is an engagement, it 
leaps and bounds before me teasing, questioning, and exposing gaps, textures, corners, 
crooks, railings and drops.                    
 
Much of the research that has shaped this chapter has been an experiment with a 
vulnerability
73
 that allows new ways of connecting, and of making moving contact with 
architectural forms.  This is more than a parkour specific point, or even a methodological 
point.  More broadly it is an issue that permeates most of our attitudes and precognitive 
interactions.  It is a call to be open to play, as a practice that can enrich and redefine our 
existence, one which encourages contact, wonder and the willingness to place a hope in 
fear.  That is de-centring oneself for the purpose of playful interaction.  Letting things; 
stones, walls, trees, bars, grass, ledges, lips, kerbs, grit touch and reshape you, and thus 
become themselves ‘alive’ in the process.  Direct honest feedback is learned, through the 
senses, in an involved way that demands fear be a type of contact. 
 
Although openness and vulnerability must involve degrees of ‘letting go’, this is always a 
partial affair.  We may not make a pure or atemporal type of contact.  The flaw in 
phenomenological reduction perhaps: that the ‘stripping away’ (epoché) can never be 
complete – we exist because we have a past.  Body-knowledge or maturity is not easily 
cast off. What is called an ‘immediate’ inspection of a situation, one that does not enrol 
prejudice (Zaner 1975), is hard to conceive of.  Yet as I have argued, here this need not 
subtract from the possibility of play with fear.  Indeed, parkour is a process that deploys 
maturity and immaturity together and inseparably in its questing.   
 
What then does play with fear do to our understanding of the word ‘fear’?  Should we be 
looking towards new words to describe multilayered emotions? Must a specific emotion 
include the place in which it has arisen, as well as the sensations it entails?  I have argued 
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 Here my vulnerability is very much a condition of my corporeality, as with Paul Harrison’s (2008) paper. 
Yet the context is quite different, and this is more a type of ‘active’ and even ‘sought after’ vulnerability – a 
susceptibility to spatial forms that is ‘achieved’ only in conspiracy with purposeful action. 
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here that the emotion is itself a type of contact with the world and that description of it 
only makes sense when we account for both the feelings and the place.  I leave the 
question of exactly how we go about describing emotions, what words we use for ‘fear-
enchantment’, ‘fear-pain’, or ‘fear-enticing’ for example, as an open one. Only to suggest 
that words like ‘fear-pain’ will mean most when they have a context with which we can 
attempt to empathise.          
 
While fear as playmate has been the focus here, equally one could look at the opposite; 
that is, fear which craves repetitive safety.  Acting without openness is to give no 
potential to place.  It is to kill play with fear outright.  It fosters a specific fear that closes 
down human experience with a dullness that describes only one path, only one future 
which gains empowerment through disenchanting.  Towards this passive spectator, fear’s 
hold can become so routine, its way of touching so familiar it becomes invisible.  It hides 
the possible, masks the fears that can beckon, spin, illuminate, and animate places.  In 
this instance retrieving one’s multiplicity, re-engaging with fear as playmate requires that 
fear be larger than an embodied phenomena.  Instead it is mobile amongst the kong 
vaults, cat leaps, palm spins
74
.  In this sense, for some people parkour can be a way to re-
enchant their relations with spaces and ideas.  Certainly my parkour and play with the 
environment have gotten lost together and lead me towards exciting and enlivening 
engagements with place.    
 
Vulnerability is an incapacity: not, however, as a lack of power but as an ‘un-
power’.  Vulnerability is not simply the antithesis of strength, imperviousness, or 
resistance, and to think that this is the case is to continue to mistake the inherent 
nature of vulnerability for an extrinsic attribute or condition. (Harrison 2008: 427).  
 
I have made a preliminary attempt to run with our widely held understanding of ’fear’, 
towards something not quite so static, singular or dishearteningly negative.  Through an 
immersive engagement with parkour, I found fear taking on an array of different textures 
and colours, many of which were not as unpleasant as has hitherto been theorised.  In the 
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 “Kong vaults, cat leaps, palm spins” are all loose definitions of types of parkour movements. 
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spirit of the practice which I have been studying (and practicing), I have attempted to 
think about and articulate these types of fear with a kind of mobile playfulness.   
 
Indeed, it may be that it is in play, and play not just amongst young children, that we can 
find ways to break out of iterative performances, not only of mobility, but of emotionality 
as well.  Specifically, certain types of unpleasant fear can be supplanted, experimented 
with and reflected on, through practices like parkour that attempt to cultivate more 
‘enjoyable’ kinds of fear. These fears are not always totally direct engagements (ie. 
physical pain = a fear) and can come from playful imaginings and various time-spaces. 
More often though they emerge in the moments of action, when engagements with place 
shift and are remade ready for a new ‘trying’ and another round of ‘getting to know’.  
 
The plasticity of a place that is under construction by traceurs can be frightening in many 
different ways.  The intimate contact practitioners have with place ties their fears tightly 
to distance, texture, surface and form. Playing with such contact is a risk that, for many, 
is seen as unacceptably high: not only does such play have the ability to radically reshape 
the body’s emotional engagement with place; it has the risk of permanently injuring the 
body itself.  For the experienced practitioner though, who has known pain and possibly 
injury, parkour has lead them to new spatial awareness, and most importantly of all, has 
given them the ability to participate more deeply in the formation of their emotions and 
the experience of the places they move through.       
 
But there can be no doubt: there is danger in this path. On my computer screen I see 
David Belle fall.  My thoughts can not be disjointed from the tension I feel in my arms 
and legs. It is my contact that responds to these images and sounds.  I have looked down 
and seen the danger.  A danger that is part of me, for it is I who considers this jump or 
that; it is a possibility of freedom that fuels my fear. 
 
It is the possibilities and the emotional engagements that connect us. David Bell runs at a 
hard concrete wall.  I know he will fall and I feel slightly sick, for I too have that wall, 
that void of space to cross or disappear into.  In this way our play extends down screens 
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and wires, until it meets, and I am standing before a wall, any wall, contemplating, 
feeling slightly sick.  But I get up, excitedly - a safe journey is not always a good one.
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Back-hopping into trials 
 
Trackstanding again: I’m looking at the supporting post of the rail, shifting 
bodyweight back and forth with the front wheel turned forty five degrees to maintain 
my side-to-side balance.  A move of the knee, a shift of the hips, a subtle kick on the 
front pedal, pulling on the bars and I’m up to the back wheel.  Rear brake fully 
locked, we adjust, bike and body sensing the sloping ground undertyre.  By making 
small hops on the back wheel we get to the edge of the concrete wall and line up for 
the gap jump to the railing.   
 
This time the aim is for the post.  Nothing else will do, the post means accuracy, 
control, and the possibility of moving on – of one day removing the safety bars either 
side – and the thought of being atop one of the smallest possible supports.  Front 
lowers slightly over the gap, weight goes back and down, like a coiled spring. Pedal 
kick, lunge forward, release brake, hook feet into pedals, push bars up and forward, 
spot landing, extend leg out to meet the post. Break hard…         
 
Knees bend and back tyre squashes, wrapping its gripping rubber round the post and 
cushioning the impact.  Relief, forced calm and panic mingle in my fingers, brake 
leavers squeezed with manic force - the brake slipping now would be disaster.  I pull 
back enough on the bars to remain up in the backhop position, before beginning the 
drop off…   
(Bike trials diary 29/08/2007) 
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Figure 10: Gapping to rail: author on Brisa custom build in Aberystwyth. Photo credit: Adam Gasson. 
                                                  
 
 
The ‘back-hop’ is something of a ‘signature move’ for trials riding.  Mastering the back-
hop allows the rider to manoeuvre the bike in a variety of spaces, and on objects that 
would not support two wheels at once.  It is a fundamental technique needed for most gap 
jumps that do not have a convenient run up.  Proficiency in the back-hop opens the door 
to many more techniques and possibilities for movement.  The relatively straightforward 
idea of hopping on the back wheel of a bike is underpinned by a host of geometric 




Like a toddler first standing, the learner makes the back-hop look very difficult or 
impossible. And while development in bike design has radically changed possible back-
hop learning curves, for most it still requires significant persistence and determination.  
Because of this, and because it is such a fundamental movement, of all the common 
moves in trials the back-hop presents the single largest barrier to would-be trials riders 
aside from the need for a bike
75
.  Once mastered though, riders can make the back-hop 
look easy and can turn the bike clockwise and anti-clockwise, side to side, forward and 
backwards.  In the back-hop position the bike and rider transform into a new entity able 
to be with and do space differently than the cyclist who remains on both wheels.   
 
“To begin with it took me weeks just to learn to back-hop properly. I would get home 
from school and be straight out on my bike.  On the first day of trying, I was with 
Tom, and I did two hops. I could already bunnyhop – I suppose you have to before 
back-hopping. Anyway, the next day I could only do one hop, so that was a downer.  
Two days later I got three in a row. The day after my best was five and I couldn’t get 
past that for ages.  After another week or so I had a breakthrough, and got 15 – it just 
seemed to magically click and I ‘got’ it.  I remember feeling pleased all day after 
that.” (Jack in conversation, recorded in bike trials diary, 3/7/06).      
 
The perception altering process of ‘acquiring’ the back-hop demonstrates well the 
problematic separation of bike and rider.  As the first few awkward hops give way to five 
or ten hops on the back wheel, the bike is being drawn closer. Just as driving cars can 
produce the ‘car-driver’ that knows without conscious thought how to apprehend and 
manoeuvre in certain spaces with a car (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986)
76
, so too does the 
trials rider acquire elements of the skills that enable sensing though the machine.  Often 
the ‘magical click’ of developing embodied skill is understood as simply an inevitable 
progression from conscious incompetence through to unconscious competence, facilitated 
by intentional practice or doing.   
 
                                                 
75
 I have spoken to many mountain bike riders who have ‘dabbled in’ trials but been put off because of 
difficulties experienced learning the back-hop. 
76
 “The expert driver becomes one with his [sic] car, and he experiences himself simply as driving, rather 
than as driving a car.” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986: 30). 
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Indeed, for the brothers Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1986) some kind of intentional goal 
or plan is an essential and powerful strategy which allows us to progress from ‘beginner’ 
levels of understanding and skill: “A plan causes certain elements of a situation to stand 
out and thus makes comprehensible what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly 
complex situation.” (ibid: 47).             
 
Unlike the habitual movements of car driving, the trials rider is not governed by the same 
restrictions: places to ride change as further embodied skills and new styles are explored.  
As Dorn (1998) notes of the Dreyfus brothers’ examples, ‘their models assume an 
equipmental context that is pretty much taken for granted’ (ibid: 196). In other words, the 
structures and rules governing the activities (they primarily use studies of car driving and 
chess playing), change very little. (ibid).  While much of the Dreyfus brothers’ analysis 
remains useful in terms of trials, as we shall see, the rider is often looking to change the 
context of riding.  Trials riders tack between fixing context: ‘drilling’ movements so that 
they are deeply ingrained, and experimenting with obstacles, bikes and movements.  In 
this way there may be a foundation of embodied skill from which place might change.  
As discussed in chapter 2, finding and actively inventing the playgrounds is crucially part 
of the riders play with machine, bodies and space.  
 
As articulated in the first diary entry, the trials rider, and writing the trials rider, can 
become a problematic of identity - is it ‘we’ or ‘I’ or neither?  That the machine, the bike, 
is involved in this process is obvious, and as much literature on ‘material culture’ has 
argued, technology should neither be understood as determining human interactions or as 
independent from ‘social’ relations (Gibson 2006, Law and Hassard 1999).  What is less 
obvious is the way in which bike and rider accommodate to each other, becoming so 
close that the rider is unable to make contact without the bike.  A thousand falls, a 
thousand gaps, an inestimable number of combinations of bike and rider, begin to 
produce a distinct set of hybridities carved in biology and machine, but also reaching 
further out: engineering facilities, design studios, trials communities (virtual and 
otherwise), trials ‘parks’, magazines, advertising…  The production of a ‘trials aesthetic’ 
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while first and foremost shaped through a symbiotic meld of bike and body through 




“Look at the hills in the distance. I always think wow, cool, it looks like you could 
gap jump between the peaks of them from here.” (Dave, bike trials diary, 27/8/03) 
 
Bike trials is a very specific kind of cycle riding, and while its practice does share a lot 
with other ways of cycling, it is different in kind.  One obvious similarity is the bike, and 
yet modern variance between, say, a dedicated trials bike and what is traditionally named 
‘a bike’ is large enough that people often react to the trials bike in surprise – the 
exclamation, ‘that’s not a bike!’ is not rare (though its very incantation marks the 
machine as something recognizably ‘bike-like’).  Since its beginnings bike trials has been 
in continual evolution – types of movements, techniques, technology, and sociality in and 
amongst the trials riding communities have not been stable for any length of time.  
Although there are differences that can be seen right through from individuals’ style to 
national variance, still we often say of this broad set of activities and technologies, that it 
is ‘trials’
77
.    
 
Bike trials in Britain has developed in a unique trajectory, as compared with the USA and 
other European countries.  Here I will sketch something of an ethnographically informed 
consideration of its growth in the UK.  In doing so I want to use the notion of contact 
developed in the previous chapters to help think through how trials riders participate with 
place.  Broadly speaking this chapter paints a positive picture of trials riding as a practice 
that has something to contribute to the theorizations of geography and our emergent 
understandings of place and materiality.   
 
The evolution of trials is at once a personal journey and a community in continual 
transition.  Talk amongst riders about the ‘limits of trials’ often turns up comments that 
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 As with most activities whose practices are continually mutating and developing, there is a good deal of 
debate and some disagreement about what trials is or should be.    
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point to the limitations of human physiology, but almost all qualify this with the assertion 
that when limits are reached new ‘styles’, challenges, bikes and types of riding will keep 
trials ‘progressing’.  I go on to examine how such meanings can emerge in startlingly 
different ways by body-knowledges that are socio-technological.  The kinds of 
movements we learn from acting with and being in contact shape our understandings of 
space.  We have the capacity ‘for picking up not rules, but flexible styles of behaviour’ 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986: 5) based on the technologies we become involved with.      
 
The trials rider develops an intimate and specific kind of knowledge of certain places.  
Regular riding spots become known well, but still retain their potential to surprise and 
challenge (see ‘the separation’).  Similarly, objects are never mastered, but remain a play-
in-progress, always offering up new sides of themselves and new ways to construe 
movement amongst them.  The trials rider, then, does not for any length of time, attain 
what Stuart and Hubert Dreyfus (1986) consider to be ‘expert’ skill level.
78
  Flitting 
moments of ‘expert’ practice might be experienced, in which the rider “simply 
spontaneously does what has normally worked and, naturally, it normally works.” 
(Dreyfus 1989: 8).  Yet more often the rider is considering the next new obstacle, they are 
almost always working up to and having to reflect and reason out what needs to be done 
in order to…  Though continually drawn by the prospect, they are not masters of space 
but instead apprentices, manipulating bike and body with some more-or-less distinct aim.                            
       
Thus, as with parkour in the previous chapter, we might consider bike trials as a utopian 
practice.  Although there is less a sense of leaders, or ‘founders’ helping to guide 
practice
79
, and therefore less documented philosophical underpinnings, a similar desire 
for re-interpretation of mobility and place exists.  The sometimes unbidden hopes that 
orientate riders toward possibilities are not developed in isolation, but like most 
imagination is rooted in contact with the world.   
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 Here the skill level is ascribed based on not only the performance as observed from the outside, but 
primarily from the embodied processes that constitute the activity.    
79
 Though there certainly have been prominent pioneers.  Just some are: Martyn Ashton, Martin Hawyes, 
Hans Ray.  
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Utopianism, whatever else it may become (ideology or escapade), is at root a feeling 
– the feeling that the world can be remade on awesomely beautiful lines (of which the 
utopian vision is given a glimpse) and in a way that promises to ennoble human life. 
(Davies 1980: 407 emphasis original).  
 
Unlike parkour these utopic practices are much more bound to the bike - to technological 
innovation and experiments in material science, geometry, and mechanics.  Bike trials 
tends to make experimental engineers of its participants. In the section ‘becoming an 
engineer’ I use the ‘experimental engineer’ as a metaphor, not only to describe the 
relation of body and bike, but too discuss its use in the way trials riders ‘do’ space.                            
         
While riding bikes has been given a significant amount of serious academic attention, 
most of this research ties tightly into debates on sustainable transport policy, obesity and 
fitness initiatives (see for example Furness 2007, McClintock 2002, Pucher and Buehler 
2008).  Valuable though this work is, it is primarily concerned with cycling as transport, 
and the representations of the ‘cyclist’ are more or less rigidly maintained, with limited 
engagement with the wide diversity of biking experiences.  Some notable exceptions to 
this literature is the work of Justin Spinney (2006) and Phil Jones (2005), both of whom 
take a more experiential tack.  In writing an account of embodied mobility, Jones’s daily 
commute becomes much more than a trip from A to B with risk factors.  Instead, we are 
given an account that, although being ‘functional’ (as a regular road ride that fits into 
transport policy strategy), also exceeds categorization with descriptions of sensations that 
tell us more about the riding space and journey.  
 
The bicycle allows me to create my own micro-geography of the city, reconstructing 
various spaces in a highly embodied fashion: the streets with the bad potholes that 
shake your teeth out; the steep slope where you can get the rush of zipping past traffic 
queuing for the lights; the high curbs you can jump the bike off to land with a 
satisfying jolt. (P Jones 2005: 827)  
  
Spinney’s work, like Jones’s, is diverse in its consideration of the ‘bike’, arguing that the 
meanings of the bike are far more multiple than is regularly acknowledged.  He uses the 
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notion of the ‘safety bicycle’
80
, as an understanding/meaning of the bicycle as standard in 
geometry, size, style and use.  Of course, the ‘safety bike’ is something of a useful (for 
academics) but fictitious average.  It is argued that this representation of the bike, 
construed at the intersection of machine and thought, has the ability to affect the physical 
production, use, and re-production of the ‘standard’ bike.  Here the bike is solidified 
primarily in representations - the safety bike does not evolve (Cox and Van de Walle 
2007). Indeed, Spinney goes slightly further suggesting that:          
 
As an established technology, the design of the safety bicycle simply reproduces 
transport as an appropriate mode of movement, effectively concealing the capitalist 
and narrowly defined ideology of movement which it is the materialization of. Thus 
the technological ‘closure’ of the bicycle is seen to be less to do with any kind of 
technological imperatives, rather it has everything to do with political-economic 
imperatives and how they conceive of movement. (Spinney 2008: 287) 
 
That the bicycle has come to represent transport and green lifestyles (Horton 2006) might 
seem commonsensical, but not only is the meaning of the bicycle far from certain and its 
political allegiances more multifaceted (see for example Bijker 1995, Cresswell 2005, 
Mackintosh and Norcliffe 2006, all of whom demonstrate the bike’s association with 
women’s liberation movements), but they are also continually being redefined. They are 
given what Bijker (1995) calls ‘interpretive flexibility’. The bike is constituted with both 
the mobility of individual bodies, and intersubjectively within communities of riders, as 
well as non-riders. Similarly the technologies of the bike; its components, geometry and 
specifications are, in part, constitutive of the movements and place-creating ability of 
trials riding.  This communal way in which trials has developed is discussed later in the 
section ‘Social Technicity’.  Like most forms of knowledge, the embodied techniques of 
the trials rider are a communal enterprise.  Spinney argues that such cycling related 
undertakings remain marginal as they have too long passed ‘below’ the gaze of 
academics.                
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 The term ‘Safety Bicycle’ appears to have been used first by Henry J, Lawson in 1878, to describe his 
new rear wheel drive bike design, in which the rider was far closer to the ground than on the ‘high 
ordinaries’ that were popular at the time.  Later in 1879 he produced a modified version of the design called 
the ‘Bicyclette’, a term still used in France to describe the safety bicycle. (Herlihy 2004: 216-17). 
Subsequently the safety bicycle has come to refer to any bike of ‘standard’ diamond shape and design.    
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The inability to include bicycles other than safety bicycles - or more accurately, 
bicycles suited to ‘transportation’ - is not for any lack of alternative technologies, 
rather it constitutes a wilful ideological blindness on the part of academics, policy-
makers and activists alike. (Spinney 2008: 316).  
 
To call this lack wilful, might be a touch strong, as choices and chances to research more 
marginal mobilities are embedded in established economic institutions.  Nevertheless, 
Spinney’s point has merit, as this marginalized position is mirrored in the actual practice 
of bike trials.  While regular cycling – that is, cycling as sporadic transport, ‘A to B 
leisure’, or for the daily commute – has the backing of government bodies, policy 
documents, and sustainable initiatives
81
, bike trials enjoys no such protection.  With a few 
exceptions (see Figure 11 and Figure 13), there are very few public or populated places 
where the street trials rider can be sure of not receiving hostile attention.   
 
As such bike trials, or street trials at least, occupies a somewhat precarious position, in 
most instances being a practice of ambiguous legality.  As discussed in the next section, 
the status of bike trials practice is thus interwoven with a performative dynamic, in which 
‘body image’ (see Evans 2006), becomes a concern.  While ‘perfomativity’ is typically 
used as a concept in which a person is, at least to a degree, ‘unaware’, here the gaze of 
others can turn what would be a habitual performance, into something quite different. 
When Butler (1990, 1993) discusses the performative nature of gender, for her, bodily 
identity is reproduced through iterative practice such that the identity comes to inhabit or 
possess the body.  This is a body which performs without realising it is a ‘performance’. 
This kind of performance is very different to a theatrical performance in which the actors 
are ‘aware’. Rather, the body becomes ‘identity’ and ‘object-like’ precisely because of 
cumulative and unwitting performative acts (ibid).  Here we might show that 
performance is always a communal unfolding, which is very much dependent on the 
specificities of place. 
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Figure 11: Trials park in Sabdell, Spain is currently the biggest in Europe.  It boasts many different styles of 
purpose built obstacles (including an indoors section) and different types of materials. Photo source: 















I am aware of people watching, and I am aware of the noise caused by each move of 
my bike. Klunk, klunk. Every hop is a cringe that makes the chain slap the bike frame 
- my rear mech is way too loose.  I have been ignoring it for a while, but now, 
knowing that I am being observed by these people has jolted my senses: it makes me 
realize that they can hear it, and in turn that it makes my riding seem heavier and 
clumsier than I would like to think it is.  All of which seems to amplify the sound, as I 
maintain balance on the uneven rocky surface by making little ‘correctional hops’.  
Sound closes in about me, and my ears feel pressured as I attempt to hop up a 
platform, turning ninety degrees at the same time to face the next obstacle.  Hard to 
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describe – low confidence seems to make my ears go funny, as if I’m underwater.…  
(Bike trials diary, 4/6/2006).  
         
In his PhD thesis, nestled amongst ethnographic work on cycling, Spinney (2008) 
includes some relatively short discussions on bike trials.  As he discovers, the practice of 
trials is not something that can be done on a whim – it requires months, if not years to 
grasp some of the movements.  For people unfamiliar with the practice, trials can even 
seem mysterious: “How do you do that?” is a very common question from children who 
see trials
82
.  But if there is a magician’s ‘trick’ or ‘deception’ involved, it is simply that 
past practice, failures and accumulation of small successes, remain hidden.  In a 
discussion of his research methods and the benefits of active participation even Spinney 
writes, “within the remit of this research, it is only trials bikes which are a completely 
‘foreign’ object and to this day I still have no idea how riders make them do what they 
do.” (Spinney 2008: 93).  
 
We can take it as a given that when Spinney describes the trials bike as a ‘foreign object’ 
he is describing the interaction of bike and rider: the bike-body.  The trials bike is not a 
completely ‘foreign object’ for most people, as it shares enough with more common 
mountain bikes that it can be readily identified as a bike (see Figure 14, page 166 for a 
comparison).  While it is true that in a relatively short time period, from the mid 1090s 
on, the trials bike has undergone many changes in design and manufacture, there has been 
something of a performative imperative not to deviate too far.  A rider beginning trials for 
the first time has the option of two distinct styles of bike: mod or stock.  The main 
difference between them being that a mod (short for modified) bike has smaller 20 inch 
wheels, compared to the standard 26 inched wheels of the stock
83
.  Mod bikes evolved 
more specifically from competition trials riding, in which the rider was mainly hopping 
up, over and down tricky rock strewn sections. Here the smaller wheels and ultimately 
lighter weight of mod bikes have excelled, to such a degree that they are considered a 
different class of riding in most all trials competitions. 
                                                 
82
 My experience is that older people with little trials experience will express the same sentiment and 
curiosity, but are more restrained and far less likely to blurt the question out, only asking ‘in conversation’.    
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Alternatively, stock bikes have a number of distinct advantages for street riding, not least 
of which is that the larger wheels allow them to roll better over bumps in the terrain, 
making them much more suited to a rolling ‘flowy’ style
84
.  As well as being less harsh, 
and juddery for general riding between obstacles, the larger wheels are more forgiving 
when gap jumping to a narrow object like a rail – they have a larger diameter and thus do 
not require the same precision as a mod with 20 inch wheels.  For these and other reasons 
the stock bike has tended to be favoured amongst street riders.  It is important to clarify 
here though, that the stock bike certainly does not go unmodified, it is simply called 
‘stock’ in contrast to ‘mod’. 
 
Another reason stock bikes are more popular with street riders has to do with their 
interaction with non-riders.  Just how one perceives others to perceive the self becomes a 
quite important issue here, for the bike becomes constructed to be an important part of 
those things that compose the self.  Such a sense of self can be quite reflective, 
contemplative, and, when applied to the trials bike-rider, adjusted accordingly.  Riders, 
for example, were reluctant to move to using small mini saddles, something which made 
sense in terms of performance: shedding unnecessary weight (unnecessary as the saddle 
is very rarely used in trials as standing up allows better control, balance and ability to 
absorb and direct forces with the legs), but left the rider uneasy when observed by the 




 wanted people to think it is normal, the bike I mean.  If people think it is 
something out of the circus, with a really small seat and tiny wheels, they don’t get it, 
they can’t relate.  If it looks like a normal bike then it works.  Most people know what 
it is like to attempt a wheelie, or to balance without going forward, so it is all the 
more impressive when they see a rider hopping on a railing on the back wheel.  They 
can’t do it but they can appreciate it better if it’s on a ‘normal’ bike.”  (conversation 
with Ben, essence of which recorded in Bike trials diary 2/6/2006).        
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 As is pushed in Ryan Leach’s film Manifesto, in which he rides with as few correctional hops as 
possible. 
85
 As an influential figure in British bike trials history Martin Ashton appeared regularly in the media, 
writing a regular column in MBUK and performing trials demos at events and in numerous videos.      
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While initially resistant to the mini seat trend, when Martin Ashton saw almost all other 
riders adopt small seats, he did eventually change to ride mini-seat, and in fact later 
designed a frame (the ‘Ashton Justice’) which looked very unusual in that it incorporated 
a minimal ‘saddle’ into the frame itself.  Even now, when many trials bike frames no 
longer accommodate a seat of any description, riders begrudge the seeming infinitely 
persistent question: “where’s your seat?”  Indeed, some riders who would otherwise 
rather save the weight resort to fitting one purely to avert this question.  While this is a 
somewhat particular example, it highlights the way that riders do often feel themselves to 
be watched, in a way in which they become associated, attached or even intertwined with 
their bike.  Here we see that: “all relevant social groups contribute to the social 
construction of technology, [and] all relevant artefacts contribute to the construction of 
social relations.” (Bijker 1995: 288).  
 
The bike, like a person’s clothes, becomes an important part of perfomative practice.  Not 
only this but, as Ashton’s changing viewpoints about the look of a bike can show and as 
other riders often articulate, they are intuitively aware of the public’s ability to empathise 
or not, to understand the difficulty of, and ultimately be impressed or not by certain trials 
techniques.  In other words, as performing movement artists, riders have knowledge 
about the ‘kinaesthetic sympathy’ (Jarvinen 2006) that people might feel for their riding.   
 
“I always think about what people must think, when they are watching. It’s like, I 
know when I started [riding trials] I saw stuff half as big as this and thought it was 
amazing! And like, what would I have thought if I saw myself now, with the stuff we 
do now? I would have been blown away!” (John, bike trials diary, 2/9/07)       
 
Thus riders often deliberately engineer both bike and movements to make maximal effect 
of the possible kinaesthetic sympathy of watchers.  In some instances this might involve 
performing certain flashy movements that are not particularly technical or difficult for the 
riders – but which look most impressive to the non-trials rider.  For example, flicking the 
bike up to the back wheel from a position in which it is resting on the bashguard, is 
notoriously tricky, but looks particularly unimpressive to a person who has not spent a 
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long time trying to learn the movement.  Here the visibility of ‘skill’ is a subtle affair, in 
which much remains hidden to those inexperienced in trials riding, but similarly 
experienced riders themselves often find it hard to remember the processes involved in 
learning a movement.       
 
Oppressively ‘Embiked’?  
 
“I hate it when people are watching me here, which is annoying because it is such a 
cool place to ride.  It’s just, you know that all the grannies are looking out the 
windows disapprovingly.  It’s just that feeling of being watched… not like when you, 
or another rider is watching, obviously.  But when someone might just not understand 
what you’re doing because they haven’t seen it before.  There is just more chance of 
getting told off…  But then other times, like round on the prom, people might watch 
and approve, so long as you don’t bashguard anything, say “well done” or clap, which 
is cool.”  (Martin, recorded in Bike trials diary 14/7/07).  
 
As I perform trials movements, feelings that might be described as nervousness or 
anxiety are often fused into the context of riding.  Other people, whether riders or not, 
affect the sensuous encounter, they intrude upon the body’s supposedly ‘trained’ up 
capacities.  In front of spectators, even a relatively comfortable move can become 
daunting for a rider used to ‘quiet’ trials.  The influence of other ‘watchers’ is particularly 
noticeable when riders are attempting movements at the limits of their ability.  Many 
times I have witnessed riders waiting for cars and even distant onlookers to move on 
before attempting a particular obstacle.  It is as if someone else watching becomes a 
distraction that will divert an unacceptable amount of attention away from the 
coordination of embodied movement.   It is precisely our capacity of outwardly extending 
whole-body reasoning which seems somehow to be curtailed by self-consciousness while 
under scrutinous observation.  In such instances, do we consider the body as ‘something’, 
do we become, as Iris Marion Young (1990) puts it, a ‘body object’?  
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“I mostly practice stuff I’m not sure of, or haven’t tried before in my garden at home, 
on my own.  It is probably more dangerous that way, but it feels better - you don’t 
mind cocking up so much.  Even if people do watch me when I’m at home, it doesn’t 
matter so much I can do what I like there.”  (John, Bike trials diary 27/08/07).             
 
Similar to Young’s notion of a ‘feminine comportment’ - the thoroughly internalised 
need to exercise bodily restraint and not mobilise the whole or ‘intentional’ body - it 
seems that there is a distinct ‘cycling comportment’.  That is, a mode of mobility in 
which ‘traditional cycling’ is expected – a kind of cycling that does not involve dramatic 
body movements – particularly jumping off the bike (controlled bails).  With such an 
externalized ‘self image’ (akin to that of Young’s), the body must continue to perform its 
learned inhibitions, and it’s embodied ideas about technology and place.  For Young, the 
cramping of individuality inevitably follows as the body is existent in relation to 
possibilities but more so in relation to itself and its habits of emotionality and movement.  
Such an objectified body experiences ‘inhibited intentionality’, and ‘discontinuous unity’ 
(Young 1990). 
 
As Spinney (2008) shows, however, these types of embodied comportments can vary 
with place.  In his case, London’s South Bank is described as a place in which the 
practices of BMX and trials riders actually ‘conforms to the social and display aesthetics 
of such spaces’, and whilst the riding in such places is continually evolving (or for 
Spinney ‘critiquing’ particular material forms through movement), their practices are 
much more an expected part of the place.  Incidentally South Bank is also a popular 
parkour haunt and associated with other avant-garde practices.  Here the so called 
‘subversive’ practice of trials riding and BMX ‘sits more comfortably within such spaces 
than many accounts suggest’ (Spinney 2008: 232).  Still, we can say that most places 
trials riders move through, are not so regularly inhabited as to become places in which 
assumptions about any kind of ‘belonging’ can be made.      
 
Indeed, if, following William James  (1879), we consider consciousness to be slowly 
evolved and developed in our limbs and ‘all organs that have use’(ibid: 3), then it may be 
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fair to accuse this ‘consciousness’ of fickle character, for it leaves us dumbfounded and 
forces us to resort to reason so frequently.  I sense the danger of a movement or the risk 
of onlookers disapproving and it stops me from simply acting and makes me consider: in 
these moments intense emotions mix somewhat unsympathetically with reason.  My 
unified ‘expert’ status, as the Dreyfuses (1986) would say, is revoked.             
 
It seems that the consciousness that James talks about, and the ‘expertise’ of the Dreyfus 
brothers, in which we might effortlessly and rapidly ‘avoid familiar obstacles when we 
dash to the phone’, or automatically ‘dodge missiles in a familiar video game’ (ibid: 30), 
are both ways to describe the immersion of the body in time-space
86
.  The familiar allows 
the whole body to extend backwards and forwards in time – knowing outcomes, acting 
with ease and letting them occur.  Yet this learned intuition, in trials is often interrupted, 
and often the very intuitive knowledge itself plays an important part of that interruption.  
We see an obstacle with little risk or difficulty, and move the bike over it, not with 
deliberation but a set of familiar feelings.  But when we ‘find’ an obstacle and intuitively 
know that it is on the boundaries of possibility suddenly we are evaluating, consciously 
comparing it to other obstacles, and rehearsing necessary movements and possible 
outcomes.                                  
 
That consciousness should only be intense when nerve-processes are retarded or 
hesitant, and at its minimum when nerve-action is rapid or certain, adds colour to the 
view that it is efficacious.  Rapid, automatic action is action through thoroughly 
excavated nerve-tracks which have not the defect of uncertain performance.  All 
instincts and confirmed habits are of this sort. But when action is hesitant there 
always seem several alternative possibilities of nervous discharge.  The feeling 
awakened lay the nascent excitement of each nerve-track seems by its attractive or 
repulsive quality to determine whether the excitement shall abort or shall become 
complete. Where indecision is great, as before a dangerous leap, consciousness is 
agonisingly intense.  Feeling, from this point of view, may be likened to a cross-
section of the chain of nervous discharge, ascertaining the links already laid down, 
and groping among the fresh ends presented to it for the one which seems best to fit 
the case. (James 1879: 16). 
                                                 
86
 And see also Seamon’s (1980), time-space-routines. 
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As mentioned, the same conscious jolting occurs when ‘watchers’ interrupt the flow of 
intuitive action.  I have myself felt relatively easy techniques become difficult while 
being closely watched.  When embarrassment or shame would follow, even ‘safe failure’ 
becomes very much less desirable and as such familiar obstacles are re-examined, and 
bike and bodily capacities brought into question – doubts are amplified.  When our body 
consciousness, as James would have it, is shorted out with intensity that has us ‘groping 
for new nerve endings’, reason regularly (and thankfully) steps in.  This is the case 
whether intuition is interrupted by an inexplicable and indefinable uneasy feeling, the 
body consciousness itself warning us of the difficulty, or the uncomfortable sense of 
watchers disapproving, which is of course just as much a learned intuition.  
 
For the Dreyfus brothers such moments, when intuition ‘knows’ to call upon a more 
reasoned mode of consciousness, mark a regression from an expert skill level, and 
necessitate the initiation of more ‘rule following’ based action, which dramatically 
detracts from performance.  They cite an interesting example of a flying instructor who, 
after a long break from piloting himself, finds he must revert to following the analytic 
‘rule book’ of how to manoeuvre.  Here it is ‘reason’ and the detached rule following, 
rather than unconsciously and masterfully ‘just doing it’, as he once had, that prevented 
him from performing as well (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986: 17-8).  The problem with all 
their examples though, for our purposes, is that they have a distinct ‘rule book’, however 
abstract it might be.  Intensity that stops the rider and practically forces a re-examination 
of body-space-machine relations, does not (always) result in us falling back on rule-based 
analytics.  Rather, it more or less engages our intuition in new ways; ways that play with, 
make contact afresh, and bid us try space out.  As James put it, consciousness can 
become ‘agonisingly intense’, as the body seeks out new perspectives or grasps upon the 
terrain.                      
 
‘We seldom “choose our words” or “place our feet” – we simply talk and walk.’ (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986: 32).  And yet the trials bike and the encounter with both people and 
place draw forth the need to reflexively improvise.  Seemingly an oxymoron, reflexive 
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improvisation is an expression of the ‘time inseparability’ of our embodied action.  Here, 
and as the Dreyfus brothers go on to suggest, ‘deliberative rationality is not opposed to 
intuition, but based upon it.’ (1986: 205).  In this way whole-body reasoning becomes 
central to the rider’s capacity for re-interpretation of place.  It is the repeated experiences 
– in this case those of being with a bike and moving in certain places - that give 
foundation to our intuitions and thus our capacity for ‘reason’.  In other words, for the 
experienced rider, embodied reasoning cannot help but take place through, or rather with, 
the bike.  Do we then learn specific kinds of ‘embiked’ reasoning?     
 
Embiked: sounds like a prison – caging our ‘intentionality’ and ‘humanness’.  Indeed, it 
seems that some writers on technology have implicitly come to just that conclusion: all 
too easily we begin to think of technology like the bike or car as a distancing mechanism, 
an obstacle to some authentic or more real world, in which the body senses are truer, 
purer and more primary (compare Augé 1995 and Merriman 2007).  That new 
technology, as a dynamic object, alters or rather co-constitutes perceptions is clear, but 
that has always been the case.  Experience of climbing trees is a contact with the body as 
readily as scaling a metal climbing frame.  Both are interactions amid objects which 
emerge with our movement and their distinct characteristics.  Both shape perceptions and 
embodied knowledge through contact. 
 
Might it be there are other specific kinds of technologies that require special distinction?  
For writers like Virilio (1999) the automobile and other motorized and electronic forms 
of transport and communication (in particular the television) is productive if a certain 
kind of optically framed experience.  Perhaps this is so: it is clear that different textures, 
materials and configurations of objects stimulate different kinds of sensorial experience, 
thus we can distinguish between and have quite different affects from say a painting as 
from a tempting plate of food.  It becomes more difficult however, to accept that one 
experience can be less ‘real’ an encounter than another because here we venture into the 
realm of ethics and values.  In making this extra step we put ourselves on the line, as 
agents of change – we say of some technology or activity that it is better than another – 
not just different.  For example, Phil Jones, in considering the experience of the cyclist, 
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makes such a claim: that the bike has potential for a more intimate connection than the 
car.   
 
This Playstation-perception of automotive movement simply does not apply to the 
cyclist.  The physical intensity of the cyclist’s experience locates the bicycle in an 
older transport paradigm – very much the ‘equestrian’ mount. The sense of speed is 
very real, with fast-moving air bringing tears to unprotected eyes.  The cyclist’s 
fragility seems all the more acute when the slightest miscalculation could send the 
body hurtling across the asphalt… It is the very sense of danger that makes the speed 
an exhilarating and very real experience. (P Jones 2005: 821, my emphasis).        
 
For him then, the bike, as opposed to the car, is a technology which actually heightens the 
real immediacy of space. For Jones, riding a bike allows a reality more ‘real’, an intimacy 
that is inevitably lost behind a car windscreen.  Similarly Virilio, begrudges the loss of 
‘real’ spaces of immediate action, at the hands on new technologies of so-called ‘real 
time’ communication (Virilio 1999, but see also Merriman’s (2007) critique aimed at this 
kind of thinking).  Following such writers one might be tempted to equate the ‘real’ with 
danger, intensity, ‘nowness’, and the necessity for constant reflexive improvisation, and 
perhaps with good reason, as it seems the most obvious and heart rending interruption to 
bland, forgettable habitual everydayness.  What I wish to suggest, however, is that it is 
the quality of contact we make with technologies that often gets dubiously referred to as 
more or less real.  To do so we must obviously look to the specifics of contact, in which 




The relative merit of bike components is of great interest to almost all trials riders.  Each 
part of the bike can usually relate to distinct and intense experiences of riding trials - of 
falling off, or overcoming an obstacle.  Most riders can recall some feeling of what it was 
like to first fit and then ride with this or that component, and will happily discuss their 
take on the advantages and disadvantages of any given bike part.  Geometric forms and 
material design are carefully considered.  For example, how a pedal ‘performs’ for trials 
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riding is a complex function of its interaction with the shoe, but also extends out to 
encompass the crank, the bike, foot size, the body and the terrain.  Thus the question is 
not how does a pedal perform, but rather, what does a pedal enable, what does it 
constrain, how does it participate in the new landscapes it enacts?  
 
The pedal, like any other component of the trials bike, shapes the rider and the style of 
riding to such a degree that one might guess a significant amount about the kinds of 
riding people do from the choice and markings on the pedal.  The scratches and wear of 





 obstacles, or how smoothly they ride will all be reflected in the 
material bike.  Similarly though, riders carry marks which may be read in a ‘trials way’.  
Here bikes and riders with so many comingled choices tell a story in which “cyborgs are 
simultaneously entities and metaphors, living beings and narrative constructions.” 
(Hayles 1995: 322).   
 
 
Figure 15: right-side crank arm and pedal.  Left footed rider, fairly experienced, good at getting up 
high obstacles, likes lightweight components over strong heavy ones - likely to be a light smooth 
rider, keen on tricky technical riding as opposed to ‘big street’. Source: Trials-Forum.  
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 This refers to the foot that is forward during most trials movements. 
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 Bashguarding up an object is where the trials rider cannot get straight up to both wheels, instead the bike 
ends up resting on the bashguard and front wheel.  This is an acceptable technique in many trials 
competitions (but not in Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) competition) and can be both intentional and 
unintentional.  It is often frowned upon during street rides as it can cause damage to the obstacle/street 
furniture.   
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Apart from clothing choices and safety equipment, the flesh is sometimes quite literally 
etched with ‘readable’ signs.  So called ‘pedal rash’ – not uncommon amongst trials 
riders – most often occurs when a rider’s foot slips off the front pedal during a move or a 
‘bail out’. The weight still on the back pedal forces the cranks to spin round, smashing 
the front pedal into the shin, often gouging out long vertical strips of flesh. 
 
Figure 16: Shark Bite pedals. Source: Trials-Forum. 
 
 
In this instance the rider has to make a judgment of technology based on a set of 
compromises: the grip of the pedal roughly corresponds to the sharpness of its design.  
Once popular ‘Shark Bite’ pedals are an extreme choice, supposedly having exceptional 
grip, but incurring a heavy toll if the rider’s foot does slip.  A more common choice is the 
flat pedal which has a varying number of removable ‘pins’ that dig into the rubber shoe 
sole (as in Figure 15)  
 
Technologies that are novel – new frame geometry, a fast pickup hub, a different tyre, a 
change of stem – slowly become, like Mike Michael’s (2000) walking boot, a mundane 
technology.  So incorporated into the body as to be forgotten, taken for granted until 
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either body or machine fail or otherwise perform in some way as to re-assert the 
‘thereness’ of a component.  Well-designed components, in particular, merge seamlessly 
into the body’s range of movement and perception. 
 
What then, can the pedal tell us about the quality of contact a rider has with places?  Just 
as with footwear, once it becomes familiar the pedal goes largely unnoticed, except 
during falls or bail outs, yet it is always there making a difference.  It performs in a 
certain way, when compared to other pedals of different design, and is thus implicated in 
the way a rider makes contact with space, and the intuition and emotional judgments they 
might have about certain spaces.  Can we say of a particular pedal that it makes contact of 
a lesser or greater quality?  For the rider, of course, the answer is emphatically yes: one 
need only use some cheap plastic pedals that will not grip the foot and in turn will not 
allow many trials movements
89
 , to see a variance in the quality of contact.  Not being 
able to move in certain ways changes the way riders perceive and inhabit spaces, in what 
is, for them, an obviously negative way.  
 
We cannot help but make judgments in this way.  Flat pedals are better than clipless, the 
experience of the car is inferior to that of the bike, television is better than reading, 
hydraulic brakes are better than V-brakes - all judgements about technologies based on 
our contact with the world.  In this instance the technology of the pedal is integrated with 
a host of complex relations that riders have with space.  This is true of those things that 
tend to be described/marketed as the ‘contact points’ of the bike - that is the grips, pedals 
(and also the saddle for other kinds of riding) – but also of the rest of the bike, and the 
quality of contact it allows.  The body too is able to evaluate its own abilities for making 
contact with the world, and it is to this embodied, yet ‘embiked’, technology that we now 
turn.       
 
The human as a technology? 
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 ‘Front hops’ - that is, hopping on the front wheel only - is a particularly good test of pedal grip, as the 
foot is continually hooking up and back – a movement all but impossible of slippery pedals.    
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I finally made it up the sewage wall [a four foot high concrete retaining wall near a 
sewage works] without using the bashguard today! [….]
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  After the first time I just 
did it again several times – all worked.  These were some strange feelings: those 
similar to techniques used getting up smaller stuff, but different.  While I was doing it 
I could sort of feel that I looked like Martin.  I shift bodyweight right over the front as 
the front wheel is just clearing the lip of the wall, and just let the back roll up without 
any brakes.  I could ‘recognise’ this body movement as ones he (Martin) does.  This 
might well have to do with the frame-stem combo I am using at the moment: it seems 
suited for that kind of movement.    (Bike trials diary 25/07/06, emphasis added later).         
          
Very little explicit ‘instruction manuals’ exist for bike trials techniques in printed form, 
and only a few tutorial videos available for purchase detail some of the basic movements.  
Nevertheless, even without diagrams or formulas to follow, riders learn from each other.  
Members of the so-called trials community (in Britain we might consider the centre of 
which to be the on-line forum ‘trials-forum’) carefully dissect movements other riders are 
doing and showing in edited video clips uploaded to the internet.  In this digital video 
format riders can use freeze frame and slow motion to analyse the techniques of other 
riders and take what they can from others’ embodied knowledge.   
 
Similarly riders very often ride in groups, not only for company (and in some cases 
safety), but also because of the improved learning curve.  This is not simply a technical 
matter - rides interact in complex emotional ways, movements may elicit inspiration, 
curiosity, and outright amazement, but also for competitive riders a sense of 
disappointment or inadequacy.  Either way, many riders espouse the benefits of ‘social 
aspects’ of riding.  The talk (common topics being: discussions of relative merits of 
certain bike components, riding locations, technique, and past trials experience) is often 
considered as much a part of riding, as the riding itself.  Thus in riding sessions riders 
communally negotiate the practice ‘trials’, communicating not just with their talk but also 
with their bike-bodies’ movement through place.   
  
                                                 
90
 There is a note in my diary here about how I have recently been most enthusiastically recording events 
where I manage to do something new (especially where I have not ‘done’ the obstacle before but have been 
trying for some time).  I write myself a reminder to pay more attention to failures.        
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Riding with better riders will definitely help you improve.  Your perception of what is 
rideable and what can be done will change which can help you progress quicker. But 
remember there is no quick way to getting good at trials and one person’s method 
may not work for your style of riding, you need to just get out and ride. Videos can 
give you pointers and breakdowns of techniques, but watching all the videos in the 
world won't make you good on its own. Try, try, try, do....... (Dan, 11/12/06 trials 
forum). 
 
The trials rider has a ‘socially organized competence’ (Gibson 2006:172) which comes 
into existence through interaction with technologies.  Riders pay keen attention to the 
way others approach similar objects – timings, speeds, and all other aspects of technique 
are watched, often vocalised, but not necessarily then translated into doing.  One of the 
problems with Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work is that he describes the practices of ‘normal’ 
people, whose functioning is smooth and unproblematic; they are mobile in the world in 
terms of their body’s coherent intentionality.  Or they have serious neurological 
dysfunction and are entirely incapable of operating in an everyday capacity.  Of course 
most people do not have perfectly smooth experiences or performances (Shusterman 
2005).  Instead their performances, their bodies, and their emotional states change over 
time and place.  Indeed bodies in trials, as in other activities are being changed, perhaps 
even consciously ‘worked on’ (Shilling 1993), but in all instances, as Dan suggests 
above, it involves a good deal of trying.  
 
One can watch a trials movement several times and, as Spinney found, still have no idea 
how to do the techniques, what muscles must be called upon and what kinaesthetic 
sensations ‘mean’.  As such, less experienced trials riders can watch unfamiliar 
movements with a sense of disbelief and confusion
91
.  Out riding with better riders I 
would often have watched closely how other riders made the movements, yet when 
considering the obstacle directly, on my bike, I might be completely at a loss.  In such 
circumstances translating the visual into the kinaesthetic seems a hefty task.  One way to 
adapt is to look closely at one particular part of a movement, isolate off the breaking 
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 Interestingly one of the most common responses on trials-forum to new ‘paradigm making’ videos goes 
along the lines of, “what just happened?”    
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finger, the pedal stroke timing, or the approach speed - try to get just that bit right before 
moving onto some other part of the body. 
 
Through this process of dissecting little bits of visual representations (watching others 
performing movement in situ or on videos) and then cobbling them together later when 
actually doing the technique, I can build up a feeling for the body motions.  All the while 
this requires that I move quite unlike Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) intentional body-subject.  
Instead I am always focusing my attention on certain bits of my bike-body, hunting for 
the ‘best’ way to receive, interpret and respond to the sensations coming to me from the 
terrain.  This ‘best’ way comes not just from my firsthand experience, but is 
complicatedly mixed with sensations encountered while watching other riders.              
 
Figure 17 shows this circuit of watching and doing and breaking habit
92
.  What I wish to 
show, is that whilst the time spent watching other riders either in person or on video may 
have been, a visual sensory input, they become very much a feeling experience.  I did not 
experience them as representation in the sense of something that can be imaged or 
visualised, rather as a set of feelings that were happening: the  and the  so common 
in responses to forum posted videos.  When I started trials for example, I could relate 
very little to what I saw happening at (A).  The movements had impact, but they were 
foreign to me, my body had no idea how they would feel or how to perform them. Thus 
when it came to practice the move (C) I would be quite dumbfounded.  Of course, this 
feeling is not specific to me, in many years of riding, all the riders I have spoken to have 
at some point felt overwhelmed by an obstacle / movement – unable to easily understand 
it as a possibility.  Indeed, it is interesting to note the how this happens differently when 
watching videos.  Many riders have self-confidently seen obstacles-movements in video, 
only to find that when they see the place firsthand, with their bike, in place – it can be 
transformed into a daunting impossibility.   
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 Use of diagrams can tend to be sterile, straight and clean; suggesting inhuman disembodied 
understandings of space (Longhurst 2001).  I hope though, that the diagrams in this project will be 
generative abstractions (McCormack 2005), ones which will create modes of understanding the activities 
which are clearly not ‘truthful’ in the sense of practicing aikido, but might be a useful emergence form an 
entirely typescript feel.  Like the text, I wish to push the diagram’s potential to be ‘added to’ and ‘made’ by 
the reader.  Diagrams remain open for interaction, because the possibility to affect, I believe, and as these 
activities seem to suggest, is amplified by the ability to be affected.  A productive and playful negotiation 
then. 
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Figure 17: The feeling-doing loop 
 
 
As with other riders I have found that, through practice, or rather sustained trying, the 
process occurring at (B) becomes quite different.  I feel what I see at (A).  It would 
trigger off memories of previous doings that were nothing like pictures, or words, but 
more like twitching, feeling muscles, which knew the pleasure or pain of side-hopping a 
certain way, or jumping a gap between walls.  I am not always particularly aware of those 
kinaesthetic feelings; they just occur, and while at times I would ‘form’ the action in my 
head as language: “so he put his right knee to the side and squatted more back before 
launching…”, this was rare – language seemed so inadequate for what trials riders are 
doing.  Thus, when it came to (C), it was those feelings which were retraced – I attempted 
to evoke them once more.  It was always an experimental focus, feeling different speeds, 
distances and intensities.  At (C) my feelings were ‘done’ and practiced, the movements 
no longer static and internal, rather expressed through space with the bike.   
 
After some time once new techniques become less about trying and more a practicing, the 
failures give way to success – sometimes counted in the number of times out of five or 
ten one could pull off a certain movement.  (C) became more important - the kinaesthetic 
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dynamics became much more complicated as we progress, because very often the risks 
are increased. Heights and dangers become immediate.  Forging of the body’s responses, 
a process undergone during practice becomes a movement a hundred times, a thousand 
times.  And slowly the bike-body comes together approaching what has been described as 
the ‘body-subject’, only to be pulled apart by the new way of being in space.   
 
Because of body subject, people can manage routine demands automatically and so 
gain freedom from their everyday spaces and environments. In this way they rise 
above such mundane events as getting places, finding things, performing basic 
gestures, and direct the creative attention to wider, more significant life dimensions. 
(Seamon 1980: 157).  
 
In some places, for some actions, the need to focus attention on the body’s individual bits 
recedes and the bike-body moves as one coherent entity.  Occasionally a limb will be 
reminded when it is not moving ‘properly’, when it is out of tune with the goings on.  
Pain or failure or both are usually involved but other times friends might point out 
something in your technique. This brings the offending limb/part back into focus for 
some time while its movement is worked upon, before once again it fades into 
unconscious realms.  The kind of masterful ‘body-subject’ of Seamon is a tempting one, a 
body which is freed up to focus on other aspects of the activity, such as making the move 
as smooth and soundless as possible, rather that concentrating on the fundamentals of the 
move - in a sense fine tuning.  Even in these instances though, when focusing on 
individual parts of the body, it is true that this negates the ‘un-attention’ and unity, 
obscuring the more primordial body of Merleau-Ponty.  But ultimately, such practices are 
transitory and seem to have as their ‘goal’ the improvement and heightening of that 
primordial, intuitive perception.  Again, it is only when a certain proficiency is achieved 
that the body can begin to move unselfconsciously (Malbon 1999).     
 
The box - what an unexpected find! Strange that none of us had ever ‘seen’ the shiny 
blue electric box before.  It was about three and a half feet high, eight inches across 
and about five deep, and had a perfect run up.  It was not a massively high obstacle to 
getup, but required a fair amount of precision and it had to be ‘back-wheeled’ because 
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there was nothing to put the front wheel down on.  Scary stuff. (Bike trials diary 
16/9/03). 
 
‘Effortless intuitive perception’, the bike-body’s goal might be, but it is always being 
seized and surprised by what the fulfilment of that goal means: new places, new distances 
and new movements, which do require effort (or play).  Always these new places are 
arriving with: with other riders, techniques, technologies, materials.  When a new rubber 
compound used in a tyre can open up new risky lands, or a new video can unleash a 
movement previously unconsidered, the trials rider might only be understood as a 
collective.                  
 
Changing technological bike trends and the changes in the types of riding in trials are 
informed by the communication between riders, and go hand in hand with the re-
interpretive utopic nature of trials.  As a continual exploration of possibilities for 
mobility, trials riders invent new techniques and technologies in an inescapably 
connected way.  We live and change as part of cyborg worlds ‘whether we want to or not’ 
(Haraway 1995: xix).  Here the bike could be considered as an object that has ‘embodied 
within it’ the social relations and riding context that first gave rise to it (Dant 1999).  
Such inventions come from within the trials community but also from ‘without’, as we 
become ‘constructed’ as ‘trials riders’ (or just as often as BMXers, trouble makers, or 
lazy drop outs).   
 
In mounting the bicycle, I was not simply travelling to work, but transforming and 
reconstructing my body, both literally as I became more physically fit, and also in the 
more abstract, Butlerian sense… I was being loaded with a whole series of labels: 
‘fit’, ‘healthy’, ‘eco-friendly’, ‘sustainable’ (and also ‘mad’, ‘crazy’, reckless’).  No 
longer myself, I was constructed as a cyclist. (P Jones 2005: 814)  
 
As I have discussed, ‘cyclist’ is a very different label to ‘trials rider’.  Riding a trials bike 
and doing trials has measurably different effects.  And yet like Jones, we are often taken 
for ‘cyclists’ and as such simply do not belong in the places we go: a cyclist has no place 
lingering in little used industrial areas, farmers’ marts, or in pedestrian squares, let alone 
up on a walls or railings.  As classic Butlerian thought goes, in the process of riding, the 
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‘cyclist’ or the ‘trials rider’ “is both produced and destabilized in the course of 
reiteration.” (Butler 1993: 10).  Thus, while doing trials can redefine what it is to be a 
‘cyclist’ (or begin to define ‘trials rider’), so to is its practice susceptible to those pre-
existing constructions.  Such a susceptibility is manifest in numerous ways. The routes 
trials riders choose, for example, are often based on feelings and perceptions of the 
likelihood of certain public encounters: moving from one riding spot to the next, staying 
long at some but not others, avoiding some altogether.  Places laden with associated 
safety or trouble, understood as fit to be observed doing trials in or not.  And it is the 
riders’ more or less habitual perceptions of the possibilities in place, as well as a whole 
raft of other, typically unarticulated, emotive judgments – what rideable formations are 
there?  What kinds of body movements/feeling will be involved?  Who else is around?  
What interactions are likely?  Is my bike setup for that kind of riding?  These are all 
questions that feed into the riding spots trials riders ‘session’.  All performances are 
materialized. They are compiled in contact, as so many elements of time-space are ‘taken 
care of’ by intuitive bike-body thought.   
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Figure 18: Richard with Orange Zero, riding little used areas..     
 
Out of the tension between out and out constructivism and essentialism of sex, Butler 
produces a theory of performed identity that comes close to approximating this.  Here 
matter is neither solid thing nor cultural embeddedness, but is better understood as 
emergent process.     
 
What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the 
notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that 
stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call 
matter. (Butler 1993: 10, emphasis added). 
 
Taking such a conception of ‘matter’ seriously requires that we call to attention those 
modes of behaviour which can so easily go unnoticed.  While the trials rider should 
probably be considered creative in their systematic development of embodied techniques 
and accompanying re-envisioning of space, as important is the ‘matter’ upon which such 
development depends.  A trials rider, separated from their bike, moving as pedestrian, is 
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still a technologically constituted entity in that they will still notice walls of specific 
heights, rails a certain distance apart, enticingly angled walkways, and so on.  Similarly a 
rider’s current ‘projects’ – the places, movements and obstacles they are thinking about 
doing – are founded on the permeability of their materiality.  In other words, trials 
practitioners see, touch and feel place with the bike, if not in mind, then in body.  Riders 
can remember many of the moments in which such perceptual foundations were 
‘redesigned’ – but much of the continual practice which ingrains their ways of perceiving 
place can slip past thoughtful reflection.     
 
“Now I can do it, it just seems easy, but I remember watching Chris doing this [move] 
and thinking “oh my god, he’s amazing!”  I really couldn’t believe he was getting up 
there on a bike!” (Dave, Bike trials diary, 2/9/05).  
 
The heights of things actually look TOTALLY different to me now 3 years into 
riding. When I first started, a bench was for sitting on. Riding up behind it the thought 
of EVER getting near the top was utterly ridiculous.  It really did look VERY high, 
yet now, that same 3ft bench looks like a mere curb. I just sorta 'ride' straight over it. 
It’s very odd.  (Prawn, trials-forum.com, 1/12/03).  
 
It is interesting to note the ease with which experienced riders dismiss so much activity, 
so many hours of trial and error as now being ‘just easy’.  Shocking flashes mark our 
bodies but the slow grind of muscles and nerve pathways restructuring can slip by 
without comment – it becomes ‘just who we are’.  It seems we forget how not to ride a 
bike.  The small gaps and fissures opened by Butler’s iteration, the marginal progress, the 
average days without distinctive incident, all build into the sense of place a rider enjoys 
or not, whether on a bike or not.       
 
We cannot assume that the (nearly) naked human body is not already a technological 
artefact, shaped by cultural training techniques and subject to social dynamics, such 
as learned inhibitions, and accumulating practical knowledge and innovation. 
(Downey 2007: 203-4).   
 
None of this means that slow development through repetition cannot be exceeded, 
disturbed or stunned.  As a playful and vulnerable entity the trials rider ‘cannot be wholly 
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defined or fixed by the repetitive labour or that norm’ (Butler 1993:10).  The human as 
‘technological artefact’ is still one which remains unfathomably complex in its evolving 
contact with place.  As such, solidity is, as always, an illusion cast by an 
underappreciated kind of contact.  In trials stability is actively sought, if only to provide a 
foot-up to another rickety shifting platform.                  
 
This instability is the deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition, the 
power that undoes the very effects by which “sex” is stabilized, the possibility to put 
the consolidation of the norms of “sex” into a potentially productive crisis. (Butler 
1993:10). 
 
The similar disruption of ‘the cyclist’ might be one thing, but it seems for many trials 
riders a more desirable outcome would actually be the creation and recognition of a 
category: ‘trials rider’.   
 
When people have seen it before and know what it is, they are usually cool with it.  If 
they can point and say oh look, he’s doing trials, that’s fine.  But so many people just 
don’t know what it is.  It’s because they don’t know what it is.  (Richard, in 
conversation about getting told off for doing trials, bike trials diary, 21,9,04).          
 
People, it seems, are highly suspicious of the body in process.  That which cannot be 
categorised is mobile beyond conventional description, is innately and indefinably 
deviant, and is very often made to feel unwelcome (Cresswell 2006).  Countering this 
taken-for-granted ethos of fixity Elizabeth Grosz, in considering the question of how 
places and bodies are mutually constituted, draws on the notion of a ‘body image’ 
(particularly as deployed by Schilder 1978) which is never stable or complete.  Rather, 
the body image is plastic and is moulded through the body’s day-to-day actions in 
place
93
. At the same time the ‘body image’, for Grosz, coordinates and unifies bodily 
senses and behaviours.  It is not simply the physicality of the body; it also incorporates 
‘mental’ processes as well as times and spaces that might typically be considered as 
outside of ‘the body’.  “The body image is not an isolated image of the body but 
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 Thus, Elizabeth Grosz argues that the use of groupings or categories like sex, class, race etc. does 
violence to the world that defies ‘common sense’ categories, or axes of identity. 
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necessarily involves the relations between the body, the surrounding space, other objects 
and bodies, and the coordinates or axes of vertical and horizontal.” (Grosz 1994: 85). 
Thus while the body image is, at least in part, a product of places and events, it also 
facilitates bodily action, movements, expressions and attitudes towards places and 
people.  Here then, we have our categories carved into our flesh by our contextual 
emergence – the cyclist, branded by those people who will recognise the shape of a bike 
and rider, while simultaneously, unbranded by their unusual actions and 
contextualisation. 
 
By considering ourselves as constituted through repeated actions with spaces, as a 
reading of Grosz and Butler might suggest, we have a scene set and ready for the ‘post’ 
or ‘trans-human’ perspective.  One in which we can no longer accept the autonomy of the 
individual, or the human-centred presuppositions of such disciplines as anthropology. 
From what standpoint we now write remains in the balance.  Do we embrace the kind of 
disembodied subjectivity, in which we are dispersed amongst networks of machines?  A 
profound question for the discipline of geography, for ‘a disembodied subjectivity messes 
with whereness’ (Stone 1995: 398). How do we locate ourselves or others in this 
technofied dispersion?   
 
Some theorists of ‘cyborg anthropology’ have actively begun to explore “a new 
alternative by examining the argument that human subjects and subjectivity are as much a 
function of machines, machine relations and information transfers as they are machine 
producers and operators.”  (Downey, et al. 1995: 343).  Such a perspective is attractive 
because technology is patently involved in every human activity we would care to 
theorise.  A rider can, of course, be conceived of as a cyborg, a hybrid of organic flesh 
and technology, but could not also the street and the bike and rider?  In other words, there 
is a question about how far we can go with the knowledge that, ‘human agency’ 
(traditionally construed) ‘serves in the world today as but one contributor to activities that 
are growing in scope, complex, diverse, and yet interconnected.’ (Downey, et al. 1995: 
343). As the study of material culture has repeatedly demonstrated, technology is never 
developed independently of human society (Law and Hassard 1999).  But does, we might 
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ask, technology still make for separations as well as connections (see ‘The Separation’, 
this chapter, for more on this)?  One possible route through such questions is advanced by 
Nikolas Rose’s critique of the kind of performitivity envisioned by Grosz and Butler: 
 
Rather than an analytic of inscription, in which culture is written on the flesh, I think 
it is more useful to think in terms of technology… Language, writing, memory can 
themselves be seen to be elements in a technics, each entailing truths, techniques, 
gestures, habits, devices as assembled through training and embedded in more or less 
enduring associations. (Rose 1998: 186). 
 
Thus, for Rose a persons’ relations to themselves are stabilised in various technological 
assemblages, each rendition of which differs over time-space.  The trials rider is always a 
being-assembled-together with technologies, techniques, configurations of objects, forum 
posts, bike components, marketing material, videos, designs, and all the rest.  As 
Downey’s (2007) study of the ‘Ultimate Fighting Championship’ shows, so called brute 
or natural bodily force (including violence) is no such thing.  Subtle and seemingly 
insignificant changes, from clothing, handlebar grips, pedals, to the smallest place-based 
differences, ‘rules’ and perceived attitudes of onlookers, make a big difference in trials 
riding, just as they do in the training practices, and essentially body knowledge of many 
other activities.  Downey dispels any thoughts of two bodies ever being in a ‘natural’ 
fight, showing instead that human interactions are always made with ‘skilled, socialized 
bodies, tools (some invisible because they are not considered tools) and learned 
inhibitions.’ (ibid: 207).  Downey’s consideration of the body as technology, while a 
touch formulaic, does indeed seem to show: 
 
that science-like traits and technological processes – experimentation, communal 
problem-solving, refinement of skills, ‘paradigm’-like framings of strategy, unspoken 
aesthetic reservations and preferences in solutions, dependence of socially 
communicated ‘tacit’ knowledge, reconfiguration of the tools for increased efficiency 
even if those tools include the body itself – are hallmarks of how humans as a species 
approach even the most basic problems, such as self-defence. (2007: 220). 
   
 190 
Always and forever an assemblage - one might well ask then, who or what is doing the 
assembling?  In what order?  Where’s the logic?  Returning to Rose’s work we once 
again see the now popular dismissal of any particular centre, individual, coherence or 
locus of which we might point at and say, this creates – this creates meaning and it makes 
significance.  After all, why should the combination of stuff we might refer to as ‘the 
trials rider’ have any more ‘agency’ than the materiality which animates him or her?  
 
There is no need to posit any ‘propulsive medium’ behind all these technologies, no 
primordial force or desire courses through these assemblages and makes it possible 
for them to move, act, change, resist, mutate.  The ‘question of agency’ as it has come 
to be termed, is a false problem. (Rose 1998: 186).    
 
Rather, Rose goes on, ‘such capacities for action emerge out of the specific regimes and 
technologies that machinate humans in diverse ways.’ (ibid: 187).  Here, if there is any 
‘agency’ at all, it is something that is dispersed amongst, produced in the process of 
assemblage.  The human, and indeed other life, is ‘machinated’ as readily as a bike tyre is 
cast in its mould, as willingly as the cassette rotates for the chain or as much alike as the 
wheel hub, stressed in a complex way by compound forces, its own personal history of 
metal fatigue, dirty bearings and undue sideways loads.  Changes in component bike 
parts can cause trouble to the ‘bike system’, as much as the body of the rider: disrupting 
the accumulated familiar ease with which the bike-body is controlled.  For the rider, 
different components demand a refocusing of attention, a deliberate and conscious re-
engagement, which often reduces proficiency.  “The conscious use of calculative 
rationality produces regression to the skill of the novice or, at best, the competent 
performer.  To think rationally in that sense is to forsake know-how and is not usually 
desirable.” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986: 36).  In our example however, embodied know-
how is not forgotten, rather it is re-focused while the body adjusts.  These modifications 
are not calculative, nor do they come from exact or ‘case-based’ experiences, which 
never quite match the context of riding as it occurs, and neither anyway does the memory 
‘store’ experience in this way.  Rather, the disturbing differences in the bike are 
accommodated, explored, considered, and modified in relation to places - often with 
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intuitive rationality - as the body knows kinaesthetically which positions are desirable, 
but has to try things to take them up.  
 
For Rose, agency may be a ‘false problem’, but can we so easily abandon the 
‘uniqueness’ with which we may (or may not) explore and interrogate new modes of 
existence.  Pedals, spokes, hubs, gears - it is clear that some of us do find significance in 
all these processes, beyond machinations, because we have done what they themselves 
cannot: we have chosen a path of possibilities that led us closer to them.  Unlike 
inanimate stuff we have ideas, emotions, and fundamentally, contact.  Thus my approach 
to the ‘scale of the cyborg’ question, is to be led, not by some innate humanity or 
immutable sense of ethics, but by the qualities of contact we feel, with things, through the 
body.   
             
The mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.  Consciousness 
consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the 
suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention. … As 
well might one say that the sculptor is passive, because the statue stood from eternity 
within the stone.  So it did, but with a million different ones beside it. … We may 
even, by our reasoning, unwind things back to that black and jointless continuity of 
space and moving clouds of swarming atoms which science calls the only real world.  
But all the while the world we feel and live in, will be that which our ancestors and 
we, by slow cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this, as the sculptor 
extracts his statue by simply rejecting the other portions of the stone.  Other sculptors, 
other statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same chaos! 
(James 1879: 13-14). 
 
Technology or not then, our ability to re-invent ourselves, to find new qualities in the 
kinds of contact we have with the world, enables us in very unique ways. Trials as an 
ever-evolving set of practices is driven forward, not by objects themselves, but by those 
objects becoming technology, and by what we can do with technology, how we become 
attached to technology, how we move with technology and how we develop techniques to 
redefine technology.  As such, the rider participates amid the assemblage filled world as 
they design, consciously or not, habitually or not, different ways of making contact with 
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places.  With our experience of contact as playful and mischievous companion the trials 








Figure 19: Anatomy of a stock trials bike. Labelling: author’s, photo credit: Adamantbikes.com  
 
 
“Have you seen the Brisa frame?  It looks amazing.  It has short chain stays that are 
internally reinforced so it aught to be more responsive on the back wheel. The disk 
mount looks cool, it’s a totally different design, the calliper goes in-between the stays 
instead of just stuck on top, the dropout is a solid machined piece so looks like it 
might actually hold up running a disk.”  (Morgan, excitedly in conversation. Recorded 
in bike trials diary 2/6/2006) 
 
 
As the pace of trials riding evolution began to far outstrip any reactions amongst the 
mainstream industrial manufacturers of bicycle components, riders employed a variety of 
coping strategies to improve their bike’s trials potential.  Typically street riders started 
with a standard mountain bike - often ones having frames that were traditionally thought 
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to be too small for conventional riding - stripped of any unnecessary parts (such as front 
mechs, shifters, etc.) and made other custom modifications.  As the separate disciplines 
of ‘downhill’ and ‘duel slalom’ emerged, trials riders often specked out their bikes with 
related components, which were not ideal, but were usually stronger and more durable, 
and more likely to stand up to the rigors of trials.  With many of these items, weight was 
a significant limiting factor in their performance.  Make-shift trials bikes incorporated 
items that were made for downhill racing and advertised as ‘bombproof’.  At that time 
this had instant appeal to trials riders, who had found standard mountain bike parts, 
particularly cheaper ones, fail with alarming regularity.  Hubs and other parts of the drive 
chain were particularly susceptible to the sudden and intense bursts of force involved in 
‘pedal hop’ movements.  Even the expensive XTR, top end Shimano hubs were not really 
suitable because of their slow pickup and lack of strength in the freehub mechanism
94
.   
 
From 1995 to early 2000 this problem was addressed by smaller companies (sometimes 
referred to as ‘off-brand’, meaning not Shimano) like ‘Goldtech’ that found they could 
produce for this growing niche market, and sell at a higher price point to trials riders who 
had little other alternatives.  Like me, riders, who had experienced hub breakage while 
riding, would often spend a disproportionately high amount for a hub that would last 
longer than a few weeks and spare them the potentially spectacular calamity of 
transmission failure.  In early 2000 Chris King hubs which used a completely different 
mechanism to the typical ratchet freehub became the hub to have, if one could afford the 
price which was around £300.  Popularized not just through advertising
95
 but primarily 
through personal rider recommendations (probably the most influential and far reaching 
of which were made on trials-forum.com), the rear Chris King hub dominated because 
the technology was uniquely suited to trials riding (being exceptionally light and strong 
and featuring the patented ‘RingDrive’ design which has an almost infinite number of 
pickup points, compared to Shimano’s 17 per revolution).            
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 Very fast pickup is particularly desirable in trials as the rider is often stopping and starting, making 
quarter revolution ‘kicks’ of power.  With slow pickup a large part of this subtle movement is effectively 
lost before the drive is transmitted to the rear wheel.    
95
 Of which there was surprisingly little.  If anything the American company seemed initially reluctant to 
service the UK market, and had major distribution problems.  
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Historical geographer Glen Norcliffe (2001) concludes, from an examination of Canadian 
patents from 1868 to 1900 which document many of the changes and innovations in 
bicycle technology: ‘The evolution of the bicycle was not simply a technical progression, 
but also an act of social construction embedded in local culture.’ (2001: 87).  As we have 
seen, ‘technical progression’ can only refer to a context: a type of riding, places of riding, 
size and style of rider etc. Long forum threads detailing potential designs for bicycle 
components, tests of prototypes, and home made modifications abound.  Manufacturers 
are certainly not deaf to these internet forums.  The well known Leeson trials frames, for 
example, are produced to individual riders’ geometric specifications.         
 
Becoming a trials rider then, is very often also something of a folk apprenticeship in 
engineering.  There was and still is great interest in prototyping and testing new designs: 
frame geometry, brakes, bashguards, makeshift gear changers and chain tensioners - all 
undergo sustained experimentation as riders tried to match the mechanical properties of 
components to their riding styles.  In competition riding this was done under the 
regulations set down by competition organizers, and within the ‘mod’ and ‘stock’ 
categories.  For example, rules stated that the bike must have at least five working gears, 
which led some riders to produce home-brew shifters that were small, unobtrusive (often 
being mounted on the chain stay) and light but could only be operated with some 
difficulty or from a position off the bike.  As the trials rider rarely uses more than a single 
gear many street riders did away with multiple gears all together.  Initially they made up 
single sprocket cassettes by dismantling spare or old cassettes and salvaging the small 
spacer rings these contained, using these to replace all the cogs aside from one.  
Manufacturers responded by producing now popular ‘all in one, go single speed’ kits 
(such as those offered by DMR and Onza brands).  These effectively do the same thing 
but addressed the problems of the single sprocket digging into the freehub body by 
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 Many ‘everyday’, taken for granted engineering terms, such as this, are in fact gendered and sexualised 
terms.  For more on the way that gendered language travels across scales, and permeates technology see 
chapter two of Cresswell, T. (2006) On the Move: The Politics of moving in the Modern West. New York: 














Figure 21: A typical single speed conversion.  A short cage road mech acts as a tensioning device.  It 
has been locked in gear with a cut down spoke and the cages have been spaced out to accommodate a 
wider, stronger chain.  
 
Individual riders, then, are certainly not opposed to modifying their bikes – and such 
modifications often speak volumes about the way riders approach obstacles.  Reducing 
weight becomes something of an obsession for some.  So called ‘gram counters’
97
 
commonly drill, grind and machine away what they consider excess material.  
Everywhere, from the inside of rims to brake boosters, bashguards and even the frame 
itself is subject to a critical ‘weight saving evaluation’.  Here riders chart a fine line 
between structural integrity and weight saving: ultimately an embodied and emotional 
judgment (which encompasses technical knowledge) about how the types of riding that 
will be done and the risks involved.  An interesting dialogue between embodiment, 
mechanics and material science ensues, as riders meld such emotive reasoning with the 
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 See for example, the exhaustive list of component weights compiled by many riders, who do not have 
complete confidence in manufacturer’s spec sheets.  http://www.trials-
forum.co.uk/forum/index.php?showtopic=9809 
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scientific ‘facts’ about relative tensile strengths, dynamic force modelling and so on. 
Here, statistics and quantified data is imbued with an emotive sensuous quality.    
    
 
 
Figure 22: Choosing the perfect trials gear ratio.  First figure along x-axis is represents the number 
of teeth on the chainring, the second is the number on the sprocket.  E.g.  22, 18 a common choice, 
would consist of a 22tooth chainring and 18tooth sprocket.      
 
 
The many riders that convert from multiple gears to single-speed often refer to tables 
(Figure 22) as they try different cogs, and relate numbers to changing experiences of 
place.  Single-speed might refer to having only one gear on the bike at any given instant, 
but it is not uncommon for a rider to dismantle and reassemble different combinations of 
gears as they progress in trials.  In such instances not only does the rider act as bicycle 
mechanic, but through the tool of the bike they also contribute to the engineering of 
varying trials spaces.  Here the world is indeed being added to as we produce new ways 
of being with place.  Bikes have intent built in.  They are designed and redesigned, with 
specific agendas such that they become, for riders, instantly affective.   
 
A machine in working order functions fatally in one way.  Our consciousness calls 
this the right way. Take out a valve, throw a wheel out of gear or bend a pivot, and it 
becomes a different machine, functioning just as fatally in another way which we call 
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the wrong way. But the machine itself knows nothing of wrong or right: matter has no 
ideals to pursue.  A locomotive will carry its train through an open drawbridge as 
cheerfully as to any other destination. (James 1879: 16).  
 
But it is useful to recognise that ideas can be built into objects so that they do behave in 
certain ways.  A train, for example, is built with a track, and more importantly with the 
idea that the train will go where we want it to because we lay the track in a certain way.  
The train does a specific set of things, because it has been constructed in a very specific 
way, so that it has affective capacity.  Affect can be engineered through our fated ability 
to interact with matter (Kraftl and Adey 2008).    
 
James’s example is artificial because it is not easily within our capabilities to create such 
distance between ourselves and technologies, or some technologies from other 
technologies.  If such a manoeuvre were possible, one might argue that in those instances 
technologies would cease to be technologies altogether.  Instead, the bike as a tool is 
customised in such a way that much of its purpose is also designed in – it will not be lost 
unless the knowledge of trials riding is also lost.  ‘Once the creation of work is regarded 
from an embodied or ethical perspective it is impossible to overlook its social and 
political implications’ (Hansen and Kozel 2007: 208-9).  The standards and expectations 
of the trials bike, although indefinite, are enacted only by the material presence of the 
bike: the bike not as individual or atomisable by itself, but instead as a confluence of 
possibilities and material presences (cf. Teal 2008). 
 
In trials, the sedimentation of practice becomes manifest in the object itself as it is 
selectively mutated to fit a particular body, with a preference primarily for riding style, 
but also intermingled with this is a ‘trials aesthetics’.  Components, machined from 
aluminium can be finished various ways: anodised in certain colours, shot-peened, laser 
etched, etc.  And while each of these has distinct physical and mechanical properties, 







Figure 23: Echo Control 09 trials bike, red anodised rims, leavers, brake booster and mounts, bashguard, bars, 
leavers and headset.  Image credit: Echo Bikes. 
 
 
Getting Attached  
 
I saw Brian again today.  He is still driving round with his new Pace trials frame in 
the boot of his car - it has been over a month now and he has been off camping and all 
sorts with it.  Apparently he likes to have it close at hand to look at, talk about and 
show people… Although curiously funny - that he can’t stop thinking about it and 
how he is going to build it up (he is waiting for a set of forks he has ordered) - I do 
understand.  It is a beautiful frame, seemingly a perfect fit for purpose.  It certainly is 




“When I’m in school sat in lesson bored out of my head I always think about how I 
could arrange the tables so they would be good to ride. Try it!  I’ve thought of some 
mint lines out of school tables!”  (Planet-x-rider, 22/12/06, trials-forum.com) 
 
A number of box section 7000 series anodised aluminium tubes, externally double-butted 
and welded together in something of an irregular diamond shape: an item ascribed with 
truly aesthetic qualities, by some.  Brian’s Pace RC250t trials bike frame, lovingly kept 
near at all times, in the boot of an old car whose value is less than half that of its resident 
bike parts.  What can we say about a technology which inspires such emotive 
interactions?  The Pace, which was one of the first of a new breed of dedicated trials 
frames, will extend Brian’s possibilities; it will help him see new ‘mint lines’ in places 
old and new. Or so we believe… 
 
Out of the infinite chaos of movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer 
world consists, each sense-organ picks out those which fall within certain limits of 
velocity.  To these it responds, but ignores the rest as completely as if they did not 
exist….  Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of 
distinction or emphasis, our senses make for us, by attending to this motion and 
ignoring that, a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, in a word, 
of picturesque light and shade. (James 1879: 9). 
 
James’ insight is important for geography because it bids us attend to the way the 
material world, space, objects, and even time, is to some extent learned; our ‘facts’ about 
it change with the development of our senses (and indeed the technological augmentation 
of those same senses).  Riding trials, causes the body to produce new kinds of perception, 
a bicycle rack can become treacherously thin, and given definition enough to be picked 
out from across a car park.  The senses here are working together as the body looks to 



































































When I see a finely finished shot-peened
98
 set of handlebars then, it is not just with visual 
acuity that I consider them beautiful, but it is with my experiences of riding; of side-
hopping up a wall and being shocked, grazed and bemused by suddenly fractured and 
yielding handlebars; by the gentle rising curve from the stem clamp to the grips that 
contains none of the weakening that can occur with steeply bent riser bars; by the 
proportion I have, handlebar by handlebar, decided would make a bar that you can scoop 
up forward in a bunnyhop; and I consider them beautiful in the way they angle my wrists 
so that on pulls and impacts alike the bones are in neutral alignment.  In other words they 
feel good based on both my relatively abstract knowledge of metallurgical principles, but 
also the way they have melded with the intense and visceral contact I have had with 
places.      
 
“So many things look different.  Now that I’ve been riding a year I go back to places 
that I haven’t been to for a while and suddenly go “wah!” look at the gap/drop or 
whatever how come I haven’t seen that before.  Ever since starting biking I’ve 
thought it would be very cool to hop on these wooden post things I have outside my 
house.  I’d thought it'll never happen, but now I’m so close.”  (Seb, trials-forum 
28/9/03) 
 
Technology does not just contribute to the ‘expressive and emotional texture of peoples 
lives’ (Hansen and Kozel 2007: 209), rather lives are fundamentally constituted with 
technology, and to such a degree that the aesthetic sensibilities and creative endeavours 
which individual bodies routinely take credit for are exceptionally fluid.  But while we 
may be constituted together, we are not determined by technology.  As discussed in the 
previous section while we are in process with them, we also have an unrivalled ability to 
re-invent, even seemingly static and immutable objects in everyday life.  A bike stem
99
, 
for example, is a particularly solid object.  Upon leaving the machine shop, in this case 
finished with paint, one would think such a specialised item has relatively little room for 
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 Shot-peening is a metal conditioning process that compresses the surface of the material, making it less 
susceptible to fatigue cracking and surface scratches.  It is done by firing many tiny balls at the material at 
high speed – this creates a uniquely textured surface finish.   
99
 The stem is the component that attaches the handlebars to the fork’s steerer tube (see Figure 19: Anatomy 
of a trials bike, page 186).       
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re-interpretation (if being used on a bike at least).  The individual rider however is free to 
experiment with the height at which it is mounted (by using spaces on the steerer tube).  
Another option, one that would not have occurred to many, is to flip the stem upside-
down.                       
 
“It looks semi ridiculous, but it just seems to work, the sidehops are better than with 
all the other stems I have been using.  The mini golf course gap always seems like the 
test, and that just seemed bizarrely easy today, with the Thomson stem and the other 
one it was fifty-fifty whether I would make it.”   (Conversation with Richard while 
riding – recorded in bike trials diary 23/8/2007).  
 
 




Richard’s selection of bike stem makes a big difference to the overall geometry of a bike 
and hence the riding position.  A long stem extends the ‘front end’, and therefore the 
distance between the handlebars and the pedals.  This extension can have the effect of 
giving the rider more ‘leverage’ over the bike (often making it feel more controllable 
when hopping on the back wheel), but at the same time it stretches the rider’s body out 
making the front harder to pull up in the first place.   
 
When Richard turns his new bright yellow stem upside-down and rides, his contact with 
the bike does not just mediate place but co-produces it.  His understandings of distances 
‘the mini-golf course gap’ is made with rather than through the bike.  And yet, just as 
with more so-called ‘pure’ body practices (yoga for example), this making can be 
reflected upon and re-interpreted.  Choices about the bike reflect a whole host of 
considerations, ranging from embodied practice, to social groups and product 
representations.  But this is not all: the inventiveness of trials riding, as an activity that 
itself strives towards re-making and pushing open limits of possibility, it is always being 






Gap jump up from the flat bench seat to the rim of a large circular flower pot (devoid 
of flowers).  The gap to the opposite rim is about 6ft, for me, a reasonable gap 
considering it is from a narrow take off to a narrow landing.  I let the front wheel 
drop, lower my weight, down and back, preload the pedals ready, and with nearly all 
my strength pedal kick and jump up and forward.   
I hear as well as feel (vibrating up through my foot, ankle and leg) the fracture – 
sounding like a gunshot the chain shears under the explosive load, attracting the 
attention of everyone in the vicinity.  While this has happened few enough times to be 
shocking, it has occurred enough that my body has a stock of pre-prepared 
movements, or attempts at movements which are now underway: bike contact is 
thankfully lost – pushed aside, my vision becomes inadequate to chart my spinning 
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trajectory.  Fully committed, and now betrayed, my body movements take on a new 
twist as I move head-first over the opposite edge of the plant pot toward the stone 
slabs below.  As I have done so many hundreds of times in Judo and then later in 
Aikido, I meet the ground with soft muscles and roll across my back to ‘break the 
fall’... (Bike trials diary, 19/7/07).                                          
 
Can consciousness increase its efficiency by loading its dice? (James 1879: 6) 
 
 
While the title of this section emphasizes separation, I want to consider how thoroughly 
‘in contact’ trials riders necessarily are.  Paradoxically a fall or separation is an effective 
way to demonstrate this.  A bike might be violently discarded, as in the example above 
(although this is rare), but it continues to participate in determining the actions of the 
rider.  The physicality of the space and its relation to the body becomes of paramount 
interest.  As always, this relation is not split off in time, as a distinct ‘event’, but a 
shifting of sustained contact.  In the most immediate sense the bike colludes with the 
flower pot, with the concrete, etc, but more than this the bike, for the experienced trials 
rider, has become so enmeshed in their embodied movements that even falling off 
becomes a technique.  
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Figure 26: Flowerpot - chain failure – separation.   
 
Falling off is an inevitable part of learning bike trials, and continues to happen regularly 
even to experienced riders.  In continuing trials, a rider must accept that bike failure is an 
ever present possibility, and further that unfamiliar movements require trying.  By trying 
out technology, inventing, and re-inventing movements, riders do things with bikes that 
manufacturers and designers simply do not anticipate.  Bike components do fail, 
sometimes with freighting and spectacular results.  Even those particularly harsh 
movements (such as drop offs) that producers do consider are provisioned only as a 
compromise to the weight and manoeuvrability of the bike.  As a particularly mobile 
technology which interacts in a large range of complex environments and human 
behaviour, that trials bike will always have failures (cf. Perrow 1984).  Moreover, 
because the trials rider is a tightly coupled ‘system’, when things start to go wrong, they 
often do so very quickly, and very often without the ability of anyone to isolate and fix 
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the particular component part which has failed (Perrow 1984)
100
.  In the case of 
experimental movements the rider may simply not know what failing feels like until it is 
too late to react.  
 
 
Figure 27: Broken disk mount, a serious but not uncommon trials related 
failure.  This design attempts to cope with this by using a replaceable mount, 
designed to break in preference to the bike frame itself. 
 
Of course, there are failures which the rider has become most accustomed to, and can 
often predictably manage.  Paramount amongst these is the failure of riders themselves; 
when they exert too much or too little force in a certain direction, neglect to brake at the 
exact time, or misjudge a distance.  Many of these failures happen so routinely in the 
course of learning that that they are ‘coped with’ without undue concern.  Similarly, the 
bike can develop common faults, which can be identified with easy familiarity.  Most 
faults manifest between bike and rider.  A pinch puncture
101
, for example, is an event in 
which it is not clear where the fault originated – from an old or otherwise defective inner 
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 Perrow (1984), refers to these ‘inevitable accidents’ as ‘normal accidents’.  For him, normal accidents 
occur because of complex systems interacting in incomprehensible ways and the tight coupling of 
components in a system, which can compound a small failure.   
101
 This kind of puncture is usually caused by heavy landings in which the inner tube is crushed between 
the tyre and the rim.  This leaves two symmetrical slits in the tube, because of this characteristic pinch 
punctures are also referred to as ‘snakebite flats’.   
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tube, from an inappropriate air pressure, from the rider landing too heavily, or from the 
sharp edge upon which the tyre landed.  At this intersection, the trials rider navigates a 
path, pragmatically learning which kinds of vulnerability play toward their shifting goals.       
      
“The first time I tried a ‘forward-back-hop’ I didn’t have the coordination to put the 
back brake on after jumping forward, the back wheel slipped straight out from under 
me, and I ended up flat on my back, completely winded.  I didn’t try it again for a few 
days, but when I did I made sure the brake was on. After overcoming that, it just 
became this great thing, a great move.  And that none of my friends could do it, made 




Figure 28: Pinch puncture, received from the edge of the 
wall upon which Mark now sits, fixing a common complaint 
amongst trials riders 
 
As with parkour, in ‘trying’ in trials we inexorably ‘do’ the unknown and the as yet 
unfelt.  Such a kinaesthetic mystery is complicated in bike trials by the degree to which 
bike components, and configurations play an active role in the unfolding movements.  
The body is joined, which makes it particularly open and susceptible to surprise.  It may 
be a rider’s intention to ‘forget’ this complication
102
, through both mental exercises, and 
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 The thought that a component could fail at any point is a certainly one that can bring on paralyzing bouts 
of fear – though again, as with parkour, this is a fear that is not simplistically unwelcome.  Rather it is a 
hugely complex part of the engagement with place.    
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becoming sufficiently familiar with the bike as to know how it will react in any given 
system it is a threat of an intention – never to be completed.                                   
 
Vulnerability cannot be willed, chosen, cultivated, or honed and neither, therefore, 
does it necessarily or even primarily denote a weakness or a misfortune; rather, it 
describes the inherent and continuous susceptibility of corporeal life to the unchosen 
and the unforeseen – its inherent openness to what exceeds its abilities to contain and 
absorb.  (Harrison 2008: 427).   
 
While Harrison’s ‘vulnerability’ appears to be an innate function of living embodiment, 
there is an element of will and choice to the specificities of embodied vulnerability.  This 
is precisely because exactly what embodiment is is not static or immutable. As the hybrid 
becomes more or less accepted in the social sciences (Haraway 1991), it remains a task of 
researchers to consider the different ways in which people and objects, animals and 
elements, are all involved in enacting this hybridity.  As a rider ‘tests’ space it is very 
often with the bike that their vulnerability is expressed. 
 
The integration of bike trials to the body is a good indicator of the way corporeal 
vulnerability can and does change.  The bike leaves a permanent ‘imprint’ on the body 
that adds ‘roll’, ‘bounce’ and balance to the experience of place.  Even when trials riders’ 
body’s ‘forget’ the bike, and walk, to varying degrees, objects and place continue to be 
encountered in a ‘trials way’.   
 
The bread and butter moves, jumping off the back or side of the bike, keeping the 
bike safe with the handlebars controlled, happens so often I have stopped thinking of 
it as falling off (though it can be quite dramatic from high stuff).  I feel like it has 
become part of my trials, like any other set of techniques. Still, it evokes 
disappointment as it always marks a failed attempt, but it is a world away from a real 
stack.
103
 (Bike trials diary 13/8/03).  
 
Becoming separated from the bike in a failed attempt can charge places with affectivity.  
Specifics of experiences of falling repeat through time-space: they cannot be contained, 
however much we may wish it of them.  As in parkour moments of failure persist, and in 
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 “Stack” is a term often used to describe a fall or crash.    
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bike trials they more or less permanently add the bike to place, the bike becomes an 
indelible mark in the body’s perceptions of texture, shape, and architecture.  Regardless 
of physical presences, when I experience places the bike is metaphorically speaking, with 
me – I am forever falling off. 
 
 
Figure 29: Obstaclised dreamscape?  Brian and the Pace practicing on Aberystwyth rocks.  
 
After a conversation while out riding today (sheltering under the bridge during a rain 
storm), it turns out that all of us, Brian, Martin, Dave and I, all dream about riding.  It 
seems we have new twists on movements, Brian said that a few times he has dreamt 
he was backhopping along Aber rocks “for ages, all the way and it felt totally 
effortless”. […] For my part, I keep dreaming that I am manualing
104
 and that I can 
just keep going (something I normally have trouble with), And when I wake I think 
“great! Now I can manual”, but I still have trouble with the move. (Bike trials diary 
25/4/04).             
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Riding between artist and engineer    
 
I like it [bike trials] because of the feeling you get when you land a sweet line that 
you’ve been trying for ages and when people say "that’s good". (Chocolatefoot, 
19/12/05, trials-forum.com). 
 
Vulnerability, as I have considered it above, is an inevitable encounter with the world, 
but one full of specificity.  Getting on a trials bike, or watching someone perform cutting 
edge trials, can be like casting a spell on the landscape.  The practice of ‘trying’ and 
‘being with’ afford different qualities of contact, a constituent part of which is our 
vulnerability toward the world.  While embodiment does equate with an inherent 
condition of susceptibility, the way we make contact with places and technology radically 
changes the kinds of vulnerability we enact.  Whether this falabalism manifests through 
our changing perceptions of place, an unwelcome uneasiness at being watched, a wonder 
at certain engineering processes and outcomes, a fascination with design and bike related 
aesthetics, or even waking dreams of hopping a bike between mountain tops, it is our 
embodied gift of vulnerability that make possible these kinds of contact.   
 
Anthony Giddens, in developing his structuration theory, stressed the ‘essentially 
transformative character of all human action, even in its most routinized forms.’ 
(1984:117).  As Giddens asserts, these routines are made, or done, over time – they are 
lived.  However, saying this is only helpful as part of a theory which also considers the 
variance between the likelihood of transformative action, and the type of action.  
Embodied routines, which are acted out with the materiality of places, have a structuring 
power because they are, more often than not, repeated without thought or critique.  The 
differences between ways of being-with-place are important – contact, as I have 
conceived it here, can be more transformative, because it is less reliant on any 
unchanging property of humanity, but instead on our ability to re-invent ourselves with. 
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Contact, a quality which can easily be in short supply in a highly routineized life, might 
still be cultivated.   It is open to embodied utopic practices like bike trials, capoeira and 
parkour, which are always playfully questing.  With no fixed or rigid goal, but a plethora 
of evolving projects, riders are a strongly mobile phenomenon that is engaged in co-
designing places by trying things out.  Athletes of all sorts might be ‘virtuosos of 
corporeal alteration, focusing on the body as a functional tool and as the medium of 
pragmatic self-fashioning’ (Downey 2007: 221), but if so, as this chapter has shown, it is 
a hybridised re-invention, that is more experiment than completion of per-formed idea(l), 
more ‘trying for ages’ than doing a ‘sweet line’, and often more gifted than ‘self-made’.  
The last point might seem antithetical to my argument, but not if we consider that 
whatever effort we make, or work we do on our body, is not ours alone.          
 
Trials riders can simultaneously be engineers, designers and movement artists because 
none of these are easily separable.  For some, a particular ‘engineering arrogance’, in 
which we take full responsibility for the way we craft the world, may persist, but for 
many riders the message from doing trials, from experiencing particular types of contact, 
has been to abide the unexpected.  Mastery of space is sought: ‘try try try do’, but every 
‘doing’ is a complex contact that is followed by, or rather part of, more trying.  However 
thoroughly we learn (and modify) the beauty of a technology, a movement or a place, 
chance is never quite replaced by choice.  Nowhere near in fact: the contact that we feel 
and experience as direct, that is, the feedback from the surfaces of rocks, felt through bars 
and grips, is very adept at linking us into complex networks, often ones we can neither 
see, or feel in such a direct way.  These networks – networks of on-line media, 
engineering experimentation, photography, bicycle design, movement innovation – are 
thankfully so vast and so complex that all we are ever engineering, no matter how 
wilfully, are surprise gifts for ourselves and others.
 215 





There is noise, exuberance, song and music all about.  Squatting down at the head of 
the circle I face an athletic looking woman of 28 or so years.  Beside me the drum is 
beating, excitedly moving off the rhythm which is carried by the rest of the 
instrumentalists.  I’m not entirely sure of the significance of this and neither have I 
the time or composure to consider it.  Though it does flit through my mind that the 
drumming is reverberating into me amplifying a pounding heart and a rising ‘fight or 
flight’ feeling.  The two people playing in the ring - already breathing heavily - seem 
to respond to the drum call with renewed vigour, exchanging kicks, moving around 
with acrobatics interspersed with ducking and dodging. Their movement is kept 
within a circular space delineated by other capoeiristas, themselves all singing, 
clapping and watching the action.  One of the two players stops, puts out his hand, 
which the other shakes, they embrace and move back to the circumference of the 
circle. Fearful. Excited. I reach out and take the hand offered me. The woman 
opposite squeezes it with a gentleness and a meaningful smile that reassures me 
somewhat. I attempt a smile that no doubt reveals something of my nervousness. 
Keeping eye contact I mirror her movements by doing one slow cartwheel into the 
centre of the circle.  (Capoeira Diary 19/7/07, that evening’s experiences of entering 
the roda
105
)    
 
                                                 
105
 Roda is the term used to refer to both the game of capoeira itself, and the physical formation of players 
into a circle which has the instruments and axé [good energy] to provide a space for capoeira play. 
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Preconceptions: pre-capoeira class anxiety 
 
In the previous two chapters we have seen how the body makes contact with the world in 
which it extends itself.  Through parkour practice I have tried to argue that the emotion of 
fear is part of this process and not necessarily a negative one.  Many of those fearful 
engagements also applied to the discussion of bike trials, in which technology and the 
body is playfully developed by riders as a method of contact augmentation.  In this 
chapter, which will consider the practice of capoeira, I further expand the discussion of 
contact by considering how the body might play towards contact in particularly close 
proximity to and with another, or indeed, many other bodies.           
  
Here capoeira is used to play an argument that is fundamentally about listening to place 
with more than the ear, but with a whole range of learned mobile and embodied 
techniques.  Evasion followed by attack, escape followed by entrapment, invitation 
followed by trickery, these are characteristic engagements in the game of capoeira.  Yet I 
consider a more-than-representational politics of these encounters, which despite the ever 
present deception, begins to angle towards a type of trust formed through the practice of 
contact. 
 
Capoeira, a dance, a martial art, and a game, has a long and contested history that can be 
traced back to the forced movement of African slaves to colonial work colonies in Brazil 
(Almeida 1986, Fryer 2000, Taylor 2005).  As both a ‘traditional’ and a contemporary 
Afro-Brazilian cultural practice it has become popular across the world.  The dance of 
capoeira originated, so the story goes, as a way for African slaves imported to Brazil to 
disguise the practice of fighting techniques which could be employed in their struggle for 
liberation.  Whether this is true or not has been a subject of some debate (see Lewis 1992, 
Taylor 2005).  Throughout its historic evolution it has been bound up in struggles over 
the freedom to move the human body in certain ways.  From the enforced slavery in 
sugar plantations, to the Brazilian state ban of capoeira, which lasted from the 1890s to 
the 1930s, to the practice itself, capoeira is fundamentally concerned with claiming, 
sharing and giving space by moving the body in certain ways.   
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Despite being able to discern certain trends, pinning down exactly what types of 
movements and behaviours are ‘correct’ in the practice capoeira is a near impossible 
task.  Indeed, its ambiguous mix of dance, fight, play, music and performance, lend it the 
ability to evade our best efforts to neatly define it or place it into well understood 
categories (Lewis 1995). There are a number of good scholarly accounts of capoeira’s 
historic development (see for example, Lewis 1992, Taylor 2005, 2007), but this chapter 
plays off my own capoeira experiences and interactions, in Britain, beginning in July 
2007, and leading up to the time of writing.  As with bike trials and parkour, contact in 
capoeira can cultivate certain emotive attitudes and states of embodiment-with.  The main 
function of this chapter is to add to, and consider what, a theory of contact might gain 
from an explicitly interpersonal endeavour – one in which the body’s development with 
another body, rather than its ‘as is’ quality becomes primary.  It explores the possible 
interactions between people while they are playing capoeira together and considers how 
contact develops through this playful activity.  
 
Play, as I have begun to outline in previous chapters, is a tricky process – one which does 
not rest, and like capoeira, it delights in its ability to defy attempts to define it with 
language.  In the game of capoeira, uncertainty abounds.  Capoeira has rules, though 
they generally remain unwritten (but see Figure 30, page 220), and are rarely spoken.  All 
appear to be subject to contextual revision (see Lewis 1992 for a discussion of the 
patterning of rules in capoeira).  In other words, anything goes, except that it doesn’t.  
This creates a particularly difficult situation for the newcomer to capoeira who as well as 
having to attempt to learn a whole new set of embodied movement styles, is also required 
to quickly work out an approximation of a shifting rulebook.  As I have been arguing, 
certain habits can detract from the quality of contact we have: in capoeira certain habits 
can be downright dangerous in that they quickly become noticeable facets of a person’s 
game and are exploited by other players.  As we shall see, one cannot easily remain static 
and prosper in capoeira.  
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How then could such a setting, so filled with deception, trickery and the possibility of 
violence be a place which can facilitate a quality of contact that might enable trust?  It 
might at first appearances, or even after some time practicing capoeira, seem strange that 
the practice be thought about in terms of friendship or trust.  This is, after all, a practice 
that is historically built around conflict and fighting.  It involves two people, who on the 
face of it, are trying to trick, outdo, or even hit their ‘opponent’.  At the legendary 
capoeirista Bimba’s
106
 academy in Brazil, the last of his nine written rules declares “It is 
better to get beat up in the roda than on the streets.”  And while capoeira, as practiced in 
Europe and the USA, certainly discourages overt and excessive violence during the roda 
(Taylor 2007) it is not unheard of for a game with many unwritten and flexible ‘rules’ to 
escalate into all out fighting. 
 
Working with the productivity of capoeira’s paradoxical nature, we might explore the 
ways in which places can be deliberately engineered to facilitate playful conversations of 
movement.  Here affect is not only systematically adjusted (Kraftl and Adey 2008) but is 
also given over to be spun, flipped, absorbed, worked around, sent back and forth 
between bodies, and in short, played with.  The result, I argue, can be remarkably 
powerful.  It can, through continued exploration of moving contact with other 
capoeiristas and changes in body movements and capacities, facilitate the creation of a 
distinct type of movement for the other.  Practice halls can become places of trust for 
participants: metaphorical laboratories for human interaction which can foster long 
lasting relationships.  In such places, movements and people can acquire an inseparability 
which facilitates positive kinds of contact. 
 
It is, I argue, the very slipperiness of play that makes possible the implicit trust that can 
develop between players.  In part it is the ever present risk of being hit while playing 
capoeira, or the ambiguous freedom to hit others, which enables and allows the 
possibility of trust.  Capoeira play having no formal judges or winners (except in the rare 
case of organized competitions), allows the participant to choose their own goals.  
                                                 
106
 Mestre Bimba is probably the most famous capoeirista, accredited for forming the regional style – a 
style often, but not always associated with many vigorous fast paced kicks and aerial acrobatics. 
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Alternatively motivations can come moment to moment from a range of embodied 
engagements that often occur with others. This is one of the elements that makes 
capoeira, as it is practiced in many places, close to becoming the play that Thrift (1997) 
and others have valorised for its ability to create new moments and “ways of being” less 
bound by past ideas about places.  
 
The structure of this chapter is born from the format of a typical capoeira session.  The 
‘warm-up’ is followed by a period in which capoeira techniques are ‘taught’. This is 
usually in a copy-cat fashion – the instructor demonstrating and explaining, the students 
attempting to replicate the movements.  Here the body attempts to learn the ‘vocabulary’ 
of capoeira, putting techniques together piecemeal but not normally learning how to 
implement them in a game or ‘conversation’.  Thus, this section will briefly dwell on the 
way in which ‘technique’ is deliberately passed on and learnt. 
 
Subsequent to this, there is normally a break in the formal class, a ‘play-time’. Instruction 
stops, and play begins.  In these times people stretch, rest and watch, but mostly they play 
with other members of the class.  This section will look to the contact that comes from 
learning to playfully move with another, deploying body-knowledge in creative 
interaction.  
 
In the next section, ‘partner work’, we are shown and then practice sequences of 
movements that are done in relation to a training partner.  Here I briefly discuss how 
contact is modified through scripting and practice.  At the last there is a roda (the 
arrangement of instruments and people, and the playing of the game).  In the roda, I 
consider the way in which contact can help to develop a place of trust.  To begin with 




1. Quit smoking. 
2. Stop drinking; alcohol is bad for your metabolism. 
3. Do not show off your progression; instead use them as a surprise tool. 
4. Avoid conversation during training, instead observe and learn from watching. 
5. Always practice the ginga.  
6. Practice daily the basic fundamentals. 
7. Do not be afraid to come close to your opponent – the closer that you get, the 
more you will learn. 
8. Keep your body relaxed. 
9.   It is better to get beat up in the roda than on the streets. 








The warm up was comforting in that some of the stretches were familiar to me.  The 
ever present music though, reminded me just how different things were.  The warm 
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up involved skipping while swinging the arms dramatically, walking around on all 
fours, and other movements that I felt quite foolish doing.  (Capoeira diary 12/7/07)  
 
In general, a warm up serves to loosen, condition, and prepare the body for strenuous 
action. As with most martial or performance arts, the warm up exercises in capoeira tend 
to be designed to do more than get blood pumping to the muscles.  The movements are 
done to capoeira music, and serve to build a familiarity with styles of moving.  Being 
comfortable upside-down and shifting bodyweight between feet, hands, and head with 
ease are all movement styles developed in a typical capoeira warm up.  The movements, 
games, and stretches are mostly things designed to train-up the body toward doing 
capoeira.  It cannot therefore always be easily separated from other parts of a session. 
   
This chapter’s ‘warm-up section’ is no different.  Thus, by way of preparing for the rest 
of my discussion, I will briefly consider the need for thinking about that which has 
traditionally been excluded from academia, but which is developed in any good capoeira 
warm up: an awareness of embodied knowledge, physicality, flexibility, musicality and 
play.  
 
I begin then, with Merleau-Ponty, and his significant contribution to philosophy and the 
social sciences: the incorporation of the body. ‘In the field of Western philosophy’, writes 
Richard Shusterman, “Maurice Merleau-Ponty is something like a patron saint of the 
body.” (2005: 151).  Indeed, the mark of Merleau-Ponty’s theories of embodied 
phenomenology, can be seen across much geographic work that stresses embodiment and 
pre-cognitive practice (e.g. Dewsbury 2000, Obrador-Pons 2003, Seamon 1979, 1980, 
Thrift 1997, Wylie 2005).  His specific goals for a phenomenology of embodiment owe a 
huge debt not only to Husserl but to Heidegger (and his notion of ‘dasein’ or ‘being-in-
the-world’) as well (Carman and Hansen 2005).  Husserl proposed a phenomenology that 
might reveal a realm of pure transcendental subjectivity, a domain of ‘ideal essences’.  
Thus, Husserl’s conception of phenomenological reduction was in some senses to escape 
the worldly body.  Drawing on Heidegger, though, Merleau-Ponty (1962) conceived of a 
‘body-subject’ which could direct a person’s behaviour intelligently without cognition.  
The acquisition of ‘habit’, or the ability of the body to ‘cope’ with most situations (which 
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Dreyfus 2005: 145 suggests is better understood as ‘skill’)  is, for Merleau-Ponty, an 
unreflective process. Thus, for him, subjectivity was not primarily located in the mind, 
but rather in the body (1962). 
 
If, as Merleau-Ponty argues, motility or movement is the more ‘primary form of 
consciousness’ (Cresswell 2003: 276), then it is a consciousness routed in the living 
form, the body, rather than in thought. This is immediately attractive to theorists of 
embodied activities including many sports, dance and martial arts which prize quick un-
contemplated movements. Here action can be completely raw, and events can unfold in 
which the intuition of the body reigns supreme and can act with blistering speed. While a 
useful and crucial stepping stone, such a theory does not adequately account for the way 
the body learns these movements, a process which is often highly reflective.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the body has, to some degree, suffered unfairly from a critique 
of human centricism.  In his last work The Visible and the Invisible (1968) he makes a 
radical challenge to subject-centred intentionality. To put his argument bluntly, through 
his concept of ‘the flesh’, Merleau-Ponty suggests that we cannot be considered as 
isolated entities, rather ‘the flesh’ is a matrix or web that extends beyond the body, and it 
is in and through that matrix, which one lives. The flesh is not just what we touch 
‘outside’ the body, but must include our possibilities for touching, and being touched (cf. 
Wylie 2006).  As movement of materials and bodies in the world is ceaselessly throwing 
up new possibilities, so the flesh is always in process, and given the capacity to make 
contact.             
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Figure 31: Warm up stretching.  An Aberystwyth workshop led by Contra-Mestre Parente (of 
Cordao de Ouro Liverpool / Manchester). 28/2/09. 
 
While the notion of playful contact I have been developing here is drawn from the 
practice of bike trials, capoeira and parkour, it is a concept that can be tried with many 
other activities in which spatial perceptions are transformed.  There is a possible critique, 
as Cresswell points out, that much recent ‘more-than-representational’ work tends to 
focus on unusual activities like “political performance art, dance, or graffiti”, in the name 
of ‘everyday practices’ (Merriman, et al. 2008: 195). It would be fair to say that capoeira, 
in Britain at least, is such an unusual activity. Yet it is often those unusual moments - or 
out of the ordinary ‘events’ - that are affective, precisely because they are different; an 
interruption (Harrison 2000). Such events very often force an emotional re-negotiation, 
which has intensity that endures throughout a person’s life.  Similarly, it is in examining 
unusual activities (which can still be everyday practices for the participant) that we are 
often given a chance to affirm a different way of doing things as an alternative to 
critiquing ‘everyday practice’.   
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Indeed, calls for a so called geography of the ‘everyday’ are always dogged by the need 
to recognize the vast differences in peoples daily routines and life paths.  Transformative 
events and practices like capoeira have the potential to stop a regular pattern, to inspire, 
and to be remembered, re-imagined, re-told, and mulled over.  In short, to drastically 
affect the lives of those that experience them. 
 
Me: So what first got you into capoeira? 
Jason: Well I saw this street roda in the centre of town, and I was just mesmerised.  It 
was not like any dance or martial art I had seen before.  It was just really flowy and I 
was captured straight away, it was amazing to watch and I just thought “wow! I want 
to learn that.”  (Capoeira diary 21/8/07).        
 
In this way such activities can break down the persistent divides between the ‘everyday’, 
fantasy and reality (Lewis 1999).  Such events when re-told or represented are one of our 
best means of relating to and evaluating theoretical stances. “Small stories should also be 
treated as entry points to the working out of conceptual ideas in local contexts.” (Lorimer 
2003: 214).  Through stories we can attempt to put ourselves in other’s shoes, and thus 
deploy our imagination and expertise from a new and often productive perspective.      
 
Warming up in capoeira, attempts to prepare the participant for a similar sort of process.  
The instructor ‘tells a story’, through movement, and the students quite literally try them 
out.  It is both a gradual ‘getting to know what it is like to…’, which works cumulatively 
over a long time period as muscles are exercised and stretched, and a more immediate 
‘preparing the body to…’.  The instructor often demonstrates movements in a 
bewilderingly lithe manner.  A lack of flexibility, in particular, can be a major block to 
many capoeira movements – and thus, as far as many capoeiristas are concerned, a 
cramp on a player’s ability to communicate and express themselves during capoeira play.  
 
It is also common for teachers of capoeira to tell stories in a more literal way, recounting 
anecdotes which have lessons about how to train or that contain moral messages.  These 
stories are very often tied to the movements of capoeira.  The movements and postures of 
the hands, for example, relate to stories about slaves wearing manacles while they 
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devised and played capoeira.  As capoeira scholars have noted, the historic accuracy of 
these stories is often more debatable than is implied by mestres (Fryer 2000, Lewis 
1992).  Though important, in some sense this is beside the point, as the stories are almost 
always used to enrich the doing of the movement as practiced in the present. 
 
We may never know the ‘true’ origin of capoeira movements, but it is clear that students 
are encouraged anyway, to re-invent, assume, and develop these stories: to make them 
their own.  Unlike many martial arts, most capoeira teachers encourage players to 
develop their own style.  As soon as the student has the basics of the ginga
107
, for 
example, they are given very little further tuition on the ‘finer points’ of it, as these must 
be developed in accord with a player’s personality and character.  Despite this it is readily 
evident that a student’s movements and style is often influenced most by their teacher - 
and in many instances they can be recognised as belonging to certain schools by their 
style of ginga.  
 
None the less, many of the warm up exercises in capoeira seem designed to facilitate the 
individual’s ability to express themselves through movement.  Running, skipping, 
walking on all fours, or any combinations of such movements are often used as warm up 
exercises.  First these are often done as a group, in rows and ordered, under the direction 
of the teacher, but then often students are told to move how they want and where they 
want within the space.  Coming at capoeira with a martial arts background, as I did, I 
found this quite an unusual exercise, in which I could not help but try my best to do what 
I thought the teacher wanted me to do – quite unproductive given that the idea is for the 
student to release inhibitions and express themselves through a set of quite unfamiliar 
movements.  Over time, though, requests to ‘go where you want’ became expected and 
even relished for the promise they held: of being able to try out new movements, and to 




                                                 
107
 The ginga is the most fundamental movement in capoeira. It is roughly equivalent to the ‘base stance’ 
from which most other movements flow. 
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Beginning to learn basic capoeira movements  
 
 
When we begin the ginga, people often take this to signal the end of the warm-up.  
After more than a month of regular capoeira I would have thought my feet would 
have hardened up by now, but not so.  Yesterday’s spin kick marathon has renewed 
half healed blisters and added a good many more again.  The pain is so pervasive, and 
although my feeling is that my technique has improved a lot it was not evident today.  
As we started with the ginga and went on through some of the basic kicks and 
esquivas [evading movements], I attempted to minimize the screeching pain caused 
by each twist on the ball of my foot, by finding all sorts of ‘ingenious’ ways to do the 
technique wrong.  I tried twisting on the heel (making me stupidly off balance) and 
even jumping round during the armada kick (a point I was corrected on by the 
instructor – I did not try to explain why I had been doing it that way).  (Diary 26 
August 2007) 
  
The calls of Cresswell (see Cresswell 2004, Merriman, et al. 2008) and others to take 
account of the politics of the ‘everyday’ embodied activities (like doing the dishes, 
driving to work, etc.) is both difficult and worthwhile.  My approach is to begin from a 
position in which ‘taken for granted’ embodied competency is an ‘unattainable’ but 
desired end-point (see Chapter 3 on utopic practice).  Here the journey towards embodied 
competency is on-going, intense and open ended.            
 
It is precisely this journey I wish to become involved with, in order to make new kinds of 
contact.  Yet such a move, as I have shown, is risky, it makes us vulnerable.  More than 
this though, it puts us in positions in which we are affecting others in quite direct ways.  
The ethnographer Sarah Delamont gives us an interesting account, while researching 
capoeira, of how she became furious with herself for intervening in a situation, to save a 
capoeira player from embarrassment, and missing a ‘data collecting 
opportunity’(Stephens and Delamont 2006: 335).  This gives us a valuable insight into 
the tradition under which she has been trained, but is also somewhat typical of the 
academic’s disposition towards involvement.  Of course, my activities by her standards 
might be outrageously caught up in other people’s lives. Yet this is deliberately a story 
that does not hide the storyteller, or their affects.   
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Work in geography has tended to undervalue ethnography because it has been seen as too 
involved and therefore impoverished by subjectivity (Herbert 2000).  It seems to me that 
while we have seen a welcome expansion into the realm of what constitutes valuable 
experience worthy of research (see for example Anderson 2004, McCormack 2003, 
Wylie 2005), it is still the case that this type of research tends to involve more time 
reading philosophy at the expense of less lofty empirical events that also shape people’s 
lives (Laurier and Philo 2006).  
 
It would clearly be hard to understand the subtleties of capoeira practice and even the 
point of certain exercises without experiencing them firsthand (Downey 2002).  But does 
it make any difference if I have a good depth of ingrained body-knowledge, when it must 
be presented in a text-based format such as this?  Hopefully a positive answer lays in the 
fact that such practice has a widened and intensified range of affects for the body which 
has learned to move in, what are for most, foreign ways.  Involvement is at least one way 
to avoid what should be the worst of all researcher’s “nightmares, that of having taken a 
long and costly trip only to find out in the end that one has never really [metaphorically] 
left home” (Katz 1999: 17).    
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Figure 32: Practicing basic movements: ordered rows in the Buarth Hall, Aberystwyth.   
      
 
Time in a capoeira session given to practicing distinct movements, or sequences of 
movements, develops the capacity to ‘talk’ to other players.  Here we are schooled on 
basic moves and ways to refine techniques or add expression.  Like the first steps of 
learning a verbal language, learning the individual movements, is like learning some 
basic vocabulary.  During such practice, feelings and muscular contractions and 
contortions are related broadly to intersubjective affects.  A meia-lua de frente (a ‘half 
moon in front’) kick as shown in figure 32, is usually considered a ‘gentle’ kick, 
described by many teachers as an invitation. Depending on the specifics of execution 
(such as speed, power, hand position, angle of the foot, height, etc.) it can be an 
opportunity for one’s partner to enter the game, generally being easy to evade and make a 
reply.  I had it described to me as a movement that says, “Hello, how are you today?”    
 
None of these things are immediately obvious to an observer or even someone who has 
only practiced these movements individually without explanation.  Thus, all the 
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movements we practice in ordered rows, some basic, others outrageously difficult, ‘say 
things’.  But the movements say very different things to different people, and in the 
specific context of capoeira play.  Thus the capoeirista, like the researcher, in learning, 
doing and feeling these movements can begin to better understand the different ways they 
can be performed and the different intimations that can be brought to bear during a game.  
Without deliberative thought, the affective potential of such movements can be assessed, 
or made sense of.  An appropriate movement, learned by rote, ‘on the tip of one’s 
tongue’, can then be done in response to a partner’s movements.                                 
 
As many ethnographers have noted, when I participate in activities it makes me infinitely 
more (though we might say, differently) qualified to talk to other practitioners about their 
experiences and why they do what they do.  In this instance, to communicate and to play 
with capoeiristas, in their language (capoeira movement) it is necessary to learn at least 
the basics of these movements.  During my first three months of capoeira research it was 
only by learning these basics that I was invited to informal weekend practice sessions in 
the park, which often turned into meandering conversations (both linguistic and physical) 
about the philosophies and movements of capoeira play. 
 
Yet the thought of obligation to long hours of practice sits quite uncomfortably with 
many, if not most, busy academics.  Practice based education, or learning by doing, 
moving and engaging the body and all its senses, has for a long time, been devalued, both 
implicitly and explicitly in academia (Abram 1996, Levine 1991, Rodaway 1994, 
Saposnek 1985). 
  
To undertake geographical research into moving, dancing bodies is not only to think 
about these bodies: it also involves thinking with and through the spaces of which 
these bodies are generative.  To make this claim is not to advocate a kind of ‘just-do-
it’ vision of geography in which we all have to get up and dance. (McCormack 2008: 
1831). 
 
Our accounts, questions, arguments, and thoughts should be based on evidence of one 
kind or another, and it seems likely that when talking about the moving body, one crucial 
piece of evidence, and one that can be exponentially expansive (because it offers up new 
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horizons of contact with events and places, people and documentary sources) is likely to 
be trying the activity itself.  This is not always advisable, or even possible.  Even in such 
cases though, we might do well to attempt to ‘walk in the shoes of the other’, even if only 
in our imaginations - to make contact as best we can.  Whether we are evaluating archival 
sources, or an unfolding mobile practice, our knowledge about it is always partial and 
exists as a relationship between the contact unfolding and produced.           
 
About two months into capoeira, during a break in training, another student, Mark, came 
over and made a surprising comment: that he thought the movements I was doing seemed 
to flow much more.  This came as quite an unexpected compliment, not least because 
Mark seemed quite quiet and had hardly said a word to me up until that point.  Further 
conversation revealed that Mark’s biggest struggle since starting capoeira had been in 
becoming less rigid and more fluid in his movements – changing individual moves into 
movement (a challenge, he claims, was made very much harder by his background in 
karate).      
 
As talking with Mark emphasised, learning moves, in capoeira, only makes much sense 
when they can be strung together and used in a ‘conversation’.  For him, other bodily 
habits of movement made this particularly difficult.  Greg Downey’s (2005) first hand 
account of learning capoeira echoes this, and perhaps there is something to Mestre 
Maxwel’s
108
 assertion that British people find that overcoming reserved habits of 
embodiment is one of the biggest difficulties in learning capoeira.  As an embodied 
comportment that does not tend to gesture overly much, or has not been trained in 
physical theatre or some related practice, one of the consistent challenges for a teacher of 
capoeira in Britain, is in encouraging the student to overcome feelings of shame and 
embodied inhibitions (Downey 2005).   
 
   
 
                                                 
108
 Mestre Maxwel teaches capoeira In Cardiff, Bristol and Swansea.  He kindly gave a workshop for us 
here in Aberystwyth, and staying overnight at our house, we had a good amount of time for meandering 




We have a break, which it becomes evident, is not a break at all for most people, as 
instead of resting they begin to play capoeira together in pairs.  Like me, some people 
(mostly beginners) look on sheepishly, not really knowing what to do.  Those playing 
look quite impressive and are weaving in and out of each other, making up mixtures 
of moves, some, but not most, are recognisable from the class so far.  They are pretty 
much all smiling, and start and finish their play by shaking hands or hugging or both.  
They look like they are having a lot of fun – wish I could join in, but wouldn’t know 
where to start… (Capoeira Diary 12/7/07).            
 
Play casts a spell over us; it is ‘enchanting’, ‘captivating’. It is invested with the 
noblest qualities we are capable of perceiving in things; rhythm and harmony 
(Huizinga 1970: 29).  
 
     
How to move with a person? What to try? What to avoid? How to react?  Unanswered 
questions all, for the beginner of capoeira.  Through careful observation and gradual 
experimentation, answers emerge, but through the inevitable and extremely effective 
process of re-contextualisation that capoeira retains, they are continually re-asked.  The 
ambiguity in capoeira play lends itself to keeping these questions flowing, and 
unanswered.  Indeed, often the winner or loser in the game of capoeira is ambiguous and 
undecided even when the game ends (Lewis 2000).  What movement is good movement 
is open for perpetual discussion (both physical and verbal).   
         
Different cultures elevate and prize different types of embodied mobility in different 
kinds of places.  Capoeira, having its own fragmented and multiple history, its own range 
of customs, is no different.  And yet each capoeira club and each capoeirista is unique, 
and capoeira, to some degree celebrates these differences. Many movements, for 
example, while having a roughly similar and recognizable form (so that names can be 
more or less universal), are still distinctly personal movements.  Similarly, impromptu 
improvisations in both music and movement are highly prized.  
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This became evident as I experienced more and more capoeira.  The play of capoeiristas, 
during break-times (which did not normally last more than five to ten minutes) could be 
framed simply as practice for the roda, but it is far more than rehearsal of a familiar 
game.  Rather this was where things were tried, and new phrases of motion, new 
invitations, traps set and questions asked.  Some awkward and unrefined, some polished 
and extensively developed.    
 
 
Figure 33: Pair of capoeiristas’ experimental play.  Clashes, surprising flow and unexpected 
movements can be tried and emerge.  
     
 
In capoeira play, participants are unfinished and remain capable of new intimate 
connections with other entities.  It is this process that we might try to attend to. “It is to 
the uncovering of the constituting intentionality itself that the battery of epoché and 
reductions are directed.” (Zaner 1975: 141, emphasis added).  It is now recognised, if not 
wholly accepted, that such a ‘constituting intentionality’, if such a thing exists, is widely 
dispersed, is not singular or discreetly embodied.  As such, conceptualisations of this 
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intentionality begin to encroach upon theological musings.  A small step, perhaps, from 
what Thrift considers ‘bare life’, the split second “between action and consciousness 
which has increasingly become attended to because of our enhanced ability to capture 
movement.” (2004a: 148).  Of course, the ‘life’ in bare life resists any attempt at capture, 
though new technologies allow us to re-examine and present these realms in significant 
detail.  Such technology can produce (evoke) new fields of perception, and can multiply 
‘the amount of content that is immediately available to feed our imagination’ (Thrift 
2005: 473).  This type of ‘second order’ contact is a troubled form of contact: as it tries 
(with varying degrees of success) to take leaps in time, to contact places now gone.  That 
is not to say it is somehow inherently negative or futile.  Imagination is an 
accommodating host and will entertain new and unique contact, both gone and yet to 
come.  Thrift warns that these technologies encroach into our non-representational 
experiences, with a distinct and fierce biopolitics.  A politics that is very particular in its 
use of these technologies:  
 
Our perceptions are increasingly becoming instrumentalized.  The half-second 
interval is being trained up. The dark side of this process is patently clear.  Our room 
to play and dream is being cut down.  There is more and more habitual look to 
precocity. Our anticipation is being anticipated. (Thrift 2004a: 161).                
 
A pertinent observation for the capoeirista, who trains up their own split-second bodily 
intelligence so that they might themselves anticipate the anticipation of their play partner.  
Players need ‘play practice’ so that they might move play onwards, go bigger and further.  
Such a play is based on the partial inhabitation of the present with the past.  Non-
representable contact with the world must, after all, retain an element of the past so that 
anticipation can function.  Like a capoeira  player though, the nature of contact is such 
that it can sometimes exceed.  Our contact is thus shaped by the ability of embodiment to 
participate in both the virtual (ideas) and physical realms. 
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Figure 34: A typical exchange in capoeira.  1)Top-left: bent over as if carrying a load is symbolic of the work of a 
slave, but also functions as an escaping dodge to the kick Max (black trousers) is beginning.  2) Bottom-left: shows 
the reversal of positions, the deception of the dodge, used to achieve a position of advantage.  3) Right: Position is 
once more reversed, as Max while crouched shows the ability to sweep the supporting leg away.    
 
 
The ambiguous ‘idea’ of ‘capoeira ’, as with ‘parkour’ and ‘bike trials’, is thoroughly 
lived but also mixed up in a history of invention.  Each embodiment of these ‘ideas’, 
which can to some degree be ‘trained’, will play out different affects when combined 
with another body.  In other words, when two capoeiristas play each other they are 
responding to each other, often before deliberative thought and in a unique unfolding.  
One prominent ‘idea’ in this form of embodiment is that of ‘flexible response’.  
Regularly preached in capoeira classes (particularly to beginners) is the principle that 
capoeiristas do not block an opponents attack (as is the practice in karate and many other 
martial arts).  Instead the capoeirista flows with the movement dodging out of the way, 
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no matter how awkward the position it puts one in (cf. Capoeira 2006
109
).  One of the 
tricks therefore, to being able to create beautiful capoeira, is to become comfortable in 
unusual positions, and to be able to move between such positions with unexpected ease.  
In doing so one can turn such positions into unforeseen moments of advantage.   
 
This principle, that we might call the ‘flexible response’, has some further subtleties.  
One is that no part of the body should touch the ground apart from the hands, head and 
feet.  Where rolling would be a convenient escape, for example, capoeiristas, go to pains 
to avoid touching their back or legs to the floor.  As with many ritualistic elements of 
capoeira practice, it was explained to me that this tradition stems from capoeira played 
by the slaves, outside on the dirt floor.  Falling or allowing the clothes to touch the dirt 
left evidence that suggested to the slave-masters that they might have been doing 
something untoward.  Similarly if a capoeirista got dirt on their white slave’s clothes, it 
often signified that their opponent had ‘marked them’ – as a kick supplied with inevitably 
dirty feet would leave conspicuous prints.  
 
Having had variants of this basic story corroborated by several highly experienced 
capoeiristas, and having not found a better explanation for this principle, I would accept 
it, but with some important qualifications.  First, some capoeiristas I spoke to about this 
simply had no good reason for not touching the ground, they did not appeal to the history 
of slaves.  It was still an important stylistic point, though one that they may not have had 
‘reasonably’ articulated verbally, but one that, nonetheless, had become a significant 
factor in evaluation of capoeira performance.  And therefore, secondly, this seems much 
more an embodied aesthetic, which has been implied, and trained-in by learning a host of 
techniques that simply do not involve touching the floor with any part of the body save 
hands, feet and head.                      
 
                                                 
109
 Somewhat confusingly the author’s name is Nastor Capoeira.     
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Figure 35: Unusual postures, surprise affects.  Pair play capoeira in a street roda on Aberystwyth sea front 
prom. 
 
Capoeira play, while involving these historic reasonings, seems to be re-produced and 
invented, usually without the weight of many years of colonial history.  While ritual 
clearly frames a good deal of capoeira practice, it is a ritual that is playfully 
reconstituted, and deployed in the process of doing capoeira.  Two players playing in a 
quick break in a typical capoeira class exemplify this.  Their time and space is relatively 
prescribed, but the movements they perform, attempt, and pass back and forth, are made 
fresh only through the productive capacity lent them by many hours of practice.  They 
become open to each other, one moving away from a spinning kick, moving around and 
behind, but then once more reversing their movement, without deliberation, in response 
to the other player’s response.  
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In a recent philosophy-thick synthesis Benedikt Korf attempts to bring humanism up to 
date by theorising the geographic subject as fundamentally ‘open’.  The human subject, 
in his analysis, is not the single cause for spatial action, and yet they do retain the 
‘presumption that he or she will change some causal pathways’ (2008: 728) with their co-
produced actions.  In performing its ‘openness’, human life is grounded in the 
possibilities for moving with.  As two capoeira players play, twisting around each other, 
desperately avoiding some possibilities and moving to positions of others, there is an 
opportunity for the radical embodiment of this kind of theory.            
 
Identity then becomes a generic construction which involves corporeal activity and 
discursive practices.  This intersubjective sphere derives from interpersonal 
relationships based on reciprocity…. Free will, then, is not only a neural product 
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and/or a psychological construct, but equally a social, intersubjective coproduction. 
(Korf 2008: 728)   
 
As people play capoeira they are not normally in a fight, though they might be throwing 
kicks or sweeps, but they are learning and moving together.  A well timed kick that 
catches a player by surprise is more likely to be pulled short than not.  But this is 
somewhat besides the point, the kick, in general is not intended as an attack, but an 
invitation to move together – a call and response, a question to be answered.  As we shall 
see in the following section, capoeira players, particularly those who train together in the 
same group, have no real desire to hurt each other but wish to create movements together, 
to challenge each other to do what would be impossible to achieve alone.                
 
When we are playing the game and the game is fluid, without “breaks”, without 
primitive roughness resulting in the need to show that one is “better,” without 
mediocrity of unconscious ego trips… then we understand what Mestre Pastinha 
meant when he rote in his manuscripts: “… muitos adimira essa belissima luta 
quando dois camaradas joga sem egoismo, sem vaidade; ě maravilhosima, e 
educada.”  Translation: “Many admire this most beautiful [form of] fight when two 
comradas [pals, friends] play without selfishness, without vanity; it is extremely 
marvelous and educated. (Capoeira 2006: 181).  
 
 
Partner work: rehearsing play? 
 
“I am no singer.  When it is time to sing, I sing, but I am not a singer. When it is time 
to dance, then let’s do some dancing.  But I am not a dancer.  If it is time to fight, 
then OK, I can do some fighting, but I am not a fighter.  As capoeiristas you are none 
of those things, but you can do any of them when the time is right.  A good 
capoeirista is a chameleon.”  (Instructor Varig, of The London Capoeira Centre, 
giving a short talk as part of a workshop in Aberystwyth, capoeira diary 12/5/09).       
 
In this section I consider the way the body learns capoeira play, other than through doing 
the play itself.  A good portion of most capoeira sessions are dedicated to practicing pre-
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arranged sequences of movements, with a partner.  In this process bodies learn to 
accommodate, to move in rhythm, not only with the music, but with each other.  
Movements learned earlier in the sessions are usually incorporated into what are often 
carefully crafted partner sequences.  Here the student repeatedly practices possible sets of 
movements.  The idea being that such scenarios become ingrained enough that the body 
can perform combinations of them as appropriate during actual play.                        
 
All the problems associated with learning a new kind of bodily movement are 
encountered (see chapters 4 and 5).  Converting what one sees the teacher do into 
movement of your own is very often no easy task.  Here practicing with a partner can 
really help as they, if more experienced, can guide.  Their movement forms half of the 
moving puzzle, and can be used as a cue system for movement.  Indeed, this may very 
well be the goal of this kind of training: to give the student experience of moving in 
relation to other movements without deliberative thinking.  In this case it might be 
tempting to think of this kind of training as reducing people’s creativity, and increasing 
habitual movement.  But as in cases where we learn the grammar of a language, learning 
the kinds of situation in which it is possible to string certain kinds of movements (or 
words) together so that they make sense, far from cramping creativity, actually enables 
capoeira play (or literature and poetry).     
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Figure 37: Partner sequence demonstration. Students watch in 
a workshop as senior capoeiristas demonstrate a combination 
of kicks and esquivas (escaping movements).  Buarth Hall, 
Aberystwyth.  
 
During partner exercises, students are repeatedly told of the importance of maintaining 
awareness of their partner.  This usually involves a commitment to always be looking at 
your partner, even when upside-down or in the air.  Indeed looking in a direction other 
than at your partner is often taken as an invitation for them to ‘try something’ – and of 
course, this would often be a trap set for the unwary.  With such an emphasis set on 
vigilant observation and scrutiny of one’s ‘opponent’, it seems counterintuitive that trust 
would develop between players.  But this depends upon what kind of trust we are talking 
about.                     
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Trust is generally thought of as a good thing because it is often a consequence of another 
person’s behaviour that exhibits ‘trustworthiness’.  The flip side of this is that trust can be 
exceptionally undesirable if it is misplaced (Hardin 2006).  It is not usually considered to 
be sensible, for example, to trust someone who would likely knock you over if you took 
your eyes off them (as one can expect to be in capoeira).  But it is because we can expect 
that movement, and because we would be slightly confused and weary should it not 
come, that capoeira can produce trust.  Through a continuing context of uncertainty, this 
is perhaps an unusual kind of trust, one in which we place our own personal safety, one 
that is never contractually fixed.  During play, a ‘real’ blow can come at any time (though 
there would be repercussions for such an action), and capoeiristas are free to spring a trap 
as much as avoid it.           
 
Partner exercises, though, are generally more structured and one can be confident of 
several things.  One is that you will have the opportunity (or be obliged) to experience 
both parts of any sequence.  If a sequence involves one partner throwing the other to the 
floor, for example, both parties will experience being thrown as well and throwing.  This 
reciprocal set-up means that if a capoeirista does not look after their partner when 
training, the favour may be returned, when the roles are switched.  Instead, what tends to 
happen is that by practicing together and helping each other ‘work out’ how the 
movements go, capoeiristas get a feel for how the movements work, but also, develop 
friendships with those that have helped them towards such understandings.                      
 
Throws like vingativa (figure 38) can be practiced with varying speed and vigour.  
Communication through body-language constitutes a continual re-negotiation of how 
practice should proceed.  The person applying the throw can do a lot to minimise risk to 
their partner.  And similarly the person being thrown can cooperate or make it very 
difficult for the person trying to practice the throw.  It is assumed that in standard 
reoccurring contexts we would be good judges of who is trustworthy (Hardin 2006).  But 
in capoeira, particularly for the beginner, the context is not only unfamiliar but changes 
radically with each change of training partner and each new and unfamiliar set of 
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movements.  What they must depend upon is that they will be able to negotiate times and 
speeds, as they practice, with their partner.      
 
 
Figure 38: Takedown practice.  A capoeira ‘throw’ known as vingativa.  Laura is 
about to throw Mathew by twisting her upper torso round, pushing Mathew 
backwards over her leg.    
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Training to twist time 
 
When I am at my most exhausted, or most surprised, or lost in rhythm, the movement 
takes over.  My movement comes from something that could be called an unconscious, 
spontaneous and intelligent ‘body-subject’, but I do not wish to use that term – for the 
origin of the movement must be both inside and outside the body, and both in and outside 
‘present time-space’.  In figure 39 I have attempted to give some sense of this.  Whilst 
movement only happens in the now moment (what I have imagined as an enacting (the 
black centre stretching to infinity – a sequence of nows) it is supported, or brought into 
existence, by the past and future.  The human being will always be as the squiggly lines 
suggest, uncertain, brought into being with feelings, intuition, fluid boundaries and 
emotional perceptions.  For the human subject the past is just as much in a state of 
contingency and becoming as the future – as soon as we focus on it, it is swallowed by 
the nowness of that action: it is replaced by a new past that is partially brought about by 
the feelings compiled in the void.  Memory here is crucial element that sustains our 
ability to act competently in the present; it mixes with place and what ‘might be’ it to 








Practice of capoeira has given me a way of examining concepts like memory, time and 
place, letting me play them out in space.  Sometimes, for example, we would practice 
techniques very slowly and the sense of the movements seemed to be heightened.  This 
can have the effect of focusing kinaesthetic feelings intensely in certain movements.  The 
awareness of the contact with my training partner would increase, feeling every little 
movement.  On these occasions I attempt to feel a certain way – to bring the past closer, 
bringing feelings of previous demonstrations into existence, and shrinking the thoughts 
and feelings of what the future holds.  Focusing in on individual parts and moving 
exceptionally slowly, time seems to become so subjective it feels like, at any point, it 
may seize up altogether.  When I reflected on this one evening after a session, it occurred 
to me that the ‘idea’ of predicting the future just seemed to wink out of perception during 
training – the feeling of it gone when giving over completely to the movement.  Focus 
was intensified upon every stage of the movements unfolding with my training partner.   
 
Similarly we sometimes practice capoeira very fast.  Time and space change once more 
to accommodate this.  In reference to the martial art of Aikido, Saotome notes a similar 
phenomenon.     
 
One point in every movement, one point in every strike, is stillness. Your eye will 
learn to capture it as a camera shutter captures it… An attack that seemed very fast to 
you as a beginner becomes slower with practice and experience. Your eyes change, 
and you see differently.  If you continue to train, there will eventually come a time 
when every attack, no matter how fast, will appear to you as a slow-motion film. 
(Saotome 1993: 191)   
 
Here I have been trying to argue that the past only means anything in the present – in the 
moments of contact through which it is re-negotiated.  In this way it becomes obvious 
how capoeira books, videos, and internet representations can be enacted as more than 
representations.  If we conceive of representations in ‘present time’ - and not as simply 
visual things, but entities that play a part in opening up the void, a part in making the now 
of each encounter – they are embodied ‘doings’.  In the practice of capoeira it is clear 
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that we do not operate with representational based strategies, but instead a skilful 
embodied coping that draws upon appropriate feelings for the past (Dreyfus 2005).  
 
Creative fluidity, in capoeira, is the ability to draw upon those feelings of the past, and 
mix them together in new ways that are anticipations of the movement of one’s partner 
and the rhythm of the music.  Enough to say this is very difficult to achieve, and to 
perform beautifully with someone else in the actual game, requires more than rehearsal of 
pre-planned sequences.     
 
 
Figure 40: Partners practice together. As shown, when the hall space at a premium half the 
practitioners practice instruments and songs, while half try the movements. 
 
 
Learning to judge the space and time, control one’s own body, and always be on guard 
for trickery, requires significant patience.  Nastor Capoeira (2006), a capoeira mestre and 
author, devised his own partner exercises that were open ended “movement improvisation 
exercises” (ibid: 283-299).  While it may seem like an oxymoron to have improvisational 
exercises, these are unusual movements that cannot be easily named or classified – being 
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neither attack or defence but rather movements with
110
.  Indeed, there seems good reason 
for this, as clever and experienced players pay close attention to the movements practiced 
in conventional ‘partner practicing’ sessions, and later use the movements to their 
advantage in the roda.  For example, a regular practicing routine involves a continual 
exchange of queixada kicks and dodges.  In the game it is very easy for an experienced 
player to pre-empt (or even cause) their partners queixada kick; with the right prompting 
the less experienced partner will naturally move into the same sequence they have just 
been practicing.  And of course, rather than continue with the familiar sequence the more 
experienced player can hope to take advantage of the expected movement, by replying 
with a sweep or some other unscripted counter.   
 
Thus, as a capoeirista gains basic experience, much of their training really becomes a 
process of learning abstract principals, rather than an inflexible sequence of movements.  
Keeping vigilant observation of your partner (see figure 41), attacking their open side, 
only doing floreios
111
 when they can be incorporated into the flow of the game, or 
moving so that you are too far inside or outside the range of most of their attacks are all 
examples.  More than these technical aspects, though, what these sequences give is an 
education in the meanings of movements.  How a person is likely to react to certain 
moves: variants of sweeps and throws are experienced firsthand.  Through these more 
controlled interactions one learns what it is like to throw, and to be thrown, and how 
much force is too much…  
 
Through thoughtful reflections upon these abstract concepts and repetitive practice of 
them, calculated movements can be turned into routine habits.  Each, in practice, is 
played with, not simply assumed.  Looking at your partner, a ‘rule’ continually stressed 
by instructors, is often ignored by those same capoeiristas when they play in the roda.  
Still, if a capoeirista can form enough of these habits, they can begin to string them 
together, play with them, re-invent them and make them their own, and in the process 
become what most would consider a good capoeira player.     
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 These involve things like rolling over the back of a player, leaping behind them, spinning down and 
round to the side, and so on.  
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 Floreios: acrobatic flourishes.  It is often said the danger of floreios is that they can lead to a disjointed 





   
 
Figure 41: Keeping an eye on partner.  An exercise in which pairs move down the length of the hall 
maintaining eye contact.  Movement involves going from face up position (as shown) to all fours, 






The Roda!   
 
 
His first kick soars overhead and I esquiva down out of the way – it carries an accent 
I can not ignore.  The type of kick (a queixada
112
) says “hello” but the ‘accent’ tells 
me more, it says, “I am excited and do not want to go slow for you, you better be 
ready.”  Keeping eye contact with my partner, I kick in return, attempting to make my 
movements speak with a similar sentiment.  He easily moves away, stylishly 
collapsing his aú (cartwheel) at its apex, coming down in a dynamic movement that 
uses one forearm as prop between his body and the floor on which he pivots around 
swinging his foot back towards my ankles.  I take this as an invitation to shift my 
weight off my feet and still facing him I skip over his oncoming leg into a bananeira 
(handstand).  I feel a brief moment of relative stillness that reminds me of floating.  
From this position I can see he is closing the distance between us, wearing a happy 
but mischievous smile. I bring one leg down from its inverted position in a kick 
which he was clearly expecting - he somehow manages to evade it and end up at the 
edge of my field of vision balancing in a handstand of his own. (Capoeira diary 
18/8/07).               
 
 
The embodied expertise developed during bike trials, parkour and capoeira, are in a 
sense unexceptional.  In a perceptive appraisal of the process in which players of first 
person shooter (FPS) computer games develop competency, for example, Reeves, et al. 
(2009) show how the body learns to recognise and react to threats, dextrously managing 
mouse and keyboard controls with both hands, without the need to consider any 
individual body parts.  Indeed, I am struck by the similarity with which the body’s 
expertise is linked into the development of what they call a ‘terrain’, a term used by 
David Sudnow in his account of learning another computer game.  
 
Expertise is choreographing conduct such that individual parts are not the focus but 
rather the symphony of combined complex activity in a terrain of developing, 
emergent tactics. (Reeves, et al. 2009: 223).             
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 Queixada - An outwards crescent kick. 
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This ‘terrain’, as they note, is about the ability of an expert body to make continual 
judgments about where to go, what to do next, and so on, based on the felt appraisal of 
the current situation.  As in capoeira, to be considered good is primarily about one’s 
ability to know the ‘terrain’, to understand what movements are likely to be followed up 
with other movements, to realise the options a capoeirista has for moving from their 
current position, and within the current state of play.  Capoeira though, is not simply 
about expertise, but about character, and about fooling about with anticipation and social 
convention.  In this rest of this section I consider the way the jogo (game), which is 
founded on expertise, but derived through play, connects participants and can make large 
impacts on their relationships and attitudes.  Here contact can make lasting impacts, 
fostering a kind of trust between capoeiristas. 
 
 
Figure 42: Capoeira Roda.  Participants sing, clap, and play instruments in a circle, creating axé 
(good energy) for the two players. Buarth Hall, Aberystwyth. 
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From Trickery to Trust 
 
 
Como vai você, como vai você  
Dona Maria, como vai você  
Joga bonito que eu quero ver  
Dona Maria, como vai você  
Joga com calma que eu quero aprender  
Dona Maria, como vai você  
Esse jogo é Capoeira, não é karate 
Dona Maria, como vai você 
How do you do, how do you do?  
Holy Maria how do you do?  
Play beautiful, because I like to watch  
Holy Maria how do you do?  
Play carefully, because I like to learn  
Holy Maria how do you do?  
This game is Capoeira, not karate  
Holy Maria how do you do? 
        (Common capoeira song) 
 
 
Movements are scripted and improvised to different degrees in relation to the moving 
place in which capoeiristas practice. The most important contact a player has is with the 
person they are playing with: a kick, directed at a player that does not evade it, has a high 
chance of being ‘pulled’ and stopping short, but there is an ever-present possibility of 
getting hit, that demands a player move in relation to their partner.  Through doing 
training sequences together we have seen how trust can be cultivated between two 
people, helping each other become proficient.  In the roda though the expectations and 
customs for action all change.      
 
Imagine being amid roughly twenty five other people, male and female, who are standing 
side by side forming a circular ring
113
. To your left, six or seven people in the circle are 
playing an array of different musical instruments, one a large drum, which reverberates 
into your muscles.  Everybody is clapping and singing, focused upon you and your 
partner, willing you to play ‘well’.  While being quite nerve racking to begin with, the 
atmosphere is pounding, along with the beating of your inevitably stressed heart and 
lungs.  This is capoeira – the ‘roda’ (pronounced hoda) defines this circle of bodies, an 
atmosphere or energy, and the play and process itself.    
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 A circle is reputedly formed for historic reasons: the bodies prevent ‘outsiders’ or ‘slave-masters’ seeing 
the martial techniques used by the two players.  Thus, they might think the players are innocently dancing.     
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The spatiality to this event is under continual negotiation as, people ‘buy the game’ and 
players, move around, playing with the space they have, sometimes vying for more, other 
times relinquishing it to their partner.  As an activity it is a ‘spatially nuanced, mobile and 
non-linguistic conversation’, although I am somewhat ashamed to put it into such dry 
terms.  Rather, I want to say: it is powerful, it is exciting, it exceeds, frightens, and 
exhilarates, it makes me revel in the moment of movement.  When I play, and I feel I 
play well, then I am creating something, participating in the energy of the roda.  I 
become uplifted and de-centred.  I am completely vulnerable, yet untouchable, because I 
am more than myself
114
….     
 
As the reader might have noticed, I simply do not know how to go about ‘analysing’ this 
phenomena – which is beyond my powers of investigative reason (my linguistic ones, at 
least).  I will have to settle for making some general observations.  Vulnerability is 
crucial to the process of capoeira play, one can move around the space of the roda in a 
closed and fully defensive manner, and the movement starts to look like something quite 
different to capoeira. It would not work, it would be sparring, ‘karate style’ (something 
several popular songs warn against, see above). 
 
When I hear a sound that resonates through my body, with the power of a hundred kicks 
or esquivas practiced repeatedly and now called forth, that same music can not be 
separated from the urge to move and the jumping tension I feel in my body.  Perhaps it 
goes further than that, and perhaps the music is removing that very “I”, the me that it 
effects, is actually incorporated into the music.  When this is accompanied by a group of 
people arranged in a circle, all directing their clapping, singing and instrument playing 
towards the unfolding of events, it is perhaps a ‘ring of liberation’ (Lewis 1992) - where 
one can perhaps forget ‘themselves’, as well as their worldly troubles.   
 
The roda provides a direct and lived experience that carries with it an emotional intensity 
that permeates everyday life.  I continually found that in time spent outside capoeira 
sessions I would be reflecting on certain sequences of movements: the way they flow 
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 And as I sit typing this, remembering what it is like, I can barley suppress a rising urge to get up and 
move.    
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together or the way I had interacted with another person.  This reflection was not an ‘all 
cognitive’ affair.  Rather, at times I would feel my muscles tingling as I imagined the 
movement and the feelings of the movements, and imagined other alternatives that I, or 
another player, could have done.  Similarly, the contact people make in the roda endures, 
and feeds into the way people understand and participate in places.  The embodied 
politics of playing in the roda is a seemingly inexhaustible topic of conversation amongst 
capoeiristas.   
 
In the roda performative conventions, learned in earlier parts of a typical training session, 
are used to ensure that we convey the meanings we wish to (cf. Goffman 1958).  Though 
this process is very often fraught with miscommunication, dangers, and possibly 
productive confusion.  In the roda we must learn to ‘read’ the movements of another’s 
body, as well as the rhythms which guide.  By learning to listen closely, and by refining 
qualities of contact players develop ‘malicia’ – for which there is no direct or easy 
translation to English.  Roughly it is the positively viewed ‘cunning’ of a player, their 
ability to know the intensions of their ‘opponent’.  I use ‘opponent’ hesitantly because the 




Figure 43: Helping up after tripping up.  Throws in the roda, taken in the ‘spirit’ of capoeira, are 
tests of ‘malicia’, a means to learn how to avoid trickery ‘outside’.        
 
 
In this playful and somewhat unpredictable context, people learn a lot about each other, 
but not necessarily, things that one can put to words, though capoeiristas often try.  A 
feeling, for example, that someone will try to throw you or that they are trying to lull you 
with a slow relaxed game, can be difficult to justify, but is, one hopes, based on a sound 
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embodied logic built up through hours of training and experience of contact with others.  
What some might call ‘intuition’ is involved in making judgments about the play and 
sending one’s own body into various shapes and directions.          
 
When play ends, and when the roda finished, there are fairly significant changes in 
embodiment, and relationallity between players.  Players of capoeira make embodied, but 
still considered and talked over, judgments about the way specific games with specific 
people went.  In the groups with which I researched, participants became friends quickly.  
Assuming one does not play a highly guarded, defensive game, giving one’s self over to 
play with another is a symbolic gesture of trust.  Certain positions in capoeira, 
particularly those that involve inverted positions, render the body vulnerable to attack in a 
traditional martial arts sense.  In a sense this is a giving up of self, letting one’s self be 
played with, while one plays – being touched in the act of touching.  Particularly for the 
beginner who is arguably at the mercy of more experienced players, there is a leap of 
faith to be made, in playing in the roda.   
 
Here a wily trust is developed, one that is on the look out for deception, but knows that 
any such deception will be made in the spirit of capoeira, and while it might be 
undesirable, it is not likely to be overly violent, and is even less likely to be malicious.  
Trust is given because the past is spatialised into the cells, synapses and muscles of the 
body, which now identify certain bodies as trustworthy.  Intimate and potentially 
hazardous experiences, in which violence is turned to play, inhabit the bodies of capoeira 
players, lending them a confidence in giving out trust to their capoeira companions.  
Each relies on their fellow capoeiristas to produce with them the axé that sustains their 
play.  Trust in this case is not necessarily something that fosters cooperative action (cf. 
Gambetta 1988), although it might well do that, but is a kind of trust which helps players 
to make fresh contact.     
 
Capoeira is an example of a practice that can embody the kind of play advocated in 
chapter 2.  While far from perfect, when play is neither self-consciously restricted nor 
competitively undertaken, it can be a practice in which the body moves as de-centred and 
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open.  The trust this can elicit is quite profound and it readily shapes friendship groups 
and social circles.  All of this does not come naturally: a capoeirista trains regularly, 
adding a questing discipline to their play which enables them to make contact in different 
ways.  In training with other people the reciprocal nature of contact becomes clear, and as 
so many mestres claim, can be embodied as a virtue.  Play, as I argued in previous 
chapters, can and does embody an emergent ethics of its own.  One which will not sit still 
but will always listen.  In the case of capoeira, this play when at its best (when in an 
‘open’ kind of contact), forges a trust between participants that can further fuel their 
playful energy.                                               
 
This is a trust that is not based on being able to predict another’s actions accurately, but 
on the shared enjoyment of the fact that play with another is a mystery.  And that placing 
a faith in play as an unfolding practice that is with another, is very likely to lead to new 
qualities of contact that are quite unspeakable, but possess an energy that keep us wanting 
to talk about them. 
 
 
“Quem vem lá sou eu, quem vem lá sou eu, berimbau bateu, capoeira sou eu.” 
“Who is there?  It’s me, who is there?  It’s me.  The berimbau plays, I am capoeira.” 
(Common capoeira song) 
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Making playful habits 
 
Stoic philosophers like Zeno and Cleanthes, considering emotion and affective 
experience at the beginning of the third century B.C.E., realised that any thought or 
changes in the mind must also be physical material changes.  And that any such changes 
must, as such, be linked to changes in the world outside of the mind (Graver 2007)
 115
.  
As I have argued throughout, our contact with the world necessitates this bond.  Like the 
stoics, though, I have argued that the nature of affective response is not a ‘natural one’ 
and neither is it homogenous.  The Stoics were committed to producing a comprehensive 
examination of the various kinds of emotive responses we had with the world, and 
believed, as I do, that it is possible to cultivate changes to the nature of this contact. 
 
This is a claim I have made throughout this thesis, and one which comes not primarily 
from philosophy but empirical engagement with parkour, bike trials and capoeira.  
Learning each activity asks of its participants that they consistently engage in the world 
differently.  All three are concerned with a continual development, in which an emotive 
and imaginative engagement with the world never stops.  In practicing, I was offered a 
way to consider the functioning of emotions: the close internal, yet often mystifying, 
logic with which emotions play across body and place.  It seems clear that, as the stoics 
believed, emotions constitute an important and shifting perspective on the world.  
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 Because, they reasoned, material changes in the world were always a consequence of things acting upon 
each other.  Objects did not move on their own.  
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For emotions have content: in their character as assents, they make certain claims 
about the world, although those claims are rarely if ever articulated in our minds in 
the actual moment of response. (Graver 2007: 37) 
 
Unlike the stoics however, I put more emphasis on working out and re-working out what 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ emotions might be.  In other words, the processes and encounters in 
which emotions are tried becomes crucial.  Stoic thought held that both the stuff of the 
body and mind, and the stuff of that which we perceive, is emergent together (Graver 
2007) – but the nature of that togetherness is never static or fixed.  Affect, as ‘intensive 
relationality’, or a ‘sense of push’ in the world (Latham and McCormack 2004, Thrift 
2004b), involves the fallible body – one which is always in contact, but is still not 
necessarily the decidedly ‘open’ body I considered in chapter 2.  Being open to place’s 
possibilities, I have tried to show, involves a willingness to participate in different kinds 
of contact, which can be cultivated through various playful utopic practices.  
 
Writing at the end of the nineteenth century William James noted how connected our 
perceptions were to our past experiences and our habits of attention.  Similarly in her 
influential essay ‘Throwing like a Girl’, Iris Marion Young (1990), drawing on 
phenomenology, makes a feminist critique in which the body-subject has ‘inhibited 
intentionality’ and ‘discontinuous unity’ because of its constant tension with a ‘body-
object’.  She suggests the body constructed as feminine is constricted, because it is not 
totally present; it is existent in relation to fewer possibilities because it is existent 
primarily in relation to itself and habits of the self (ibid.).  In other words, learning to 
throw a ball, one must first let go of habitual bodily comportment.  Habit then, seems not 
only to affect our senses, but also our thinking and out movements in the world.     
 
Standing the way one normally stands it is impossible to throw well.  For Young, it is as 
if the body-subject has learnt to treat itself as an object – it is ‘closed’.  This is precisely 
the accusation that non-representational theory makes against the social sciences – that it 
has forgotten its subjecthood through a ‘closed’ emphasis on representation and re-
representation, without acknowledging its creative potential.  The charge is that by 
sketching out static and immobile framings (constructed histories) we are adding 
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finishing touches that tend to fix and constrain life. Instead, we should heartily accept our 
part in its painting. By conceiving of our bodies and those that we research with, as 
enacted, and by recognising that such an enactment will not always conform to history’s 
expectation of the future, we might begin to unfix ourselves and others from the 
reduction to either a body-object or a body-subject.  Rather than simply being ‘objects’ 
of analysis it is possible that practices that playfully try place can animate the materiality 
of the world, in a way that a more objective closed body cannot.  
 
Our body is the only means we have for empathising and connecting, for entering into 
relations with whatsoever we encounter. This denies us the possibility of making external 
objective explanation of the world, but demands we participate and speak and act the 
world from our experiences within it.  As David Abram would have it perception is an 
event of reciprocity, a connection between, rather than a traditional view of.  Such a 
notion of the body moves us beyond dismissive fearful denials of involvement, of moral 
distance and neutrality.  We are engaged at every level, every scale of analysis should put 
us in contact with our world and its ceaseless activity.  Such contact, at its best, involves 
much more than simply the experience of the actual, but is interwoven with imagination 
as well as other times and places.  When a bike is hopped onto a bollard, it depends upon 
a kind of contact that is infused with a thousand other trying, and the ability to imagine 
the bollard as an object that can be ‘ridden’.   
 
I have presented three practices which promote this kind of togetherness and contact.  
Indeed through a playful participatory consciousness, it seems possible that we might 
have a way to actually do, in a very visceral and evocative sense, what non-
representational theorists have tended to philosophically espouse with weighty linguistic 
manipulation.  That is, we might multiply up possibilities, and create new kinds of 
contact.  We might, as Thrift puts it, ‘summon life’ (Thrift 2004a: 162), and in doing so 
conjure up many more experiences that are brimming with the non-actual (imagination).       
 
The stakes are high, for we, as human beings, seem to become attached to our 
behaviours.  Habit becomes who we are, an inescapably tight clothing that can both help 
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and hinder our going on.  It can become, just like a habitual smoker’s desire to smoke, 
ingrained deeply in our body chemistry and make up.  And yet, the smoker can choose to 
be an ex-smoker at any time, instantly and without delay.  Considering habits highlight 
this ambiguity – we are free agents in that we can in each instant choose to do otherwise 
(Giddens 1984), and yet the world often seems to move around us, leaving us little 
control, even of our most intimate and basic features, like choosing when to eat, what 
clothes to wear, whether we need a smoke or not.  In part this is because we are 
connected, as I have argued, inseparably to the rest of the world.  We make contact 
continually, but not of homogenous quality.  The materials and technologies we imagine 
and physically manipulate blur into our sensual experiences with our environments.       
     
Increasingly human originary spatiality has become not just accompanied but 
suffused by a metrical space made up out of an army of things which provide new 
perceptual capacities.  In a sense, all are joined together in the domain of bare life in a 
reworking of the verification of anticipations made possible by an informed 
materiality. (Thrift 2005: 472). 
 
Bikes, trainers, or berimbaus, can add to our imaginative capacities greatly, as can our 
development of embodied stories.  Stories shared across internet sites, fictional, linguistic 
and multimedia, as I demonstrated in chapter 4 on parkour, infuse our bodies, such that 
they are always with us when we create places to play (both virtual and actual).  Such 
stories are enacted in a non-representational way because we have, to a greater or lesser 
degree, the capacity to imagine ourselves as the hero of a fictional adventure, about to 
leap across a dangerous gap, or woo our enemies with beautifully flowing acrobatic 
movements
116
.  While these imagined stories suffuse our practice, they are open to 
radically different interpretations and experiential significance.  “Language can never 
exhaust the meaning potential in the experience of movement.” (Lewis 1995: 221).  
 
Play, then, has power.  When it comes to our perceptual, place-making embodiment, play 
can, as I hope I have shown, be a radical method of enchantment.  One which has tended 
to be undervalued and considered innocently frivolous, disassociated from the real 
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 In capoeira, for example, several popular songs sing stories in which floreios [acrobatics] are used to 
impress and win freedom or esteem without overt violence.        
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business of everyday life (Donaldson 1993).  Play, like imagination, is important, because 
it permeates our contact with the world, even when we are feeling particularly un-playful. 
 
Imagination had been customarily portrayed as the entertaining of the “nonreal” in 
opposition to the real world around us. Even the earliest writings of Merleau-Ponty 
labelled the imaginary as having “no depth” and offering “no hold upon it” versus the 
perceptual whose “significance encircles and permeates matter” (PP: 323–24
117
).  
(Mazis 2008: 146). 
 
But as Mazis goes on to note, in Merleau-Ponty’s later thought (1968) he develops the 
concept of the ‘flesh of the world’, in which he takes more account of the way our bodies 
are practically submerged in the material and immaterial.  We are, as Merleau-Ponty 
claimed, touched in the act of touching, and who can say what that touch will mean 
before it is experienced?  In other words, there is no ‘pure’ perception, no embodiment or 
experience free of cultural ‘contaminants’; stories, imaginings, technological aptitude, or 
embodied knowledge of movement.  All are part of perception (cf. Downey 2007, Ness 
2004).  Imagination is inseparably with all our experience; like linguistic reason and 
stories, it is intertwined with our learned methods of sense making.  This is why, I find I 
am able, or rather fated, to navigate urban environments through flashes of bike trials 
movements and parkour cat-leaps, regardless of whether I am on a bike, out to do 
parkour, or simply taking a stroll.  Similarly the sounds of certain musical rhythms, now 
become felt as a rush of excitement and as imaginary games of capoeira played out in 
(front of) me.  All these non-actual experiences are real.  They make places happen.                      
 
In perceptions, in memories, and in emotions, there are other significances that can 
only come into the light of day through the play of imagination, breaking up the usual 
ways of meaning-making. Some meanings might be more submerged in the 
background of experience, given the usual emphasis on accomplishing practical tasks, 
but that does not mean that they are not vital to the overall significance of our 
surround. (Mazis 2008: 146). 
 
                                                 
117
 Merleau-Ponty (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. 
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Through playful activity, which is less concerned with winning than with inviting and 
inventing, place becomes involved in our imaginings, and can begin to chop through, or 
at least, work with, those perceptual habits that have become disinterested in possibility.  
The possibility of living out utopic worlds, in which we are inescapably involved in the 
epics, the adventures and the excitement, is emboldened through a dedication to play - 
making it anything but apolitical.  Writers like Donaldson might be slightly extreme in 
their approach, and dedication to a particular, anti competitive kind of play, but perhaps it 
takes such writers to remind us that play, organised, institutionalised and lacking utopic 
content, can construct and maintain habitual modes of embodiment just as effectively as 
its so called opposite: ‘work’.    Parkour, bike trials and capoeira exercise the body in a 
conventional aerobic and anaerobic sense, but more importantly these activities exercise 
the body’s ability to imagine, participate in, and enchant new worlds.           
 
the number of worlds is uncountable, that is, we change from one to another every 
moment of our lives (Wolff 2004: 349).  
 
If Thrift (2005) is right, and our proliferation of technology, particularly technologies of 
communication and mobility, means that the creation of new worlds is beginning to gain 
exponential momentum, then where does this leave our ability to make contact?  How 
can we make quality contact with so fast a shifting multiplicity?  Surely things are 
changing too rapidly, and networks are too complex for us to grasp any portion of them 
in a meaningful way?  Heidegger (1971) is renowned for a similar anxiety.  For him, we 
have begun to live as ‘rootless’, unconnected and free-floating entities, who now cannot 
draw nourishment from our dwelling in place. 
 
All distances in time and space are shrinking. … Yet the frantic abolition of all 
distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance.  
What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its 
sound on radio, can remain far from us.  What is incalculably far from us in point of 
distance can be near to us. … Everything gets lumped together into uniform 
distancelessness. ... What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies?  It shows itself and 
hides itself in the way in which everything presences, namely, in the fact that despite 
all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent. (Heidegger 1971 cited 
by Harvey 1996: 300).                 
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For Heidegger, ‘authenticity’, a highly problematic term, was found in relatively 
predictable ‘dwelling' in a farmhouse in the Black Forest.  This makes an authentic life in 
which place becomes something solid that we can depend upon and can ‘nourish’ 
(emotionally and spiritually) – a place we have constructed through repetition of our 
relations with it (Relph 1977).  As writers on mobility remind us, this was a metaphysics 
based on fixity and rootedness (Cresswell 2006), in which imagination, it seems, would 
have limited use in the day to day ‘nourishment’ one receives from being-in-place.  One 
might think ‘world making’ players of capoeira, bike trials and parkour, participate in 
places with an entirely different outlook.  And yet so much of their imaginative play 
depends upon an intimate getting-to-know of place.  As I hope this study has shown, 
imagination is not just the authority to entertain nonactual materiality, but is strongly tied 
to all other embodied powers of apprehension.  Thus, it is when we have a reasonable 
grasp of the way we can, and have, moved with certain materials, that we can begin to 
employ that knowledge together with imagination.  In this way imagining and enacting 
different places is enhanced by embodied knowledge of what places are already like.    
 
Still, it is the case that these utopic practices find ‘authenticity’, not in a place of 
certainty, but in places of fear, of design, and places of trust based on an undercurrent of 
unpredictability, rather than inherited and inert knowledge.  Here place is ambiguous, not 
simply two-faced but genuinely alive, buzzing with possible futures.  And while “place 
has to be one of the most multi-layered and multipurpose keywords in our language.” 
(Harvey 1996: 208), for the player, this is no bad thing.  As Harvey goes on to argue (all 
be it in different terms), we might regard place’s ambiguous multiplicity as advantageous, 
if we consider how people come to embody knowledge of ‘place’ as it is co-constituted.  
In other words, place skates between different kinds of materiality, being part idea, part 
physical, and all the time being re-enacted and emergent. 
 
By playing in this emergence, practitioners of these activities are paradoxically creating 
rock steady places, in which they know specific distances and textures, all be it from a 
particular perspective (that of traceur, capoeirista, or trials rider).  These places, though, 
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are only ever launch pads, stable footings for the next leap that tries out new kinds of 
contact.  The player, by participating in utopic practice, can make a habit out of breaking 





Something sees through me as I see.  I see with a seeing that is not mine alone.  I see, 
and as I see, the I that I am is put at risk, discovers its derivation from what is 
permanently enigmatic to itself.  (Butler 2005: 202) 
 
There is no need for a singular definition of ‘contact’.  Indeed in retaining its multiplicity, 
‘contact’ is unfixed, free to develop as it will.  The humanist in me might be tempted to 
conclude that making new kinds of contact, in practices like capoeira, bike trails and 
parkour, is a means of empowerment – a way to wrest back some agency to pursue our 
own personal projects.  Though, as I hope I have made clear, there is little ‘personal’ 
about making contact.  Indeed, the strength of ‘contact’, it seems to me, is that it cannot 
be ‘personal’ and it does not allow a singular self-contained subject, that can have 
agency, in the way we supposedly own material goods.              
 
In developing ‘structuration theory’ Giddens (1984) critiques Hägerstrand’s time-
geography, and makes two points that are relevant here.  Firstly, that Hägerstrand’s 
analysis depends upon ‘agents’ that are “purposive beings in the sense that their activities 
are guided by ‘projects’ which they pursue.” (1984: 117) But as Giddens argues, the 
nature of the ‘project’ remains an unexplained assumption and an implicit advocacy of 
human agency (thus replicating a structure/agency binary that Giddens wants to 
transcend).  A similar critique could be levelled at much humanist (broadly construed) 
writings that posit an unambiguous and coherent ‘project’ that human agents ‘work’ 
towards (eg. Pred 1984, Seamon 1979).  That we are constituted with technologies, 
objects and environments, denies the perfect unity of any such ‘project’.  Even attempts 
to solidify relationships or ‘goals’ by writing them down cannot achieve separation 
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(though it certainly can play a large and influential part in peoples lives and the nature of 
contact).  ‘The project’, in other words, is never coherent or complete.  This is borne out 
in the practices examined here, all of which involve a commitment to play with place and 
in so doing embellish and develop new ‘projects’.          
 
In forming a second critique, Giddens condemns Hägerstrand’s work as being ‘culture-
bound’ because of the way he treats the body, focusing particularly on embodiment and 
materiality as constraint
118
.  For Giddens, “all types of constraint... are also types of 
opportunity, media for the enablement of action.” (1984: 117).  Whether a body is 
primarily constraint or enablement, seems something that will be determined in particular 
unfolding processes of contact.  Like emotion, such a judgment will be an engagement 
with the world.  Attempting to play beyond constraint, as in the cases considered here, is 
a question of trying places out, and mixing recognised constraints with imaginative 
perceptions.                    
 
With fear, technology and other people as playmates (as in chap. 4, 5 & 6 respectively), 
there are not five senses but an infinite number, for they are, always emerging in contact 
with places.  They are mixed together, and in process with our emotive engagements to 
such a degree, that touch, for example, is not necessarily the feeling of a texture by the 
fingertips, but can instead be an affective response that involves the whole body.  As the 
body finds new ways to make contact, new ways of sensing emerge.  Particularly in both 
parkour and bike trails, our sense of shapes, textures and even time is redefined as objects 
participate in the practice.  Similarly touch is transformed and merged with hearing, and 
senses of rhythm in capoeira.  Thus, while there is a good case for a re-assertion of touch 
into our thinking about geography (Crang 2003, Crouch and Desforges 2003, 
Hetherington 2003b, Obrador-Pons 2007), it is useful to consider the specifics of the 
development of kinds of touch, and how they are hopelessly integrated with other senses.   
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 While we can say there is no escaping the situation in which we produce research, Giddens’ general 
point still stands: that Hägerstrand’s is one particular perspective of material embodiment, and there are 
other equally valid ones.   
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Indeed, while touch might well affirm a proximal and performative mode of knowledge 
that breaks with the distance between subject and object (Obrador-Pons 2007) it is still 
the case that touch can and does happen at a physical distance.  We see a ledge that we 
want to try to reach and it is felt as a nervousness in the arms that may or may not be 
capable of grasping it. There is then, no ‘raw sense data’ that is not subject to our 
embodied biases and emotive judgments.  Perception of some event as James (1879) 
asserted, is not disassociated from our whole body’s contact with it.      
 
What does all this mean for non-representational theories in geography?  Primarily, I 
think that a notion like ‘contact’ can usefully be deployed as a device that bids us pay 
more heed to the doing of events.  Admittedly contact is a concept which we inevitably 
understand from a human perspective, but one that, through our perceptions and their 
mixed-in imagination, we are able to deploy as we empathise with the most unlikely stuff 
of the world.  We are granted transformative powers, to make ourselves a part of that 
bicycle crank, experiencing those stresses or strains, or we can imagine what it is like to 
be a ‘superhuman’ able to leap across huge voids.  However inaccurately, with the help 
of the places we emerge with, we can play at making new kinds of contact.      
 
Such ways of knowing and being work to make the experience of place less a spectatorial 
object
119
, but instead are modes or attitudes of embodiment that are always participants 
with place.  There is a connection between how we perform habitual cultural practices 
like walking, reading, writing, talking, driving, standing and eating, and our ability to 
question and wonder at (and with) these practices.  Contact, as a flexible engagement in 
place, is a concept that can be used to bring these things to attention and thus to unfix 
them.  Capoeira, bike trials and parkour, it might be argued, are anything but ordinary 
everyday practices, but then this is precisely the contribution of contact: to bring to 
awareness the knowledge that there is no ‘normal’, ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ way to be 
with things.  Contact is variable, changing radically with utopic practices like bike trials, 
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 Something non-representational theory has continually promoted without giving many empirical 
examples to fuel our imaginings.   
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The practices considered here do not conclude.  They are ongoing utopic practices that 
neither settle comfortably not terminate dramatically.  Neither do they tie up neatly, 
producing a crisp and cohesive argument.  Because they are involved in playing towards 
new kinds of contact they are full of energetic paradox.  With this research I have not 
addressed them as entities that can be completed or fully understood.  What I have tried 
to do is explore and affirm certain elements of them, as phenomena that expand the 
possibilities of being in place.   
 
A possible critique of all this often made in seminar rooms, particularly of non-
representational work (broadly conceived), is that it becomes difficult to intervene in a 
traditional ‘social science’ sense.  “Where is the point of entry? How do we critique 
this?” I can hear Tim Cresswell say. This is a worthwhile consideration, as academics we 
like to be involved in the negotiation of knowledge.  Telling an open ended story makes it 
difficult for us to find fault-lines in which to construct a critique.  How do we evaluate 
the ‘theory’ if there is no identifiable hypothesis or answer?  Appraisals of this kind 
essentially approach non-representational theory from a specific tradition, in which an 
individual lays down an argument, and defends it.  This seems quite different to offering 
a story, adding or drawing out what insights one can, and laying it out there in the hope 
that it will not provide answers or settle arguments but make questions.     
 
There are a few questions that I hope have been raised by this thesis:  What can play be?  
Did I play?  Do I play?  Should I play?  What is the nature of contact?  How does contact 
feel?  How could it feel?  
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None are likely to have straightforward answers, and certainly each will be context 
dependent.  What if we treat academic work as having no special position, but instead 
like a line from a poem, a religious text, an artwork, or a concert performance?  All have 
the potential to evoke, to intervene in, and help to invent the world.  Similarly we, as 
academics, are ‘makers’, and rather than revealing the world we are participating in it.  
Such participation is always flawed, and therein lays the importance of our talk, critiques 
and argumentation.  At the same time though, it is through this fallibleism and 
vulnerability that we are granted the ability to participate with the world in the first place.  
The practices of capoeira, bike trials and parkour, are no different: mastery never comes, 
but is nonetheless sought after for the qualities of contact it can bring.
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Glossary of Terms  
 
Parkour 
              
cat-leap A jump to a wall or other obstacle, in which the traceur lands 
on the vertical surface – absorbing horizontal momentum with 
their legs and usually grasping the top edge of the wall with the 
hands.    
kong-vault  A vault in which the arms push of the obstacle to be traversed, 
and the legs tuck up and between the arms.  
precision  A jump to a narrow object like a railing. 






A type of bunny hop, where the rider coasts at an obstacle at speed, 
pulls up on the bars and then flicks the back wheel up underneath 
them. Unlike some other techniques this doesn't involve any pedal 
strokes to lift the front. 
bunny-hop 
Any move that involves lifting both wheels off the floor, usually with the 
intension of getting over or onto an obstacle. 
back-hop Where the rider hops the bike on the back wheel. 
blunt, stall or  
back-wheel 
To bunny hop on to an obstacle landing exclusively on the back wheel. 
Sometimes required if to get onto a narrow obstacle (like a wall) where 
there is nowhere to put the front wheel. 
chocolate foot 
 
The foot the rider likes to have forwards most of the time. e.g. when 
coasting along with the pedals level the chocolate foot will be 
forwards. 
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dab Where a rider puts just one foot down to steady themselves. 
dropout   The part of the frame that the back wheel axel bolts into.  
endo    A common trials movement in which the back wheel is lifted off the 
ground and the bike can be pivoted around on the front wheel. 
forward-back-hop See ‘hansing’.  
front-hop  Hopping on just the front wheel. 
gap / gap jump To clear (jump over) a gap on a bike. 
getup  Getting up onto an obstacle using any form of bunny-hop. 
hansing  Named after the famous trials rider Hans Ray, it is a back hop, that 
also involves moving the bike forwards – it is used to jump gaps.  Also 
often called ‘forward-back-hopping’ and ‘pedal-hopping’.    
manual Also referred to as a ‘coaster wheelie’, is like a regular wheelie, but 
the rider is not sat on the saddle and not pedalling – but coasting.    
natural riding 
Riding on uneven rocky surfaces, logs, steep banks etc.  Often this 
refers to a course, set out upon the terrain.    
observed bike trials 
A competition, called observed because there is an observer watching 
counting the number of dabs. 
pedal-hopping  
See 'hansing'. 
pedal kick A short sharp kick on the pedals that moves the cranks about one third 
of a revolution. 
pinch puncture:  Where the inner tube is slit because it is crushed between the rim and 
the tyre. Usually happens after hard landings on sharp edges. 
snake bite Another term for ‘pinch puncture’. 
Stack Rider unintentionally comes off the bike. 
trial / biketrial 
 
An observed bike trials competition. This is where competitors try and 
complete a series of sections, clearing obstacles with as little dabs as 
possible. There will be an observer watching each section to count the 




              
aú Roughly equivalent to a cartwheel, though there are many 
different varieties and most are different from a traditional 
gymnastics cartwheel in that the legs are kept bent.     
axé The energy or atmosphere in which capoeira play can flourish. 
capoeirista A player/practitioner of capoeira. 
bananeira The name for a handstand, derived from the ‘banana tree’.   
esquiva Generic term for a dodge or evasion.   
ginga The ginga is the most fundamental movement in capoeira. It is 
roughly equivalent to the ‘base stance’ from which most other 
movements flow.  Unlike some other martial arts, this ‘base 
stance’, is a moving stance.   
jôgo game  
meia-lua de 
compasso 
‘half moon in a compass’ – a spinning kick. 
meia-lua de frente ‘half moon in front’ – an inwards crescent kick.  
malicia Positive cunning, wily.    
mestre  master level teacher of capoeira – the highest grade for a 
capoeirista.  
queixada An outwards crescent kick. 
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